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Rivalry and Revenge: Making Sense of Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars

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Abstract: Recent research on violence against civilians during wars has emphasized war-related factors over political ones. For example, factors such as control of territory or characteristics of the armed groups have been prioritized at the expense of factors such as ideological alignments or local political competition. In this paper, I argue that the emphasis on war-related factors is conditioned by the scope conditions of previous theories, which have focused on irregular civil wars. I switch the locus of attention to so-called conventional civil wars, and I introduce a theoretical framework that takes into account both political and war-related factors. Hypotheses are tested using data on 1,377 municipalities during the Spanish Civil War. I find that levels of prewar electoral competition explain variation in levels of direct violence from both the left and the right in the areas they controlled at the beginning of the war, but that war-related factors gain explanatory relevance after the onset of conflict, when control changes from one group to the other. In particular, there is a clear endogenous trend whereby subsequent levels of violence are highly correlated with initial levels of violence. I argue that the mechanism behind this is civilian collaboration with armed groups. In short, the paper demonstrates that an understanding of the determinants of violence requires a theory combining political cleavages and wartime dynamics.

1. INTRODUCTION[1]

What explains the variation in levels of violence across time and space during civil wars? Why do armed groups use high levels of violence in some places, but not in neighboring places with similar characteristics? What leads armed groups in conflict to target non-combatants to a greater or lesser degree?

This question has been at the forefront of recent research on civil wars. To date, two types of explanation have emerged: a first generation of thinkers considered prewar characteristics of countries undergoing civil wars; following Clausewitz (1968) and Schmitt (1976), civil conflicts were seen as the result of existing political cleavages, and violence the consequence of these divisions.[1] Following Kalyvas (2006), a second generation of scholars pointed instead to security concerns related to warfare, e.g. the military needs of armed groups, the survival incentives of civilians (Valentino et al., 2006), or the organizational characteristics of armed groups (Weinstein, 2006). These authors, who were in general using more systematic research methods than the previous generation of scholars, were theoretically inspired by Mao Zedong's (1978) insight that war cannot be equated with politics because it has its own particular characteristics. This body of research de-emphasized political variables despite the fact that civil wars are usually fought over political issues, i.e. demand for self-determination, regime change, or leadership change.[2] The tendency was to assume that, even if politics matter at the

outbreak of conflict, the internal dynamics of war are driven by factors that are not necessarily political.[3]

The literature on civil wars, following Fearon and Laitin's influential article (2003), has also tended to equate all civil wars with guerrilla wars. However, this assumption has been questioned: not all civil wars are guerrilla wars. More than half of civil wars fought over the last sixty years have taken the form of conventional or symmetric non-conventional civil wars (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2007). In this paper, I focus on a civil conflict that primarily took the form of a conventional contest, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Conventional civil wars are those that "have clear frontlines, in which attacks take place mostly from barricades and stable positions, and in which there are big major battles that are usually determinants for the war outcomes" (Kalyvas, 2005). One of the main differences between them and irregular or guerrilla wars is that, except for zones that are extremely close to the frontline, the control of the armed groups over the population under their dominion is overwhelming; in irregular civil wars, instead, areas of total control coexist with areas of fragmented control where control must be "shared" with the rival. This implies that while in guerrilla wars violence against civilians is the result of warfare and the competition to gain territory, in conventional civil wars this violence is less connected to military competition –as it takes place in a space separated from the battlefield (e.g. cities, towns, or villages with non-combatants). In sum, in this paper I argue that type of warfare is connected to divergent patterns of civilian victimization, and that we therefore need different theories in order to understand them.

I develop a theoretical framework to explain intentional violence against noncombatants in conventional civil wars and I test a set of hypotheses. I focus on what I call face-to-face or direct violence against civilians, which I distinguish from indirect violence. I test my hypotheses with data from all municipalities in the region of Catalonia (Spain), which I have collected from secondary and primary historical sources. Also I run a set of robustness tests with data from the Francoist controlled area of Aragon, on the one hand, and the provinces of Valencia and Castellon, in the region of Valencia. These robustness tests are important in order to give external validity to my findings in Catalonia; in particular, the Aragon test will be crucial to test that the mechanisms explaining violence by one side of the civil war (i.e. the left) are the same as those explaining violence by the other (i.e. the right). The focus on the Spanish Civil War is motivated by the recent move towards sub-national research designs fueled by the need for fine-grained data of high quality. Also, the Spanish Civil War is, together with the American Civil War, the paradigmatic case of conventional civil war. The particular focus on the region of Catalonia derives, not only from the availability of historical data on this territory, but also from the fact that this region presents rich variation in both the dependent variable(s) and the independent variable(s) that will be taken into consideration.[4]

The organization of the paper is as follows: in the next section I briefly outline the main characteristics of the Spanish Civil War (henceforth, also SCW), which is the motivating puzzle of the paper. In section 3, I present the theoretical framework and the hypotheses. In section 4, I present some spatial and temporal data on violence in Catalonia during the SCW, I test the hypotheses using multivariate regression techniques

with the Catalan data, and I run robustness tests with the Aragon and Valencia datasets. Finally, I conclude the article with a summary of the main findings of the paper and avenues of research.

2. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AS A MOTIVATING PUZZLE

The Spanish Civil War began as a military coup against a legally constituted democratic government. It lasted for almost three years (18th July 1936-1st April 1939) and caused 800,000 deaths and over 440,000 externally displaced refugees.[5] The war took place between two main political blocs: 1) the army of the Republican government or Loyalists, which also included militias of political parties,[6] trade unions,[7] and the International Brigades. I include all of them under the label of "left", even though there were important differences between them, including intense rivalries that eventually led to violent clashes;[8] 2) the army of the rebels (Francoists or Nationalists), which also included factions of the regular army and various militias[9], and which had a higher level of cohesion, in contrast with the Republicans. I include all of these groups under the label of the "right."

Shortly after the coup, the Spanish territory became split between areas of Republican/Leftist/Loyalist control and areas of Francoist/Rightist/Rebel control. The distribution of control areas can be considered exogenous as it depended on idiosyncratic features of military leaders (i.e. more or less capable to undertake the rebellious orders coming from Franco) and contextual factors such as the evolution of events taking place during the days that followed the *putch* of July 18th 1936. The war encompassed pitched battles and aerial attacks, and in only three years the Francoist army managed to conquer all the Republican territory and win the war. I do not deal in this paper with the macro-

history of the war and I instead focus on the violence perpetrated by the different groups in each side's rearguards (specifically, on intentional lethal violence against non-combatants). I distinguish between direct or face-to-face lethal violence and indirect violence; in the SCW the former consisted mostly of individual or mass executions, and the latter consisted mostly of aerial bombings.

i) *Leftist violence*, which has been labeled as the "Red Terror," consisted of both individual and organized mass executions in the Republican zone. Following Martín Rubio (1997), we can identify at least three moments of leftist violence: a) *Suppression of the coup*: the resistance to the coup in a number of localities ended with the execution of some of its participants or supporters. This period ended at the beginning of August 1936 once the situation on the ground was largely clarified and the two zones were clearly delineated. b) *Revolutionary violence*: after the stabilization of the front, assassinations took place in zones under leftist control. c) *Withdrawal phase*: assassinations that took place when the Nationalists came close to take over a Republican area, or as the Republican army was forced to withdraw. Members of the clergy constitute a large proportion (still indeterminate) of these victims. In addition, there was violence within the Republican Army (e.g. against deserters), as well as violence between parties within the left (i.e. during the "events of May", between CNT and POUM and the Communist Party); yet, this violence is very hard to quantify and will not be included in these analyses. The left also perpetrated indirect violence consisting on bombings; these took place mostly in battlefield areas, and some rearguard places.[10]

ii) *Rightist violence* took the form of indirect and direct violence. In places controlled by the right, executions also affected people on an individual or collective

basis; in places not controlled by the right, violence was indirect, i.e. through aerial bombings. Violence lasted several years after the war in the form of executions that had a proto-legal nature: during the 40s, almost all the executions perpetrated by the right were related to the civil war.[11]

If we try to glimpse in the Spanish Civil War more than pure factual or anecdotal data, we may want to check if any of the existing theories of civil war violence can explain violence against civilians: Following the tradition of the first generation of scholars, some historians have characterized violence during this civil war as the result of political factors. Yet, it is not very well established from these works how politics influenced wartime violence as some argue that violence affected localities that were politically polarized (Ledesma, 2003) while others that it affected communities with a higher density of political opponents (Gaitx, 2006). Also, some others argue that violence affected areas with greater economic inequalities (Casanova, 2001). Further, none of these authors have performed rigorous statistical analyses in order to test their hypotheses.

Echoing the opportunistic type of arguments (i.e. those in Weinstein, 2006), some historians have argued that violence on the Republican side was the result of the anarchical nature of the Republican army, and the low level of control that the Republican governmental authorities had over anarchist and communist militias that emerged and established their authority at the local level (Preston, 1986; Vilar, 1986; Ledesma, 2003). Following this approach, violence should have been greater in those places where Republican authorities could not control the militias, and lower where they could impose their rule over them. This might seem a sound explanation, but it is an

incomplete one: for instance, at the beginning of the war, just after Franco's coup, there was a vacuum of power in most of the Republican territory and violence still diverged across localities. On the other hand, this approach cannot explain violence that occurred in the few territories where the Republican government managed to keep a higher degree of territorial control, for example, Valencia.[12] Finally, this approach cannot very well account for violence carried out by the Francoist army, since this army has been described as very well organized, with a high level of hierarchy and rank control, which gave little potential for opportunistic behavior.[13]

It could be that the strategic approaches conceiving violence as a result of the interactions between combatants and civilians (Valentino et al. 2004; Kalyvas 2006) are more helpful in explaining why armed groups killed people in their respective rearguards: for example, it can be thought that armed groups decided to commit violations motivated by the need to attain the consent and control of civilians. Yet, it is not clear what could have led to the variations in the levels of violence in municipalities located in the same military zone, since, from an strategic perspective, armed groups would have the same incentives to kill everywhere, and civilians would have constant incentives to collaborate the group.[14]

In sum, I would argue that none of these theories satisfactorily explain violence during the SCW. That is the case because these theories have been largely inspired by violence in irregular civil wars; thus, they have left violence in conventional civil wars out of their scope conditions. Further, from my point of view, the factors identified by these perspectives should not be taken as not mutually exclusive, but as complementary for a theory of non-combatant victimization on civil war.

3. THEORY

In this section, I develop a theory of direct violence in conventional civil wars. Prior to presenting my theoretical model and hypotheses, I explore the differences between conventional and irregular civil wars and I demonstrate the operation of a different logic of violence. In addition, I identify the main dimension on which the production of direct violence differs from the production of indirect violence.

Conventional vs. Irregular Civil Wars

In conventional civil wars, violence against civilians and combatants takes place in clearly distinguished spaces. Combatants are generally young men who leave their hometowns (voluntarily or forcibly recruited by the armed groups), and who engage in combat in one or different zones of the existing frontlines. A combatant can be a soldier who is in charge of a weapon, or merely one who works in any job related to the military endeavor (e.g. bridge and barricade construction, cooking, transportation, etc.).[15] The killing of combatants generally happens in the course of battles, which include the use of artillery and bombings. Civilians are generally isolated from the battlefield: while some may live close to the frontlines, or even go there to visit combatants, their life is somewhat independent from the events taking place in it. Civilian assassinations are usually the result of armed forces or militias entering villages/towns, to aerial bombings, or to massacres taking place mostly in the course of territorial conquest. Territorial conquest is nevertheless not always accompanied by civilian deaths. For example, on the American Civil War (1861-1865), Paskoff (2008) explains that "the Union army's way of war emphasized the defeat of Confederate's forces in battle. Thus, a county through

which federal forces marched was not necessarily one devastated by the war" (Paskoff, 2008: 45).

In irregular civil wars, such a clear spatial distinction between battlefield and non-battlefield areas is lacking, as the war takes place unevenly all over the territory; in consequence, there is a greater mingling of civilians and combatants (see Zedong, 1978; Guevara, 1967; Wood, 2003), who are therefore affected by similar dynamics and levels of violence.[16] In guerrilla wars, since frontlines are permeable and any action from a defector can provoke the loss of control of a locality, civilian actions can be crucial for war outcomes; control of information (in order to identify defectors among civilians) is for that reason essential for armed groups, as explained in Kalyvas (2006). Control of information is, on the contrary, less crucial in conventional wars, where the outcomes of the war are mostly determined by the evolution of the battles on the frontlines.

From this framework, a twofold puzzle arises: why do groups in conventional civil wars decide to perpetrate violence behind the frontlines when violence is neither crucial nor a function of war outcomes? And, why does this violence vary? I argue that violence against civilians in conventional civil wars is to some extent explained by the degree of mobilization of the population in the prewar period: empirically, there seems to be a pattern by which that violence in the rear is atypical in conventional civil wars where population is not mobilized along the war cleavage before the conflict, as it was the case of the American Civil War (1861-1865), or the Ivorian civil war (2002-2005). I argue that this is the case because demobilized civilians imply little danger for the war prospects of armed groups.[17] On the contrary, when population is mobilized, that is, they strongly identify with one or the other warring side, armed groups are more fearful of civilians

because, in these contexts, civilian boycotting actions in the rearguards are plausible, and they ultimately can have an effect on war outcomes. Thus, we can think that in conventional civil wars where there is a high level of mobilization of the population, armed groups are prone to target civilians in order to sweep the rears of potentially challenging enemies.[18] Prewar mobilization is likely to explain cross country variation in levels of violence during conventional civil wars: i.e. low levels of violence in the US or in the Ivory Coast -countries that had low levels of prewar mobilization- vis-à-vis high levels of violence in Spain or in the civil war in Tajikistan[19] –countries with high levels of prewar mobilization and polarization.[20] Only if civilians are mobilized they represent a threat for armed groups' goals, both in the short term (winning the war) and in the long term (establishing a set of social institutions). This hypothesis has important implications for explaining local level variation in violence. Indeed, a corollary of this is that, if there is violence against noncombatants in conventional civil wars, this will be in some way associated to the political divisions of the prewar period -those along which people are mobilized. That is because armed groups will be fearful of a subset of civilians (not of all of them): those identified with or supporters of the enemy. As in this kind of settings identities are public, armed group do not need to gather information on who is friend or foe; rather can guide their civilian targeting on the basis of the distribution of identities among the population.

In sum, in conventional civil wars, armed groups target civilians on the basis of people's political or ethnic identities;[21] they do not target civilians as much on the basis of their wartime behavior, as it is the case for irregular civil wars.

Direct vs. Indirect Violence

From Kalyvas (2006) we know that the production of selective violence in an irregular civil war depends on the intersection between the actions of the armed groups (which can have greater or lesser incentives to pursue killings) and the actions of civilians (who can have greater or lesser incentives to collaborate with the armed groups). I argue that the intersection of civilians and armed groups is relevant for the production of any type of violence, not only selective, if violence is direct: that is, if it is not perpetrated through weapons such as bombs or artillery, and it requires some type of face-to-face interaction between the perpetrators and the victims. In order to perpetrate direct violence, armed groups have to catch, process, and finally assassinate the victims; in any point during this process civilians can wield different types of "vetoes" toward the actions of the groups, and in this way constrain the perpetration of violence. For example, civilians can hide potential victims, they can help them to flee to other places, they can give false indications to the groups, remain silent, or even engage in violent confrontation with the group.[22] During the Spanish Civil War, for instance, there were many instances of priests that were hidden in covillagers's houses in order to avoid assassination by leftist militias,[23] of people that were able to flee to other zones (including foreign countries) thank to the complicity of their neighbors, or instances of localities that violently challenged the militias.[24] The constraining power of local communities for the perpetration of violence is something that has been observed in a great number of historical and contemporary cases, ranging from Jewish pogroms in Poland (Wittenberg and Kopstein, 2008), riots in India (Varshney, 2002), prosecution during World War II in Europe and Communism (Kalyvas, 2006), to the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth

century (Sharma, 2008). Some authors have named these processes -involving non-cooperation with an enemy or occupier, civilian disobedience, industrial action, and ideological opposition- "civilian defence" (Roberts, 1967).

Again, it must be outlined that this constraining power is not relevant for the perpetration of indirect violence, which is unilateral almost by definition; for example, civilians cannot veto the throwing of bomb from a plane or a tank. Another basic difference between direct and indirect violence is that the former is necessarily exerted by armed groups in those territories where they have some type of control during the war; the latter, on the other hand, can be exerted in non-controlled territories.[25] All this implies that there are different logics underlying the perpetration of direct and indirect violence against civilians in civil war: while the formed implies the interaction of armed groups and civilians, the latter does not. These therefore have to be explained with different theoretical frameworks. In the following subsection, I outline a theory of direct violence in conventional civil wars.[26]

Explaining Direct Violence

As I just said, the production of direct violence in regular civil wars is a function of an armed group's incentives to assassinate civilians and of civilians' incentives to collaborate with the group that exerts control on the rear where they live. Hence, *ceteris paribus,* greater levels of violence will be observed in those places where collaboration with the armed group is greater, that is, where this finds fewer constraints to kill whomever it is interested in assassinating. For reasons explained above, in the type of civil wars that we are considering, identities are relevant for armed groups' decision to target civilians. Incentives to kill can be assumed to be uniform for armed groups: they

want to kill every individual that is an enemy.[27] Yet, violence should not take place uniformly across the rear territory because potential enemies are not distributed evenly, that is, there are places with greater density of "targets" than others. Thus, at the local level, willingness to kill is positively associated to the degree of political dominance by the enemy.[28]

Identities are also important for civilians' decision to help armed groups out at perpetrating violence. Indeed, if there is a strong mobilization along the cleavage of conflict in the prewar period, civilians's behavior is very likely to be affected by their political/group identification, which will have an important emotional charge.[29] At the meso-level, we can think that the level of collaboration in a locality is also highly conditional to its political composition; in particular, it should be positively associated with percentage of supporters of the group. That is because the higher the number of supporters, the higher the sum of individuals willing to provide collaboration to the group. Yet, not only individual allegiances matter: social trust also has an incidence on civilian collaboration with the armed group. In particular, collaboration with the armed group for the perpetration of violence should be negatively associated with social trust. In a way, collaborating with the group implies betraying your neighbors, and –conversely- resistance or non-collaboration with the group implies cooperation with your neighbors. It can be argued that civilians will only be disposed to put their life at risk by protecting others if they have the expectation that the others would do the same for them, that is, if there is social trust.[30] Social trust interacts with number of supporters, so that we can for example expect collaboration with armed group A not to be overwhelming in places highly dominated by group A if social trust is high.

In a simplified way, we can think of a country ongoing a civil war divided by a particular cleavage (the civil war being fought along this cleavage), with competing groups A and B (each of them represents a side in the cleavage). The proportion of supporters of group A in the population can be conceptualized as *p* (the proportion of B's supporters will be *1-p*);[31] the level of collaboration with armed group A (by civilian population) can be conceptualized as μ, and the willingness to perpetrate assassinations in the locality (by armed group A) can be conceptualized as λ. Finally, social trust of the locality can be conceptualized as $\alpha = [0,1]$.

We can think that at the beginning of the war (in period t_1):

$$\mu = p*[(1-\alpha)] \tag{1}$$

The degree of collaboration with the armed group (or non-resistance) is positively related to the proportion of supporters of the group in a locality, and it is negatively associated to social trust. These two factors interact with each other.

$$\lambda = -p \tag{2}$$

The willingness to kill by the group (or demand of assassinations) is inversely related to the proportion of supporters in a locality.

Social trust or cohesion at the local level is likely to be linked to very particular factors, not possibly explained by a single set of variables.[32] I argue that we can assume that at the beginning of a civil war, trust is to be distributed randomly across localities of a country. Thus, α should be taken out of (1) in t_1 (as this cannot be explained systematically).

The following graph (figure 1) describes the distribution of λ and μ along a hypothetical continuum of localities (along the *p* axis), and the action set predicted by the interaction of these two functions. Note that these two functions are not "utility functions"; they rather illustrate the demand of assassinations by armed groups and the supply of collaboration by civilians in different types of localities.[33]

Figure 1. Direct violence by proportion of supporters (p). Period t_1

The intersection of these two functions allows us to predict maximum levels of violence in p* = ½; that is, violence will take place when the percentage of supporters of A in the population is 50%. Violence will also take place in other parts of the ideological spectrum, but it will do it in a lesser degree. In the right hand side of p*, violence will take place along the λ line (in bold). In the localities in this part of the spectrum there is exceeding supply of collaboration (μ-λ). While this has no implications for assassinations

in this period, as we will see, this may have implications for violence in future stages of the war, as it can lead to changes in civilian preferences for future collaboration (i.e. collaboration with the armed group A in t_1 might lead to grievances among the population, potentially leading to enhanced collaboration with armed group B in t_2). In the left hand side of p*, we can expect that, analogically, violence would take place along the μ line: there is exceeding demand of assassinations by the armed group (μ-λ), and violence is not as high as λ because of civilian levels of collaboration, which constrain the actions of armed groups. Yet, since there is an asymmetrical power between armed groups and civilians, civilians' constraining power is somehow limited or blurry.[34]

In sum, we can predict that violence will take place systematically along the action set delimitated by the bold lines in Figure 1. This action set captures the interaction of armed groups and civilians, which lead to different results across localities with different political demographics, namely degree of supporters of the groups. Highest levels of violence are predicted to occur in places with greater balance of power between groups.[35]

The model just presented is static: it captures the preferences of armed groups and civilians at one point of time; in particular, right after the war onset (what I have called t_1). Yet, both λ and μ can be affected by time-varying factors, which have to be taken into account when analyzing temporal patterns of victimization in civil war. First, after the war onset, α cannot be assumed to be randomly distributed across localities, rather this is highly likely to be affected by behavior of civilians during previous periods of the war. If a share of civilians have collaborated with armed group A during t_1, others individuals will feel resentment, fear and mistrust. That is going to be the case regardless of the

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identity of the individuals; people will not feel comfortable with neighbors having collaborated with armed groups, having perpetrated violent actions themselves, or having pursued denunciations, confiscated private properties, perpetrated damage to public buildings, and so on.[36] Thus, we can think that social trust decreases proportionally to the degree of collaboration observed in the previous period.

In a hypothetical second stage of the war (t_2), where the armed group controlling the territory is no longer A but B (the opponent), civilians supply of collaboration takes the following form:

$$\mu t_2 = p^* [(1-\alpha_2)] \tag{3}$$

Where trust is not random, but affected by previous collaboration with the group:

$$\alpha_2 = (1-Ct_1)$$

Assuming that Ct_1 also has the range [0,1]. Thus,

$$\mu t_2 = p^*Ct_1 \tag{4}$$

Again, *p* stands for proportion of B's supporters in the locality and Ct_1 stands for level of collaboration with armed group A during the first period of the war.[37]

Second, for armed groups, the need to sweep the rear can be felt more or less urgent depending of the stage of the war and, partially, to wartime dynamics (i.e. how close the army of the enemy is from my controlled territory).[38] Willingness to kill will be more acute in moments in which groups have greater levels of uncertainty about their control of a territory. For example, uncertainty is likely to be high at the beginning of any civil war, and to fall down as the war goes on and groups consolidate control in their respective zones. Similarly, uncertainty is likely to be high for any group conquering new

territories, and it is therefore likely to lead to high levels of violence at early stages of any new occupation. Finally, uncertainty is likely to remain high in areas close to (or on) the war frontline due to the territorial proximity with the enemy. Thus, the demand function (1) should be extended with the inclusion of a factor capturing "uncertainty about control", which can vary along time,[39] and which has a positive effect on armed groups's willingness to assassinate:[40]

$$f(\lambda) = -p*\beta \tag{5}$$

Thus, the prediction that highest levels of violence will take place in localities with highest levels of political competition (or balance of power) is nuanced by the effect of factors such as uncertainty about control and social trust. Again, these two factors are mostly time varying factors, and should therefore imply mostly dynamic changes in levels of violence.

The hypotheses derived from this framework can be spelled out and summarized as follows:

Hypothesis 1: The greater the balance of power between groups in a given locality, the higher the level of direct violence that armed group A will perpetrate against civilians in t_1.

Hypothesis 2: Due to the asymmetric power of armed groups and civilians, A will perpetrate relatively lesser violence against civilians in places where it is dominant, vis-à-

vis places where B is dominant. Violence in the latter places will be however lower than in places where A and B have balanced powers or levels of support.

Hypothesis 3: Since level of collaboration at the local level is affected by social trust, and this is endogenous to the events of the war, collaboration with A in a locality in period t_1 will have a direct incidence on collaboration with B (and therefore violence perpetrated by B) in subsequent periods of time.

Hypothesis 4: Uncertainty about control by armed groups, which varies mostly along time –reaching a peak in early stages of the war and early stages of a conquest-, has a positive effect on levels of direct violence. Uncertainty about control is also likely to lead to higher levels of violence in localities close to the war frontline(s).

4. EMPIRICAL TEST

Violence in Catalonia

During the SCW, most of the Catalan territory was under Republican control until the beginning of 1939, with very few exceptions.[41] This means that violence took place in two stages: first (from July 1936 to 1938/39) violence was perpetrated by leftist militias and the Republican army; later (during and after its occupation of the territories) violence was perpetrated by the Nationalist army and right-wing militias. Thus, we can think of direct violence in Catalonia during the civil war as a two-stage process: in period t_1, executions were perpetrated by the left; in period t_2, executions were perpetrated by the right.

Before performing the empirical test, I will present some descriptive data on spatial and temporal variation on violence in Catalonia. To give some geographical

context, I am including a map of this region with its current internal county division, which is essentially the same as that of the 1936-39.[42]

Map 1. County Division of Catalonia

Source: Institut Cartògrafic de Catalunya (Cartographic Institute of Catalonia)

The region of Catalonia is located in the Northeast of the Iberian Peninsula. It is delimitated by the Mediterranean Sea in the East, with France and Andorra in the North, and with the Spanish region of Aragon in the West. The Pyrenees are the natural boundary between Catalonia and France. During the SCW, one of the most stable frontlines was the one created along the Ebro River, which divided the region of Aragon into two sides. As the Nationalist army advanced in 1938, it conquered Lleida (the capital of the Segrià County, in the Midwest) and some parts of the Western counties, which

became combat zone for a period. One of the most affected counties was Terra Alta (in the Southwest), which was testimony to a big battle (Ebro's battle, July- November 1938), and the counties of the Midwest (Pallars Jussà, Segrià, Noguera, Alta Ribagorca), which were affected by the so-called Segre's battle (April- December 1938).

Map 2 illustrates the variation in leftist violence (in number of deaths per one thousand inhabitants). This violence was severe in the western regions (roughly, where the Ebro's and Segre's rivers are located), which are those closer to the frontline; as I pointed out above, this probably has to do with higher levels of uncertainty about control in those areas. However, violence was not severe in the frontline counties of the Northwest, which are highly mountainous.

Map 2. Leftist Direct Violence (1936-1939)

Leftist Executions (Per Thousand)

Map 3 shows the spatial distribution of direct rightist violence.[43] While it was especially severe in the Southwestern side, it was much less relevant in the Northwestern side. This is coherent with the idea that violence in t_2 is directly related to violence in t_1.

Map 3. Rightist Direct Violence (1938-1953)

0-1	
1-2	
2-3	
3-4	
4-5	

Rightist Executions (Per Thousand)

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate temporal variation in direct violence in Catalonia by both the left and the right. These descriptive graphs are supportive of hypothesis 4: first, leftist violence reached an important peak just after the military coup, in July 1936; second, highest levels of rightist repression took place in those months that immediately followed the Francoist's occupation of Catalonia and that preceded the end of the war (1st April 1939).

Figure 2. Leftist Repression in Catalonia (total number of deaths, by months of the civil war)

GRÀFIC DE LA REPRESSIÓ
A CATALUNYA 1936 - 1939

Source: Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya (1989)

In Figure 2, we can see that the peak of leftist violence was August 1936. After November 1936, it decreased quite sharply, only slightly increasing again in 1938 and in the first two months of 1939, just before the occupation of the region by the Francoist army.

Figure 3. Rightist Violence in Catalonia (total number of deaths, by months of war)

Figure 3 shows the evolution of rightist violence in the four Catalan provinces. We can see that the violence reached a peak right after the occupation of the territory by the Francoist army, and it decreased thereafter. The pattern is slightly different for the *Lleida* province because this was conquered earlier than the other provinces.[44]

In addition to being illustrative of the observed variation in levels of direct violence in the region of Catalonia, the descriptive data above roughly validate hypothesis 4; these two hypotheses will not be tested with more appropriate statistical techniques due to the lack of availability of panel data.[45]   The remainder of the

hypotheses will be tested by means of multivariate linear regression techniques using a cross-sectional dataset I have built for 870 municipalities of Catalonia.[46] I estimate negative binomial II (NB) and zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions; these are count models and therefore appropriate for the nature of the dependent variable (number of people executed by the left, in t_1, and by the right, in t_2). The ZINB allows control both for overdispersion and for the excess of zeros in the dependent variable, and it should be more adequate than the NB model (the Vuong selection model statistic will provide us information on this regard). In **Table 1**, we can observe the description of the dependent variables and independent variables that will be used in the different econometric models. In addition to the independent variables pointed out in the theoretical model, I am including a number of control variables that are theoretically grounded on the civil war literature, in order to avoid potential problems of omitted variable bias.

Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables in the Models

Name of the Variable	Characteristics	Notes and Sources
ExecutedLeft	Total number of people executed by the left in a locality	Source: Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya (1986)
ExecutedRight	Total number of people executed by the right in a locality	Solé i Sabaté (2003)
Support Left 1936	% of vote for the Popular Front coalition in the 1936 elections	Vilanova (2005)
Competition	Index from 0 (minimum competition) to 1 (maximum competition)	The formula used to calculate this index of competition is: 1-(%VoteLeft36-%VoteRight/100)^2.
AffiliateCNT	Workers affiliated to the CNT in a locality (per thousand)	Solidaridad Obrera (1936), Cucó i Giner (1970)
Affiliate UGT	Workers affiliated to the UGT in a locality (per thousand)	Boletín Oficial de la Unión General de Trabajadores (1936)

Population	Thousand of inhabitants of a locality in 1936	Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE)
Catholic center	Dummy variable, 1 if the locality had an archbishop in 1936; 0 otherwise	Conferencia Episcopal Española
Frontline	Dummy variable, 1 if the locality is in a county that had the military frontline in its territory at any time of the war, 0 if not	
Border	Dummy variable, 1 if the locality is in a county that delimitates with the French border, 0 if not	
Sea	Dummy variable, 1 if the locality is in a county that delimitates with the sea, 0 of not	
Altitude	Altitude of the locality, in meters	Cartographic Institute of Catalonia
Dominance	Categorical variable, 1 if support left >60%, 2 if 40<support left <60, 3 if support left < 40	
Polarization RQ	RQ Polarization Index, with data of the 1933 elections	Formula in Reynal Querol (2002)

Executed Left and **Executed Right** measure the total number of victims of direct violence by the left and the right, respectively (for each of the localities in the dataset).[47] **Competition** is an index created from data on the national elections that took place in February 1936, six months before the onset of the war. In those elections, the left was competing under the umbrella organization known as the "Popular Front", and the right was competing under the "Order Front" coalition. Since there were only two coalitions, I apply the basic index of political competition used in Chacón (2004), which captures the extent to which there is a balance of power between two groups.

The variable **Dominance** will allow us to test for H2; it has been created following three categories of localities: 1 (for predominantly leftist), 2 (for mixed locations), 3 (for predominantly rightist). In the regressions, I will introduce the dummies

of the categories 1 and 3 and leave 2 as the reference category. **Catholic center** is an additional measure for dominance: in particular, it allows us to measure dominance by the right. **Affiliation CNT** and **Affiliation UGT** are measures of prewar political and social conflict in a locality. I introduce them in order to control for possible effects of "class conflict" on violent outcomes. As for the geographical variables, **frontline** should allow us to capture the uncertainty that is likely to take place in zones close to the war frontline(s). **Sea** should capture the effect of a potential 'escape gate' on the number of assassinations taking place in a particular area (we expect that this will reduce them). Proximity to the French **border** should also capture the effect of proximity to an escape gate. **Altitude** is a measure for "Rough Terrain", and it should capture the effect that knowledge of local terrain and access difficulties can have on violence against civilians (in rough terrain locations, people can hide in the mountains or forests in order to avoid being assassinated more easily than in other places, so we can expect that it will have a negative sign). I measure it using the altitude of the municipality in meters, following Fearon and Laitin (2003).[48] Finally, I also include thousands of inhabitants of the village in 1936 (**Population**) in order to control for size of the locality.

Before estimating the models, I ensure that there are no significant correlations between any of the independent variables.[49] In **Tables 2-5**, I present the results of the different models. I have included competition and dominance in different equations, in order to avoid possible specification problems (these variables are created from the same source, and they capture different dimensions of the same factor, namely vote in the 1936 elections).

Table 2. Determinants of Executions by the Left. Negative Binomial II Regressions

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Competition	-------------------	1.16***
Dominance1	-0.34***	----------
Dominance3	-0.11	-----------
Frontline	0.27**	0.265**
Population(*1000)	0.422***	0.402***
CNT Affiliation	0.049*	0.046*
UGT Affiliation	0.063	0.0611
Border	-0.273	-0.282**
Sea	-0.336***	-0.335
Rough Terrain (*1000)	-0.8***	-0.7***
Catholic Center	0.955	0.991
Constant	1.171***	0.00091
N	*870*	*870*
		Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

In model 1, the coefficient for predominantly leftist localities shows to be statistically significant, and it has a negative sign: these municipalities are likely to experience lower levels of violence than localities with a greater degree of competition between groups. The coefficient for predominantly rightist localities is not statistically significant, but the sign goes in the expected direction, being negative and substantively

smaller than the coefficient for leftist municipalities. CNT affiliation also has a significant effect, and it goes in the expected direction: the presence of affiliates, which implies the existence of a greater social conflict, increases the number of assassinations by the left. UGT affiliation is not significant. Proximity to the frontline also has a positive effect, as predicted: that is because uncertainty about control is greater in these areas. Also, proximity to the French border and to the sea take expected negative signs, and the same happens with altitude, which is capturing the negative effect of rough terrain over executions.

In model 2, the variable political competition takes a very significant positive sign, supporting hypothesis 1. The rest of the coefficients are very similar to those in model 1. To further explore these results, I calculate the predicted number of leftist executions and I plot them together with the level of support for the left in the 1936 elections (**Figure 4**).

Figure 4. Predicted Number of Executions by the Left (t_1), by level of electoral support

In the picture of the left they are all localities that have a predicted number of assassinations below 100. In the picture of the right we can see only those cases with a number of predicted victims below 5.[50] We can clearly see how the relative level of

assassinations is predicted to reach a peak at higher levels of prewar political competition.

In the ZINB models, there are two different equations: one is estimating the level of violence, and the other is estimating the likelihood of non-violence in a locality. The Vuong test is significant, and this means that the zero inflated specification is necessary, and that its results are more reliable than the NB results.[51] I include the same set of variables on both pieces of the equation because I consider that at the theoretical level the same variables that explain the occurrence of violence should be able to explain levels of violence. Yet, since CNT affiliation is highly correlated with the occurrence of violence (there are no localities with a presence of the CNT that did not experience leftist violence), I have to exclude this variable from the second part of the equation. The same happens with the dummy Catholic center as there are no localities under this category that did not experience leftist violence. The results of the ZINB models are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Determinants of Executions by the Left. ZINB

Variable	Model 1 ZINB DV: Number of deaths	Model 1 ZINB DV: Non-violence	Model 2 ZINB DV: Number of deaths	Model 2 ZINB DV: Non-violence
Competition	--------------	---------------	1.85***	0.85
Dominance1	-0.144***	0.366**	---------------	---------------
Dominance3	-0.172***	-0.022	---------------	---------------
Frontline	0.037	-0.088	0.042	-0.063
Population (*1000)	0.11***	-2.1***	0.114***	-2.1***
CNT Affiliation	0.015***	-------------	0.016***	---------------
UGT Affiliation	0.053***	0.1	0.052***	0.1
Border	-0.232***	-0.084	-0.214***	-0.011
Sea	-0.26***	0.416*	-0.23***	0.408*
Rough Terrain (*1000)	-0.297***	0.814**	-0.224***	0.78**
Catholic Center	1.56***	--------------	*1.48***	---------------
Constant	1.94***	0.09	*0.153*	*-0.56*
N	*870*	*870*	*869*	*869*
				Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

The results of model 1 in Table 3 are supportive of the predictions of the theoretical model. Localities 1 and 3 are both likely to experience lower levels of violence than localities 2, which are those with greater competition between groups. CNT and UGT affiliation also increase levels of violence, in the same way as being a catholic

enclave does. As before, proximity to the sea and the French border decrease levels of violence. Frontline is not significant, so the hypothesis of the uncertainty of control in these areas is not supported here. With respect to the second part of the regression model, which estimates the likelihood of non-violence, only localities 1 are significant –implying that violence is less likely in places where the left is dominant. Proximity to the sea increases the likelihood of violence, and rough terrain decreases it. These two variables are probably capturing accessibility and non-accessibility of the militias, respectively.

Very interestingly, the results of model 2 in Table 3 show that while political competition explains levels of violence, it does not explain the occurrence of violence. This is consistent with the theoretical model, as it implies that, despite the fact that civilian collaboration can have an incidence on levels of violence, it may not be having an effect on baseline levels of violence due to the power asymmetries between civilians and armed groups.

The results of the models explaining rightist violence in t_2 are presented in **Tables 4** and **5**. Model(s) 1 copy the models of leftist violence estimated above;[52] model(s) 2 add level of leftist violence as an independent variable to model(s) 1. I consider that victimization in t_1 captures collaboration with armed groups in t_1, and this should allow us to test the tit-for-tat hypothesis: we can expect civilians will be more likely to collaborate and therefore not resist armed groups if there has been collaboration (and therefore violence) in previous periods of the war.

Table 4. Determinants of Executions by the Right, Negative Binomial

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Competition	1.855***	1.55***
Executions Left	----------	0.036***
Frontline	0.02	-0.087
Population(*1000)	0.3	0.14
CNT Affiliation	0.024*	0.023**
UGT Affiliation	-0.02	-0.042*
Border	-0.46***	-0.422***
Sea	-0.106	-0.009
Rough Terrain (*1000)	0.33**	0.55**
Constant	-1.15***	-0.92**
N	*870*	*870*
		Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

The results are supportive of the hypothesis that executions by the left have a positive and significant effect on the number of executed by the right. At the same time, competition also has a positive effect, which is supportive of hypothesis 1. Like before, CNT affiliation has a positive effect on assassinations; UGT affiliation has a negative sign –contrary to what we would expect. Also, while proximity to the border also implies

lesser killings, rough terrain unexpectedly implies greater assassinations by the right. Frontline is in this case non-significant.[53]

Table 5. Determinants of Executions by the Right. ZINB

Variable	Model 1 ZINB DV: Number of deaths	Model 1 ZINB DV: Non-violence	Model 2 ZINB DV: Number of deaths	Model 2 ZINB DV: Non-violence
Competition	1.35***	-2.16	1.07***	-0.18
Executions Left	--------------	---------------	0.017***	-0.62***
Frontline	0.008	0.17	-0.114	0.125
Population (*1000)	0.16***	-4.2***	0.07***	-2.8***
CNT Affiliation	0.0191*	0.034	0.017*	0.012
UGT Affiliation	-0.033	0.154	-0.038	0.22
Border	-0.39***	-0.07	-0.39***	-0.17
Sea	-0.11	-0.55	-0.056	-0.74**
Rough Terrain (*1000)	-0.07	-0.14	-0.13	0.31**
Constant	-0.15	2.25	0.13	-0.56
N	*869*	*869*	*869*	*869*
				Sig Level: *.1, **.05, *** .001

The results of the ZINB models are consistent with the NB results; importantly, they indicate that the revenge mechanism is important in order to understand not only levels of violence in t_2, but also the occurrence of violence. Indeed, in model 2 of table 5,

we can see that while competition is not significant in order to explain non-violence, previous leftist violence is: higher levels of leftist violence in a locality in t_1 lead to a greater likelihood of the occurrence of violence in t_2.

In reference to models 2 in tables 6 and 7, it could be argued that the effect of the variables "competition" and "leftist executions" are likely to be intermingled; as it is explained by Achen (2005), including both of them in the same regression model does not solve the potential endogeneity problem. In order to isolate the effect of these two variables, I proceed at selecting a number of localities that while being very similar in their prewar levels of competition experienced dissimilar levels of violence by the left during the first period of the war, and at analyzing their levels of violence in the second period of the war. **Table 6** shows the mean values of both total number of deaths and deaths per thousand inhabitants (perpetrated by the right) for two selected sub-samples of localities.[54] *Sample 1* includes localities that presented high levels of political competition in the prewar period[55] and experienced very low levels of violence during period t_1 of the war;[56] *Sample 2* are localities that also presented high levels of political competition in the prewar period, yet experienced high levels of violence during period t_1.[57]

Table 6. Competition, Violence in t_1, and Violence in t_2

	Sample 1		Sample 2		Difference (Sample 2 – Sample 1)	
	1.a *(Low rate of deaths t_1)*	1b *(Low number of deaths t_1)*	2a *(High rate of deaths t_1)*	2b *(High number of deaths t_1)*	Rate (a)	Total Number (b)
Mean (t_2)	**1.94** (1.75)	**2.22** (1.54)	**34.21** (299)	**11.62** (40.94)	**32.27**	**9.4**
Observations	90	50	100	113		

The results indicate that victimization in t_1 is a key factor explaining victimization in t_2: places that had high competition and experienced high levels of violence by the left present a much greater average in both number of deaths and rate of deaths vis-à-vis places that also had high competition but that experienced very low levels of violence/no violence by the left. Differences between the means of the samples are statistically significant.[58]

In order to increase the robustness of this finding, I proceed with similar calculations for sub-samples of places that had low levels of political competition in the prewar period.[59] Despite obtaining smaller sub-samples, we can compare them with the results above.[60] **Figure 5** shows differences in average number of deaths in t_2, by competitive and non-competitive places, and by levels of violence in t_1. Again, the results show that number of deaths in t_1 had a strong impact on the number of deaths taking place in t_2. This happened in both politically competitive settings and non-competitive ones.

Figure 5. Average Number of Executions by the Right (t_2), by Type of Locality and Number of Executions by the Left (t_1)

14

12

10

8

6 ■ Low number of deaths t_1

4 ■ High number of deaths t_1

2

0

Polarized   No Polarized

5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS

In this section, I include robustness tests with two additional self-built databases: one with data from the region of Aragon and another with data from the region of Valencia. As before, I will present the results of the main regressions using NB and ZINB.

For Aragon, I analyze violence perpetrated by the Nationalist army and by rightist militias, in the areas that were controlled by these groups from the beginning of the war (half of this region was controlled by the Left during most of the war, but since this area was in a great extent battlefield zone, it deserves another type of treatment). Violence only took place in t_1 –there is no t_2 as we conceptualized it. For Valencia, I analyze Leftist violence, in t_1, and Nationalist violence, in t_2. Valencia, like Catalonia, was mostly rear territory during the Civil War, and was first controlled by the Left and, later (at the end of the war) by the Right.[61]

In Aragon, a total of 366 municipalities (from the Western part of the territory) were under Francoist control during all the war. The rest of municipalities in the region

(582) were under leftist control at some point of the war. We focus on the first subset of localities and explain variation in rightist direct violence with the following independent and control variables: political competition, population, CNT affiliation, UGT affiliation, rough terrain, catholic center, frontline, and previous violence. Prewar violence is a new variable, for which we obtained data for only this region that allows controlling for conflict in the prewar period, which could have an incidence on levels of collaboration and consequently on victimization on t_1 .[62] Since I have coded geographic data for this region, namely data on latitude and longitude of each locality, I use the latitude of the municipality to capture proximity to frontline: since the frontline was on the East of all this territories, the greater the latitude, the greater the proximity to the frontline. Similarly, for a more refined measure of border, I use the longitude of the municipality, being greater the southerner is the locality (thus, we can expect longitude to have a positive effect on killings). The results of the coefficients in the NB and ZINB models are summarized in table 8 (for ZINB, I include the results of the two parts of the equation in different columns): [63]

Table 8. Rightist violence in t_1 in Aragon localities under Nationalist Control

Variable	NB model	ZINB model (VD: number of deaths)	ZINB model (VD: non-violence)
Competition	0.08***	0.078***	-0.014
CNT affiliation	-0.084	-0.03	-0.121
UGT affiliation	0.037	0.031	-2.87
Border (Long)	-0.906	0.53	1.49
Rough Terrain	-0.55***	-0.268**	0.0014***
Population	0.56***	0.43***	-0.787
Catholic Center	0.76	0.208	-----------------

Frontline (Lat)	-0.35	-0.047	0.795
Previous violence	0.56	0.475	------------------
N	*236*	*236*	*236*

The results from Aragon's data are supportive of my theoretical model, and coherent with what we observed in Catalonia for leftist violence. Basically, they show that levels of violence are explained by levels of local level competition, being greater the higher the balance of power between groups in a locality. These results are important because they show that the same mechanism explaining variation in levels of violence perpetrated by the left are explaining variation in levels of violence perpetrated by the right in the first period of the war. Also, as before, rough terrain decreases levels of violence, and on the occurrence of violence.

As for Valencia, data on a number of variables is still under the process of being coded, so I cannot run the exact same models. Electoral data is unavailable for Castellon,[64] so I need to focus on the provinces of Valencia and Alicante. I run NB and ZINB for leftist violence in t_1 with the following variables: population, CNT Affiliation, UGT Affiliation, Competition, Population. The results, which have to be regard with some caution due to the absence of geographical controls, are not entirely supportive of my hypotheses: political competition, while having a positive sign, is not statistically significant. Yet, CNT Affiliation is positive and significant at the 10%. The results of the estimations with dependent variable rightist violence are however supportive to what we observed in Catalonia: leftist violence has a positive effect on rightist violence. At the same time, I include an additional variable on non-violent victimization in t_1, which can capture level of collaboration of civilians with armed groups. This variable is "number of

collectivized societies" in a locality (as coded in Bosch, 1983), and it has a very strong effect on violence by the right. This is relevant because it indicates that retaliation at the local level is not only associated to violence, but also to other forms of victimization (i.e. social, economic), and that the mechanism behind the correlation on violence in t_1 and t_2 is civilian collaboration.

Table 9. Leftist (t_1) and Rightist (t_2) violence in Valencia and Alicante

Variable	NB. Leftist Violence	ZINB leftist violence. Number of deaths;)	ZINB leftist violence. Non-violence	NB. Rightist violence	ZINB rightist violence. Number of deaths	ZINB rightist violence. Non-violence
Competition	0.09	0.325	1.64	-0.72	0.187	0.812
Population	0.05	0.04	-1.8	0.07	0.16	-0.82
CNT Affiliation	0.072*	0.053	-------	0.008	0.0397	0.155
UGT Affiliation	0.59	0.063*	0.05	0.069**	0.032	-0.47
Killed_Left	-----------	-----------	-----------	0.019**	0.007	-0.98***
Collectivities	-------------	------------	-----------	0.762**	0.639***	-0.34
N	*291*	*291*	*291*	*291*	*292*	*292*

As in the case of Catalonia, CNT affiliation cannot be introduced in the second part of the ZINB for leftist violence as it overpredicts the occurrence of violence. Interestingly, in the ZINB model we observe that assassinated by the left in t_1 has a strong incidence on the occurrence of violence by the right in t_2 while collectivities have

an effect on levels of violence. The different relevance of these factors can be indicative of the different ways in which collective resentment operates in conflict environments.

To recapitulate, the results of the empirical test are supportive of my theoretical framework and hypotheses: they are coherent with the idea that civilian targeting in conventional civil wars is very much coupled with political identities. They also show that violence is the result of the interaction between armed groups' incentives to sweep the rears of political enemies and civilians' incentives for collaborating with the groups, as highest levels of violence are not explained by ideological dominance of territories, but by balance of power between supporters of one and the other group. The results demonstrate that while political factors such as prewar competition are highly relevant and they should be included in models explaining dynamics of violence in civil wars, wartime dynamics are also relevant to explain violence. Indeed, tit-for-tat mechanisms take place in subsequent periods, once violence has taken place. This finding sheds some light on the relationship between violence by two rival actors in war, which is quite unclear to date (Eck and Hultman 2007: 241). The results of the robustness tests with data from Aragon and Valencia provide external validity to the results obtained for the region of Catalonia. Also, the results in Aragon show that levels of direct violence against civilians are more affected by local level dynamics than by the ideological labels of armed groups: indeed, violence by the right is also explained by local levels of prewar political competition. Finally, the results in Valencia show that tit-for-tat dynamics are related not only to violent events, but also to non-violent actions undertaken by armed groups such as property collectivizations. From my perspective, civilian collaboration, is

the mechanism behind this effect: in places where civilians collaborate with the groups, either helping them out at perpetrating killings (or non forestalling them) or at pursuing non-violent victimization actions (such as collectivizations, property destruction, and similar), social trust becomes damaged, and future collaboration with other groups boosts.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has sought to explain the dynamics of violence against civilians in a civil war context, by extending the analytical focus to a civil war that was fought conventionally—namely the Spanish Civil War, using data from localities of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia. I have analyzed sub-national variation in one single civil war in a way that follows current practice in the field and provides significant empirical leverage. The focus has been on a particular type of violence, namely direct or face-to-face violence.

Several implications follow. First, variation in levels of violence appears to be largely explained by incentives of armed groups, which –in these wars- decide to assassinate to a greater or lesser extent according to the public identities of civilians, but also by civilian incentives for collaboration with the groups. All this makes violence reach a peak in places with higher levels of political competition or balance of power between groups. Second, while local hostilities can have their roots in events and factors exogenous to the military dimension of the war, they are highly affected by events endogenous to the war (i.e. prior denunciations, executions, revolutionary activities). This makes violence more likely in places where there has been victimization in previous periods of the war. Third, due to variation in the degree of uncertainty about control,

violence against civilians is more intense at particular moments of time (i.e. at the beginning of a war, just after the occupation of a new territory) or in particular locations (i.e. localities neighboring war frontlines).

In general, the results of this paper suggest that the insights of both the first and second generation of scholars of violence should be integrated into a single theoretical framework incorporating both prewar politics and within-war dynamics. Indeed, macro-cleavages and processes (i.e. political division along ideological lines) are unlikely to be detached from the reality that people live at the local level and, and they are therefore likely to have an impact on levels of violence. Yet, these macro-cleavages lose explanatory power as events such as killings of friends, relatives or neighbors have taken place (that is, once a war has started). The latter become quite determinant for individual behavior and local dynamics of violence in subsequent war periods.

In addition, the findings in this paper emphasize the need to disaggregate civil wars according to the nature of their warfare. The spatial and temporal dynamics of violence in irregular wars, such as the current wars in Colombia or Iraq, are likely to diverge from those in conventional civil wars such as the Spanish or the Ivorian ones. The micro-level analysis of the relationship between warfare and patterns of civilian victimization is critical to better understand patterns of victimization.

Finally, this paper shows that micro-level approaches to factors such as political competition or polarization can contribute to a better understanding of conflict. While macro-level approaches to competition and polarization have been quite present in the scholarly literature of conflict (e.g. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Reynal Querol 2002), micro-level approaches have been largely overlooked. Further research should

emphasize these micro-level approaches, and the application of the insights obtained at the macro-level to better understand dynamics on the ground.

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Dependent Variables. Catalonia Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Census1936	1058	1647.56	19726.11	50	637,841
Executed Left	1062	7.5414	73.65	0	2,328
Executed Right	1062	2.79	14.29	0	431
Executed Left ‰	1058	3.92	5.86	0	82.3
Executed Right ‰	1058	2.21	3.79	0	26.31
Support Left 1936	1058	52.27373	16.94505	2.2	100
Competition	1058	0.8831868	0.1595922	0	1
Affiliation CNT %	1062	0.982	4.49	0	49.61
Affiliation UGT%	1058	0.088	1.023	0	20.36
Urban	1062	0.0254237	0.1574824	0	1
Frontline	1060	0.2056604	0.4043741	0	1
Border	1060	0.2198113	0.4143142	0	1
Sea	1060	0.2783019	0.4483744	0	1
Altitude	875	368.22	317.3	0	1539
Catholic center	1062	0.0075	0.0865	0	1
Dominance	1062	1.88	.744	1	3

ENDNOTES

[1]   Clausewitz did not refer exactly to "political cleavages" in his theory, but argued that "war was politics by other means" and he made the point that "violence has no logical end unless understood in its political context".

[2]   See, for instance, Gurr, 1970; Horowitz, 1985; Bates, 1999; Gurr, 2000; Hechter, 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Toft, 2003; Sambanis and Zinn, 2006; Esteban and Ray, 2006.

[3]   Interestingly, political variables have been much less neglected when explaining other forms of political violence such as riots (Wilkinson, 2004), street violence (de la Calle, 2007), or terrorist attacks (Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2004, Schulhofer-Wohl, 2006).

[4]   Catalonia underwent both leftist and rightist violence during the Civil War. Violence had both a direct and indirect character, and it varied across the territory, as well as along time. At the same time, Catalonia was a region with a high variation of political affinities in the prewar period–having areas of strong right-wing support (e.g. the so-called highlands) and areas of strong left-wing support (e.g. the industrial areas surrounding Barcelona). They were areas of high social conflict between landlords and peasants/industrial workers, and areas with relatively greater social peace before the civil war. Geographically it is a very varied region, as it has forests and mountainous areas, (i.e. in the Pyrenees) –that is, areas of "rough terrain"-, as well as seashore, plains, and hilly areas. Further, it delimitates with France (in the North) and the sea (in the East), and during the war it was close to one of the main frontlines (the Ebro's frontline). Thus, this region presents local variation in key geographical, social and political variables.

[5]   Data on total deaths during the civil war is still incomplete, and different historians are involved in debates about estimations (Salas, 1977; Martín Rubio, 1997; Preston, 1986; Juliá, 2004). Hence, we should take this as an orientation number. Among all of them, around 122,000 are estimated to be civilian victims of intentional lethal violence –of these, 84,095 were victims of Francoist violence, and 37,843 were victims of Leftist violence (according to data in Juliá, 2004). Data on refugees is also very fragmentary, and it should be taken cautiously. The sources here are Rubio (1977) and Gaitx (2006). Baltasar Garzón (a judge from the "Audiencia Nacional" –the highest national Court) has recently taken actions to promote research of total number of victims by the Nationalist side during the civil war. For my analyses, I will use data from regions that have been already extendedly researched, so the data can be considered highly reliable.

[6]   I.e. POUM (Partit Obrer Unificat Marxista), FAI (Front Anarquista Ibèric), PC (Partit Comunista).

[7]   I.e. CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) and UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores).

[8]   Tensions within the leftist bloc were constant from the beginning of the war. In May 1937, members of the Communist party engaged in an armed confrontation with members of the POUM (Trotskyist party) and the FAI (anarchist trade union) in the streets of Barcelona. The Communist party emerged as the leader of the leftist bloc after these events, which marked the transition from a loose and decentralized organization of

the leftist army to a more strict and centralized one. On this issue, see, among others, Orwell (1938).

[9]   I.e. Falangists, Carlists or *Requetés.*

[10]   Leftist indirect violence against non-combatants was however less intense than rightist indirect violence (see Solé i Sabaté and Villarroya, 2003).

[11]   Following the example of respected historians on the Spanish Civil War (Juliá, 2004; Casanova, 2001; Solé i Sabaté, 2000; Dueñas, 2007), when analyzing rightist violence, I will take into account the post-war violence that took place up until the mid 1940s.

[12]   Indeed, while "Valencia remained during almost all the war in a situation of strict rearguard, where the structure of the State was maintained" (Bosch, 1983: 373), the amount of victims of leftist violence in this region is non negligible: 4,634, according to Gabarda (1996).

[13]   I would argue that the most significant flaw in many of the opportunistic explanations of violence during the SCW is that they implicitly or explicitly argue that leftist violence was not strategic -that it was just the by-product of the state collapse-, and that this differentiates it from Francoist violence, which was highly strategic. For example, Espinosa argues that the Francoist Army did not really want to prevent acts of cruelty in Extremadura, but to monopolize them (2005: 109-110).

[14]   If we consider that maximizing likelihood of survival is the main factor explaining civilians' decision to collaborate with the group, there are no reasons to think that civilians should vary their behavior across localities in the same zone. And if we consider that informational needs are the only factor explaining armed groups's targeting of civilians, then there are no reasons to think that this would vary across the zone.

[15]   My definition of combatant is slightly broader than Downes (2006; 2007) who, among these military-related workers, only considers munition workers as combatants.

[16]   In fact, in irregular civil wars, civilians might have higher probabilities to be killed than combatants (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007).

[17]   There is not a specific estimate on the number of civilian deaths during the US war. The overall scholarly consensus is, however, that this was a limited war in terms of civilian deaths (see, for example, Neely 2004, 2007). In Ivory Coast, the number of civilian deaths is estimated to be 4,000 (Peace Reporter, 2007), which represents circa 0.02% of the population of 2002.

[18]   For this purpose, armed groups tend to use militias or irregular forces, which are complementary to the regular forces. On the difference between these types of military forces, see for example Arreguin-Toft (2005).

[19]   According to Fearon (2003), number of deaths in Tajikistan (1992-1997) there were 51,000, which represent 0.9 % of the population of 1992.

[20]   The monk and historian Hilari Raguer argues that Spanish society was highly polarized after the February elections in 1936 and illustrates this by explaining that in his parish, he and his monk school friends played between them fighting "leftists" vs. "rightists" –instead of cowboys vs. Indians or cops vs. criminals (Raguer 2007).

[21]   The identities that are relevant -ethnic, ideological, religious, etc.- will vary depending on the dimension around which the conflict is articulated. See, for example, Horowitz (1985) for ethnic conflict, or Holt (2005) for religious conflict. At the

theoretical level, I am not distinguishing between ethnic and ideological identities because, unlike Kaufmann (1996), I do not assume that there are differences in the way that they affect dynamics of violence. In my opinion, political identities are not always "difficult to assess and changeable" (Kaufmann 1996: 72), and ethnic identities are not always "fixed and unchangeable."

[22] For extended research on varieties of civilian interactions with armed groups, see Wood (2003), Petersen (2001), Kalyvas (2006), and specially Arjona (2008).

[23] One testimony I interviewed explained me that the priest of their town was not only hidden in their house during the whole period of revolutionary violence, but also celebrated clandestine mass in their house.

[24] For example, in the village of "Bellver de Cerdanya" (Catalonia), villagers confronted the anarchist militias that wanted to confiscate lands and provisions, as well as to assassinate some rightist leaders. Due to this resistance, nobody was killed (Solé i Sabaté and Pous, 1988).

[25] Hence, when referring to direct violence, I will always assume that it is perpetrated in a territory under control of the armed group. Armed groups can occasionally perpetrate direct violence in non-controlled territories, for instance through occasional raids and ambushes. Yet, in conventional wars, this can only happen in places close to the frontlines, which are usually depopulated from civilians, so this sort of victimization is quite rare.

[26] Due to length constraints, I do not include a theory of indirect violence here.

[27] Although groups may have incentives to kill those that are more intensively identified with the other group, as it is the case of trade union members, members of political parties and public leaders. I owe this insight to Ana Arjona. For simplicity reasons, I let this consideration aside here.

[28] By political dominance here I refer to relative number of supporters (or people identified with the group).

[29] The relevance of emotions as a determinant of behavior is clearly outstanding in situations of polarization, or political mobilization. Petersen (2002), for instance, has shown the relevance of emotion (vis-à-vis other factors) for explaining ethnic conflict.

[30] We would think that the expectation of what Elster calls 'rules of fairness" (1989) is more likely in cohesive societies. In fact, with relation to the specific topic of resistance to armed groups's actions, Shaw argues that "population degree of social cohesion becomes the prime condition of its civilian resistance. The greater the cohesion of a civil society, the more it can resist an armed attack in its own" (2007:124).

[31] For simplicity reasons, I assume that everybody is a supporter of one or the other group. As a supporter, I consider a person that identifies (more or less strongly) with the claims made by the armed group, or that has preferences for the long term ruling of this group as opposed to the other. In a democratic context, we can assume that social support for a group is reflected in its political support in the elections. Yet, there can be different ways to measure support for political groups (i.e. political affiliation, church membership, or ethnic composition of the localities –for the case of ethnic civil wars).

[32] Putnam et al (1993) provide us with a possible set of explanatory factors for regional variation in social trust –or what he calls civic culture or social capital. Yet, it is not clear that the factors that they point out as explanatory for levels of social capital (i.e.

participation in public affairs, associational life, horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation) would vary at the micro-level. Their focus is on explaining variation at the regional level (North vs. South of Italy).

[33]   This conceptualization along the lines of "demand" and "supply" is similar to Kalyvas's (2006). Yet, the interaction between armed groups is crucial for Kalyvas explanation of violence in irregular civil wars, and it is not here: I am considering the actions of one armed group vis-à-vis civilians, independent of the actions of the competing groups. Also, here collaboration means something more general than pure provision of information. Thus, the framework is substantially different from this author's.

[34]   The extent to which the armed group will kill within this area of asymmetrical power will be explained by factors that are not included in our equations and that can be hardly measured systematically. For example, this might be influenced by the level of barbarism of the militia as violence is likely to take the form of a massacre when there is civilian resistance.

[35]   Interestingly, while the mechanism I am pointing out is different to his, this prediction is very similar to Gould's (2003), who argues that situations of non-dominance or power symmetry lead to conflict. He says that this is because in these cases there is uncertainty on who will prevail (62).

[36]   In the case of the Spanish Civil War, many interviewees told me that they were not feeling comfortable with the neighbors that had participated in the burning of churches, that were members of the local committees confiscating properties, and similar. That was the case regardless of their own identities (i.e. leftist people seeing other leftist perpetrating these actions). It seems pretty obvious that overall levels of social trust decreased when these actions took place in a locality, vis-à-vis in places were these actions were avoided or resisted by the neighbors.

[37]   At the empirical level, Ct_1 can be proxied by the number of assassinations by group A in period t_1, but also by other variables, i.e. number of confiscations, number of denunciations, etc.

[38]   I say partially because, in conventional civil wars, frontlines are by definition stable, so this should not matter for most of the violence perpetrated in the rear.

[39]   Again, in conventional civil wars we would expect that there is not much variation across space on β because of the stable nature of the borders. Thus, we can conceive β as mostly a time varying factor.

[40]   If β range is [0,1], it can be argued that in the static model presented above, $\beta=1$ because at the beginning of the war, there is overall uncertainty about control across the whole territory.

[41]   A few localities close to the Ebro frontline were conquered by the Nationalists in mid-1938. The first Catalan town to be occupied by the Nationalist army was Lleida (3rd of April of 1938). The total occupation of Catalonia ended the 12th of February of 1939 (Solé i Sabaté, 2000).

[42]   The current county division of Catalonia is based on the division that was created in 1936, and which was abolished after the end of the civil war. In 1987 it was re-established by the Government of Catalonia. The only differences from the 1936 derive from the inclusion of three new counties in 1988.

[43]   Again, the data used are executions per thousand, and the denominator refers to thousands of inhabitants of the county in 1936.

[44]   This graph also shows that the bulk of right-wing violence in Catalonia took place in the post-war period.

[45]   Temporal data on executions is available only at the aggregate level. Data on the date of execution for each individual is not accessible.

[46]   The totality of municipalities in Catalonia in 1936 was 1,062. I have built the dataset for all 1,062 localities, but data on all of the independent and dependent variables was available only for 870 of them. Since the missing data is not clustered in a particular type of localities, selection bias issues are highly unlikely.

[47]   The data on killings are taken from books by Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroya. These authors have collected data from local civil registers and, for leftist violence, from "La Causa General" national historical archive. They have coded the executed by their residence, not by the place they were killed (even if very often, these two are the same). Following the same coding procedure, I have completed some cases that were missing in these authors' database with local historical census and war accounts.

[48]   Although Fearon and Laitin measure rough terrain of a country by the difference between the highest and the lowest point in the territory.

[49]   The city of Barcelona is an outlier in the number of killings because of its size. I have to run all the regressions without this case for the coefficients are otherwise biased.

[50]   Due to the large differences in size of the localities, which I cannot control for in the scatter plots, there are a number of outliers that have to be taken out in order to be able to observe the data properly.

[51]   Also, if we test the different possible count regression models applicable to these data, and we check graphically the way they fit to the real data, the ZINB model shows to be the most appropriate. These checks are not included here, but are available from the author upon request.

[52]   Although, due to length constraints, I do not include dominance variables in the estimation models for rightist violence. Results with these variables are available upon request.

[53]   We must bear in mind that frontlines were almost inexistent during Francoist control of the Catalan territory and that therefore this variable should be expected to less relevant for rightist than for leftist violence.

[54]   I include the division by sub-samples following both rate of deaths and total number of deaths in order to obtain more robustness.

[55]   They are those that have a polarization index higher than 0.9.

[56]   I code as such those localities that had less than 2 deaths per thousand inhabitants for sample 1a, and 1 death or less for sample 1b.

[57]   I code as such those localities that had more than 5 deaths per thousand inhabitants for sample 2a, and 15 deaths or more for sample 2b. Even if the difference between 2 and 5 deaths per thousand inhabitants might not seem substantial, these are approximately the quartiles of the distribution: below 2 I have approximately 34% of the cases, and above 5, I have approximately 33% of the cases. They imply, in substantial terms, a big difference.

[58]	I have tested if the differences in these means are statistically significant, and they are so at the 95% level (when using total number of deaths), and at 90% (when using rate of deaths).

[59]	I coded as such those that had a Polarization index under 0.8.

[60]	These subsamples include 15 cases for places with victims, 20 cases for places with no victims.

[61]	The case of Aragon is particularly interesting for the analysis, as the perpetrators of violence in t_1 are different than in Catalonia. If the effect of the independent variables in my theoretical model remain significant also in this region, the theory will gain have a lot of external validity.

[62]	This variable is a dummy with value1 if conflict in the period January- July 1936, 0 if not. Data collected by Casanova (1985: 52). I put together all his categories of conflict, which are: strikes; occupation of private properties including those ending with expulsion; order alterations or clashes between groups; governmental intervention to solve conflicts; violent aggressions against peasants; occupation of communal lands; tension situations solved through negotiations. None of these categories include either passion crimes or normal delinquency.

[63]	As before, previous violence and catholic center cannot be introduced into the second equation of the ZINB model due to overdetermination issues.

[64]	There are no reasons to think that there is any kind of political motivation explaining the unavailability of these data, which could be biasing the results. It seems that it is mostly due to archival negligence.