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Village Leaders as Data Collectors: Willing, Capable, and Rational

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HiCN Research Design Note 9

November 2008

Abstract: This pilot study examined the process of training local elected officials to collect population data in three sub-counties in northern Uganda. The northern region is emerging from a protracted civil war that disrupted local governance structures, particularly the role of the elected village leader. For more than a decade, non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies, and researchers have gathered information using local leaders and communities as informants, but not data collectors. This study trained village leaders to take on the latter role. Results suggest that this approach is both efficient and accurate, and that village leaders are willing, capable, and rational data collectors.

Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Eve Puffer, Ayesha Nibbe, Bret Kloos, and members of the Housing and Adaptive Functioning Lab at the University of South Carolina for helpful reviews of previous drafts.

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1. INTRODUCTION

More than twenty years of fighting between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, injuries, and abductions — in addition to the displacement (often forced by the government) of nearly two million people (Otunnu, 2006). The war, however, reached a tipping point on August 26, 2006 when delegates from the GoU and the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. As a result of this agreement — and the improvement in security that followed — more than 300,000 people reportedly moved out of overcrowded internally displaced persons (IDP) camps by the end of 2006 (USAID, 2006). As of June 2008, half of the 2005 camp population had either moved to villages or smaller resettlement camps (IASC Working Group, 2008).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working under the guidance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have devoted significant resources to monitoring this resettlement process ($7 million USD in 2007 on protection, monitoring, and coordination; UNHCR, 2008b). The accuracy of this monitoring effort, however, is questionable on methodological grounds, namely the use of focus groups and unsystematic NGO "observation" to assess population movement to resettlement sites and villages.[2] While the focus group approach has garnered useful data about community-level variables (e.g., number of water points, functioning schools, road quality), it was never empirically demonstrated that population estimates obtained through group discussions accurately reflected village populations let alone disaggregated village demographics. In fact, our research indicated the opposite.

[2] At least until this research was conducted in 2007, population estimates for each district reported by the IASC were an amalgamation of various different NGO data collection methods. A common reporting form was used — the Return Monitoring Checklist — but the lack of a clearly specified methodology resulted in the use of various estimation approaches. Instructions only suggested that enumerators query the focus group and then "observe" the community to correct the focus group's figure. Without walking throughout the dispersed village communities — an activity that would have been time consuming and particularly challenging during the rainy season — it is not clear how enumerators could have systematically observed the population or the number of dwellings, especially when the grasses were high.

1.1 Potential Errors in Return and Resettlement Trends

Data from this pilot study and from our larger household surveys (Green, 2008) suggested that overall out-migration in 2006 and 2007 was underestimated by 12 percent and mischaracterized as a resettlement-oriented (i.e., movement from larger to smaller camps and settlements) rather than a return-oriented process (i.e., movement to villages of origin).[3] In terms of return to villages of origin, the official statistics reported by the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) Working Group for November 2007 indicated that only 5 percent of the 2005 camp population living Gulu and Amuru districts had moved to villages (2007). In contrast, our data collected the previous month from a large IDP camp in Gulu district suggested that 23 percent of the camp's 2005 population had moved to villages — a rate more than 4 times greater than the official estimate.

Since our data came from a comprehensive case-study of one major IDP camp, it is possible that observed migration trends do not generalize to other camps in Gulu and Amuru districts. If our data do reflect real district trends, however, the practical implication of underestimating out-migration in general, and return to villages in particular, is that agencies could not adequately support early returners with household or community assistance. UNHCR's 'top-down' approach to data collection — whereby teams of NGO/UN field staff conduct focus groups and informal assessments with community members — was not adaptable to a changing environment of spontaneous (yet gradual) return and resettlement to nearby locations and a shift from centralized, camp-based service provision to dispersed, village or parish-based operations.

Additionally, this top-down approach bypassed an opportunity to assist local communities and governments to build a modern data collection system. Demographic

[3] Our estimates suggest the opposite trend of migration – more people moved to villages than to resettlement sites. The ratio of return versus resettlement (i.e., people moving to villages versus resettlement sites) was 1.9 according to our Opit estimates and 0.3 according to the IASC (IASC Working Group, 2007) estimates.

surveillance was once, and will ultimately be, the role of the local government. But currently the system is broken — the result of more than two decades of protracted conflict and displacement. The role of the village leader — LC1, the most local of all elected government officials within the Local Council system — was particularly diminished as village populations moved to "protected camps" where a new administrative role of Camp Leader was formed.

Assisting the government to revitalize the role of the LC1 is an important activity for the international community that fits within the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2007). While there was an official shift toward a decentralized "parish approach" to humanitarian intervention in 2007 (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007; Uganda Clusters, n.d.), this was — in our opinion — more of a change in the point of intervention for NGOs and UN agencies than a change in philosophy toward working with local governments (at least in terms of data collection). What was needed was a transitional strategy whereby local elected leaders, with the technical support of NGOs and UN agencies, contributed to the monitoring process as data collectors, not just informants.

1.2 Toward a (More) Participatory Approach and Better Data

The case for involving internally displaced populations in decision-making and information gathering has been made in various publications, from the policy-oriented *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* (UNOCHA, 1998) to operational handbooks such as UNHCR's tool for participatory assessment (2006) and more recent manual on community-based approaches (2008a). Yet according to a new Brookings-Bern report (2008), IDP participation remains more rhetoric than reality. Another report by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2007) found that this has been particularly true for youth programs in northern Uganda.

Both reports noted a broad interest in participatory and community-based models among agencies, but also a lack of knowledge and research about implementation that has limited agencies' ability to put this interest into action. In work with displaced communities, the buzz around these terms has outpaced the development and evaluation of best practices. The label 'community-*based*' is often used when the term 'community-*placed*' might be more appropriate, reflecting the fact that communities are often locations rather than partners. To this end, O'Toole, Aaron, Chin, Horowitz, and Tyson (2003) outlined a process for conceptualizing community-based participatory research in the health sciences that may be useful in defining programs for internally displaced communities.

The Brookings-Bern report (2008), aptly titled *Moving Beyond Rhetoric*, presented a useful framework for classifying participatory approaches for programs that serve displaced communities. This "Participation Spectrum" ranges from "passive participation" (i.e., one-way information sharing) to "local initiative and control" whereby the affected community develops and implements programs, sometimes with agency support. At the midpoint are consultation and collaboration — the former consisting of two-way dialogue such as focus groups and the latter involving displaced persons in needs assessments and project implementation. This is an important distinction as many existing efforts could be classified as consultative rather than collaborative, the more involved form of participation. Overall, the authors argued that, beyond the legal rationale for engaging displaced communities *(*as outlined in the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*; UNOCHA, 1998), there are tangible instrumental benefits of community participation, such as improved information gathering, efficiency, and implementation. There are also civic or value-based benefits of participation, such as empowerment and capacity building.

1.3 Study Objectives

If there are instrumental and value-based benefits of participation, then why are displaced communities only consulted or — worse — excluded on issues that matter to them? Why, in relatively secure settings where collaboration and higher forms of participation are possible, do top-down models of data collection persist when there is evidence that they are inefficient, possibly inaccurate, and void of any form of skill transfer or capacity building?

Partly because of our assumptions.

In northern Uganda in early 2007, as people were starting to return to villages, we designed this project to create a sampling frame for a larger household survey effort; we planned to train local leaders as population data collectors in order to establish a census of households in each village with members transitioning from a particular IDP camp. It turned into a pilot study after receiving feedback from members of the international community working in the area. Their assumptions — and to an extent our worries — were that village leaders would not be capable of this task without extensive training, be willing to carry out the necessary activities because of a lack of time and compensation, or be able to resist inflating population statistics in the face of such great need. This pilot study addressed such concerns by evaluating a local approach to data collection — a collaboration model of participation. Results suggest that assumptions that LC1s are not willing or capable participants are false. Results of a validation exercise indicate that assumptions that LC1s will inflate population statistics for personal or community gain may be true, but in a limited set of circumstances that appear rational.

2. METHOD

2.1 Location

This study was conducted in 37 villages around Opit IDP Camp (Figure 1). Opit is located approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Gulu Town on the border of Gulu and Oyam districts in Northern Uganda. A total of 46 villages were identified through cross-checks with residents, Sub-County officials, and NGOs. Nine villages were not included in the analysis because fewer than three households in each village reported having ever lived in Opit, the site of a larger study on forced migration and well-being.



Figure 1. Map of villages (blue dots) around Opit IDP Camp.

2.2 Materials

A spreadsheet for recording household-level information was created in English and translated into Luo, the regional language (see Appendix A). Each household's information was recorded in one row, starting with the name, age, and gender of the head of household. The spreadsheet included cells for the number of household members, disaggregated by gender and age groups. As the larger study focused on population movement, the form also included questions about the household's previous residence, date of arrival to the current location, and number of household members remaining behind. Each village was provided with an example form (in English) and five blank double-sided Luo forms.

2.3 Procedure

After villages were identified and located, the study's Acholi field manager (Author: OT) — who is a member of the Opit community and therefore familiar with the area — visited each village via motorbike. Upon arriving in the village, OT located the LC1 (or his surrogate in cases where the LC1 still resided in the camp) and introduced the purpose of the study: (a) to create a sampling frame for household surveys to be conducted as part of the larger study, and (b) to examine the feasibility of incorporating LC1s into the data collection process.

OT emphasized that this exercise was not a "registration" for any services, such as World Food Programme food distribution. LC1s were told that they would receive a small research incentive (approximately $3.50 USD) in return for accurate data collection and that households invited to participate in surveys would also receive a small gift (goods valued at $1.50 USD) — no other benefits could be expected.

After a brief 10 to 15 minute training on how to use the forms, including working together to record the first household, OT informed the LC1 that he would return in one week to

retrieve the form. In the interim, the LC1 was instructed to record each household with at least one member living in the village (i.e., sleeping there most nights of the week). Additional household members were only to be included in the Age x Gender count if they also lived in the village. Any household members who spent the majority of nights away from the village were to be counted as remaining behind.

OT visited all 37 LC1s individually over a period of five days. Approximately one week after distributing the form and training the LC1, OT either returned to the village to collect the form or met with the village leader in Opit. LC1s were given a small incentive after the forms were checked for input errors and corrected if necessary. All 37 LC1s submitted completed forms within 7 to 10 days after the initial distribution. Data were entered into a Microsoft Access database by the authors within several days of receipt.

Households were then randomly selected to participate in a survey as part of the larger study. Villages with less than three households reporting to have ever lived in Opit were excluded from selection (n = 9). Six households were randomly selected for the survey in each of the remaining 37 villages.[4] In addition, two households in each village were selected for an in-depth qualitative interview: one was randomly selected from the survey list; the other interview was reserved for the village household that reported the earliest date of return. In some cases this household was one of the six randomly selected to participate in the survey. In other cases this was an additional household, bringing the village sample total to seven.

The process of locating selected households was both a validation step for the LC1 data collection and a recruitment step for the larger study's survey effort. In sum, 14 of the 37 villages had at least one error — a selected household that did not really live in the village. OT revisited these 14 villages and presented the LC1s with the discrepancies, working with each one to

[4] All Opit households were selected in villages with less than six households.

identify all households incorrectly included on the original list. OT approached the task with the goal of creating an atmosphere for an open and honest exchange about the potential reasons for the errors.

3. RESULTS

These results focus on the validation process with the 14 villages found to have at least one error in the survey sample (37.8% of the total villages). The sample error rates are shown in Table 1. These figures represent the percentage of households selected for surveys that did not really live in the village. For example, in Village A, 1 of the 7 households selected to participate in a survey was found to not (yet) live in the village — a sample error rate of 14.3 percent.

Table 1.
Sample Error Rates

Village	Selected	Not Valid	Error Rate (%)
A	7	1	14.3
B	7	1	14.3
C	7	2	28.6
D	7	1	14.3
E	7	1	14.3
F	6	3	50.0
G	7	3	42.9
H	7	2	28.6
I	6	3	50.0
J	7	4	57.1
K	7	5	71.4
L	7	7	100.0
M	6	6	100.0
N	7	7	100.0

The mean sample error rate was 49.0 percent, but the values were highly dispersed (*SD* = 32.9; *range* = 85.7), prompting two practical questions for analysis. First, why was there a wide range in sample error rates? In other words, why was it that in some villages, most or all of the selected households did not reside in the village when, in other villages, most (or all) of the households selected for surveys were valid? Second, did a village's sample error rate correspond to the overall error rate in the village? For any village with at least one sample error (i.e., one or more of the households selected for a survey found to not live in the village), OT performed a full validation of the entire village roster. Whereas the sample error rate reflects the percentage of invalid households in the survey sample, the overall village error rate reflects the total percentage of invalid households identified through the full validation. So in our analysis, we wanted to determine if a village had a low sample error rate, was the overall village error rate also relatively low?

3.1 Sample Error Rate Representative of Village Error Rate

Sample error rates were highly correlated with overall village error rates ($r = 0.94$, $p < 0.001$). This association is shown graphically in Figure 1. There is a positive linear relationship between sample error and overall village error such that when the sample error is small, village error is small — and vice versa.

The practical implication of this finding is that, with limited time and resources, the process of validating LC1 village rosters could start with random checks of a small subset of households and continue to full validation only in cases of elevated error (e.g., any village with more than 20 percent errors in the random check sample).



Figure 1. Scatterplot showing the relationship between sample error rates and overall village error rates.

3.2 Examining Differences in Error Rates

Overall village error rates are shown in Table 2. There appear to be three clusters of village error rates, labeled as I, II, and III in Table 2 and Figure 2. Error rates in Cluster I range from 11.5 to 18.5 percent. Cluster II error rates are, on average, twice as high as Cluster I error rates, ranging from 27.9 to 44.8 percent. Cluster III error rates are the highest, ranging from 75.0 to 94.7 percent.

Table 2.

Overall Village Error Rates

Village	Total Number of Households Originally Listed by LC1	Not Valid	Valid	Error Rate (%)
Cluster I				
A	52	6	46	11.5
B	21	3	18	14.3
C	32	5	27	15.6
D	39	7	32	18.0
E	27	5	22	18.5
Cluster II				
F	36	10	26	27.9
G	42	13	29	31.0
H	8	3	5	37.5
I	29	13	16	44.8
Cluster III				
J	16	12	4	75.0
K	30	13	2	86.7
L	15	26	4	86.7
M	16	14	2	87.5
N	19	18	1	94.7

Figure 2 shows the total number of village households listed by each LC1. The dark blue shading represents households found not to live in the village (after validation) and the light blue shading represents valid households. The list of villages is sorted by increasing overall village error rate so that villages with the highest proportion of invalid households — households originally listed by the LC1 but found to not live in the village — are toward the bottom.



Figure 2. Total number of households recorded by LC1s, disaggregated by household status (not valid or valid) and sorted by increasing overall error rate.

There is a significant negative relationship between overall village error rates and actual village size (i.e., number of valid households), $r = -0.85$, $p < 0.001$. As actual village size decreases, error rates increase.[5] Cluster I, having the lowest rates of error, also has the largest "real" village sizes. Conversely, Cluster III, having the highest rates of error, has the smallest "real" village sizes. Average "real" village sizes are 29.0, 19.0, and 2.6 households for Clusters I, II, and III, respectively.

One hypothesis is that village leaders with few households actually residing in the village — Cluster III villages — acted on a perceived incentive to inflate population statistics to attract additional resources. Other village leaders with a larger "real" population saw less benefit — and potentially more risk — in falsely reporting population statistics.

In addition to being supported by the village roster data, this hypothesis is also largely supported by follow-up discussions with individual LC1s. All Cluster III LC1s reported that they intentionally inflated village population statistics. The only other LC1 who also reported intentionally misrepresenting figures was the LC1 from Village B. The most common explanation for discrepancies given by LC1s in Clusters I and II was that they were "deceived" by people not really living in the village (yet), but wanting to be counted. In a period of transition like this where households were building dwellings and tending to crops, but commuting from another location, it is understandable that there was some unintentional LC1 error of this type.[6]

[5] With the exception of two Cluster II villages, the smallest villages (Cluster III) also have the most errors in absolute terms.

[6] The LC1 from Village F (Cluster II) reported feeling pressured by village residents into listing households that did not yet live in the village. For this reason, all LC1s were revisited and presented with a letter to be shared with village members that expressed appreciation of the LC1's efforts and restated that this study is not linked to any services.

3.3 Pattern of Errors

If errors observed in Cluster I villages were made without the LC1's knowledge (with the exception of Village B), then the error was non-systematic.[7] If so, then the pattern of error by gender and age observed in Cluster I villages (minus Village B) should make a good basis of comparison for the pattern of error observed in Cluster III villages where leaders reported intentionally inflating population data. Figure 3 shows this comparison.

In this figure, the numbers of errors in each category (gender and age) are displayed as a percentage of the total errors for each cluster. In terms of gender, it appears that Cluster III leaders were biased toward inflating the data with males. Adults between the ages of 18 and 59, and to a lesser extent the very young and very old, were also overrepresented in the errors recorded by Cluster III leaders. Children and youth between the ages of 5 and 17 were underrepresented.



Figure 3. Pattern of error by cluster, gender, and age category.

[7] Non-residents who deceived the LC1 into recording their household likely provided data that reflected their household's composition. Other recording errors (e.g., miscounting, form-related errors) are unlikely to be systematic.

3.4 Correcting Errors

Table 3 shows the original population demographics provided by all 37 LC1s and revised figures after validation of all villages with at least one error in the initial sample. After the validation, the total number of households and the total population was reduced by 8.6 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively. The reduction rate was similar across age x gender categories, with a mean of 9.7 percent (*SD* = 1.3).

Table 3.

Original and Revised Population Demographics

			Males (by age)						Females (by age)					
	HH	Pop	All	< 1	1 to 4	5 to 17	18 to 59	≥60	All	< 1	1 to 4	5 to 17	18 to 59	≥60
Original	1717	9997	5119	274	975	2038	1621	211	4878	230	856	1811	1770	211
Revised	1569	9049	4645	248	873	1872	1462	190	4404	212	781	1627	1599	185
Revised%			51.3	2.7	9.6	20.7	16.2	2.1	48.7	2.3	8.6	18.0	17.7	2.0
Errors	148	948	474	26	102	166	159	21	474	18	75	184	171	26
%Reduce	8.6	9.5	9.3	9.5	10.5	8.1	9.8	10.0	9.7	7.8	8.8	10.2	9.7	12.3

4. DISCUSSION

This pilot study examined the process of training local elected officials to collect population data. The results suggest that this method is both efficient and accurate, and that village leaders are willing, capable, and rational data collectors.

4.1 Efficient and Accurate

In five weeks, one field worker (the second author) managed to (a) distribute simple data collection forms to village leaders in 37 sites; (b) train each leader how to use the forms; (c) collect the forms one week later; (d) enter the data into a database with the help of the first author; (e) return to the field to locate households randomly selected for surveys (with the help of another enumerator working on the larger study); and (f) validate rosters in 14 villages with initial sample errors.

Overall, 62.2 percent of villages had no errors in the initial sample — all of the randomly selected households were found to be residing in the village. In the 14 villages with at least one error, the sample error rates ranged from 14.3 to 100 percent, with a mean sample error rate of 49.0 percent. Follow-up validation of all households in these villages showed that sample error rates were highly correlated with overall village error rates, suggesting that, in a more wide-spread implementation, the validation process can start with random checks of a small subset of households and continue to full validation only in cases of elevated error (e.g., any village with more than 20% errors in the random check sample).

4.2 Village Leaders: Willing Data Collectors

The results also suggest that village leaders — or LC1s — are willing, capable, and rational data collectors. For instance, this pilot study achieved 100 percent participation from LC1s (or their surrogates), which suggests a willingness on their part to engage in activities

within the former scope of their role as village leaders. While it is true that LC1s participating in this study were provided with a small cash incentive (approximately $3.50 USD), this amount was probably not enough to be the primary motivator.

Currently, LC1s, though elected and recognized as government officials, are not paid by the government. And while there is no formal system of compensation, it is common for LC1s to receive a "sitting fee" or a "facilitation fee" from village residents who require LC1 assistance (e.g., land acquisition, dispute resolution). Rebuilding a modern data collection system and reestablishing the role of the LC1s will require that these elected officials receive compensation for their efforts. This project demonstrates that even a small amount of financial compensation can build upon an underlying willingness of LC1s to perform their duties.

4.3 Village Leaders: Capable Data Collectors

The fact that this study achieved 100 percent participation is also evidence that LC1s are capable data collectors. A commonly repeated assumption is that LC1s tend to be unreliable and lack the requisite skills for technical work like data collection. While it is true that some village leaders are illiterate, most have proven to be very resourceful. In this study, each LC1 given a packet of data collection forms returned the completed forms on-time and with relatively few observable input errors (e.g., recording data in the wrong columns).

One aspect of this project that likely promoted LC1 success was individual training. The field manager, OT, was able to work through examples with each LC1 and start the data collection process. Another positive aspect of the methodology was the establishment of a clear deadline — one week. Almost all LC1s completed their work within this timeframe.

4.4 Village Leaders: Rational Data Collectors

Another assumption cited as a reason that village leaders would not make good data collectors is that they will inflate population statistics or exaggerate need to obtain additional support from the government and the international community.

The data suggest that there is some truth to this, but it must be qualified.

Both quantitative validation and qualitative follow-up interviews show that intentional inflation was largely limited to leaders of villages with only a few full-time residents. There was a significant negative relationship between overall village error rates and actual village size (i.e., number of valid households), $r = -0.85$, $p < 0.001$, suggesting that, as actual village size decreases, error rates increase. The smallest villages recorded the most errors in relative and, for the most part, in absolute terms. Follow-up discussions revealed that all of the Cluster III village leaders (i.e., smallest villages) intentionally inflated the numbers whereas only one leader from a larger Cluster II or III village reported doing the same.

Leaders of the smallest villages likely acted on a perceived incentive to inflate population statistics, thinking that the risk (validation) was minimal compared to the potential reward (additional services). As few organizations make efforts to validate data, the risk of being 'caught' was acceptable. This approach was therefore rational and allowed leaders to maximize their expected utility (e.g., village benefits, personal gain, political leverage).

Leaders of larger villages, however, did not have the same risk to reward ratio. Even though it was stressed to them that this pilot project was not linked to services, the risk of being 'caught' — though small — was probably a disincentive as their village was large enough in real terms to attract resources without inflation. Leaders of Cluster I and II villages attributed their errors to "deceptive" non-residents who wanted to be counted in the exercise.

4.5 "Scaling Up" Will Require Government Participation – Not Just Approval

This pilot project provides evidence that village leaders could be productive components of a population data collection system. "Scaling up", however, will require more than just additional forms and trainers. For this effort to work in the short-term and be sustainable for the long-term — after the international community pulls back from intense data collection activities – this effort must have the full support and participation of the local government.

Government endorsement is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for success. For this system to work, the local government should take the lead, with technical support from UNHCR, to develop and implement data collection, maintenance, and analysis. Under the current system — which is not functional as a result of protracted conflict and displacement — LC1s use a "Household Record Book" to record household membership and changes over time such as births, deaths, and in- and out-migration. This hardcopy-only system focuses on useful variables for demographic surveillance, but it does not allow for efficient updates or, most importantly, analysis. Data moves up the chain from LC1s to sub-county chiefs (non-political administrators) to the district office, but the hardcopy format precludes any meaningful analysis, making the whole process almost worthless in the end. Each district needs an electronic database that can be easily updated and analyzed.

A true partnership between the government and the international community would provide an opportunity for the government to rebuild capacity for this vital activity while at the same time moving to a modern data collection system. But the face of the effort needs to be Ugandan. LC1s need to believe that they are collecting data on behalf of their constituents as elected officials, not as unpaid employees of UNHCR. The clearest way to do this is for an agency like UNHCR to play a supporting rather than a lead role.

4.6 Conclusion

To anyone who has worked with local communities — particularly village health teams consisting of 'unskilled' members of the community — the assumptions assessed in this pilot study likely seem unwarranted or worse. Nevertheless, participatory models of data collection and program implementation have not been rigorously evaluated in settings of internal displacement. There is a desire among agencies to incorporate local communities in all phases of operations, but, as the recent Brookings-Bern report highlighted, the state of community participation is more rhetoric than reality in settings of internal displacement. A lack of best practices has hindered this transition.

This pilot study offers evidence that community collaboration is possible in the context of internal displacement and spontaneous return and resettlement. In addition to improving data collection efficiency and accuracy, collaborations such as this implemented on a wider scale in conjunction with the local government have the potential to build capacity for a modern system of demographic surveillance.

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Appendix

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Village Name_____

LC1 Name_____

LC1: For each household with members who sleep in this village, please record the name of the head of household, write the number of males and females who also sleep in the household, and write answers to the questions about the household's resettlement. DO NOT count people who dig during the day and return to a camp to sleep.
WRITE ONE HOUSEHOLD IN EACH ROW.

Important: This is NOT a village registration. Households will NOT directly receive assistance or other programs for signing up. This form will be used to randomly select households to invite to participate in a research survey. Households participating in the survey will receive a small gift. Signing this form does not commit any households to participate in the survey.

	Head of Household				All Household Members Who Sleep Here										When did the first member of your household move back to this village?	Where did your household move from?	If moved from a camp, which zone?	Did your household ever live in Opit?	Number of household members left behind	Is this your household's village of origin?	Number of huts/buildings in this village occupied by your household
					Number of Males, Ages					Number of Females, Ages											
	Surname	First Name	Age	M/F	<1	1-4	5-17	18-59	60+	<1	1-4	5-17	18-59	60+	Month/Year			Yes/No		Yes/No	
ex	Okot	Christopher	32	M	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	01 / 07	Opit	D	Yes	2	Yes	2

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Village Name_____

LC1 Name_____

LC1: Pi dog ot acel acel ki joo ma gi tyer iyee ma gin butu icaro man,walegi ni icoo nying won ot,coo wel coo ki mon ma gin butu I ot ki bene coo lagam ma lube ki lapeny ma dok ikom kit me dugu pa ot eno ni gang. Pe ikwan dano ma gin puru I dyer ceng ci gin dok butu I kem.
Coo ot acel acel pire kene.

Piretek: Eni pe obedo coc mo I caro. Odi pe obi nongo kony cut cut onyo yub mo ma pat pi gin eni. Fom eni obi tiyo me yero ata ata odi wek gin gu bed I lapeny ma obi bedo tyer. Odi ma obi bedo I lapeny eni obi nongo mic mo ma nok. Keto cing I fom eni pe diyo ot mo me bedo I lapeny ma obi time ni.

	Won Gang				Dano weng me gang ma gin butu kany										Awene ma ngat me acel me ott man odugu kwede cen Icaro?	Kwene ma gangi oya ki iyee?	Ka oya ki kem,jon mene?	Tika joo gangi obedo Opit I kare mo?	Wel joo ma I ot ma megi ma gin gu dong cen?	Eni en aye caro ma in iya ki iye con ni?	Wel odi lum onyo odi bati ma tyer I caro ma lugangi bedo iye?
					Wel Coo, Mwaka					Wel Mon, Mwaka											
	Nying Kwon	Nying Kwan	Mwaka	M/F	<1	1-4	5-17	18-59	60+	<1	1-4	5-17	18-59	60+	Dwe/Mwaka			Tyer/Peke		Tyer/Peke	
ex	Okot	Christopher	32	M	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	01 / 2007	Opit	D	Tyer	2	Tyer	2