

H i C N Households in Conflict Network

The Institute of Development Studies - at the University of Sussex - Falmer - Brighton - BN1 9RE

www.hicn.org

Third HiCN Workshop Summary of Discussions: Micro level conflict processes and institutions

Patricia Justino, Philip Verwimp and Tilman Brück*

p.justino@hicn.org

p.verwimp@hicn.org

t.brueck@hicn.org

HiCN Research Design Note 6

January 2008

Acknowledgements: We thank John Spall (IDS) for taking detailed notes during the Third Annual HiCN Workshop at IDS, Brighton on 10-11 December 2007. The content of the summary is the result of discussions among the workshop participants and should not be considered the opinion of HiCN, its Co-Directors or its Affiliates. We thank The Leverhulme Trust UK for funding the Third Annual HiCN Workshop.

Copyright © Tilman Brück, Patricia Justino and Philip Verwimp 2008

* HiCN Co-Directors

First Keynote Address: Scott Gates: Communal Violence and Property Rights

- This presentation examined property rights, inequality and the state, looking at dynamics between groups, and especially the state's role in establishing, defining and regulating property rights. Communal violence was examined by looking at the relationship between property rights protection (PRP) and inequality between social groups.
- Scott presented a contest success function model that demonstrates how increasing PRP reduces the effectiveness of appropriative effort, and increases the equilibrium allocation of productive effort.
- PRP is also modelled as potentially biased in favour of one group, creating inequality. If a society has a moderate level of PRP but some bias away from equity an increase in PRP can result in either a decrease or an increase in total appropriative effort.
- This argument is illustrated through the example of conflicts over property rights in the American west between free-range (pastoralist) cattlemen and homesteaders, and government bias in this conflict. He also made some reference to communal conflict in contemporary Kenya.
- In this model, changes in property rights policy, or at least an increase in bias in property rights protection can lead to communal violence. Simply increasing PRPs can increase the level of conflict in society if equity issues are not addressed. Scott argued that this has implications for international organisations that encourage developing country governments to increase property rights protection without addressing inequality.

Discussion of First Keynote Address

- You have shown us that you can build a model that produces these results, but you have not demonstrated why we should prefer this model over any others by using data
 - Until I have good data, I can only look at this hypothesis on a case by case basis. But I can say that in normal analyses they are not taking into account the kinds of interactions that we are talking about here, and this is the value of the model.
- To complicate your picture more, I have been doing some work on India, and looking at patron-client networks and their biases can help in understanding how the state disproportionately favours some groups over others repeatedly across communities. So I find your model very powerful as it takes into account such biases.
 - I am also interested in the Indian context and especially the Naxalites and the counter militia in Orissa and Chattisgarh where groups are competing for the loyalty of the executive. The state is definitely biased in this case.

First session: Groups, local institutions and alliances

Discussion of Dominic Rohner's presentation: Reputation, Group Structure and Social Tensions

- Identities are often ambiguous, and people have multiple identities and that it may be useful to introduce this into the model.
 - I could simplify the model, using a two period game and introducing some uncertainty. I think the effect of reputation would be the same, but there may be some difference between situations with well-defined groups, and those with less distinct ones.
- When you generalise your results in terms of the macro structure you need to be a bit careful: Ethnic conflict is often more to do with competition at the top rather than tensions at the base.
 - I fully agree that ethnic tensions are not the same as ethnic conflict – social tensions is just one of the ingredients leading to ethnic conflict.
- Could you integrate ‘reputation for retaliation’ for defections into the model, rather than just ‘reputation for cooperation/defection’?
 - It could be interesting to include this and would make the model more realistic. I think the results would go in the same direction though, and probably more strongly, as the threat of retaliation provides extra incentive for cooperation.
- Institutions often develop to cope with the problems of the original dynamics of the model, and the collapse of these institutions that often causes conflict. A next step would be to look at this second level.

Discussion of Jeroen Adam’s presentation: Inter-Elite Competition and Access to Land in Hila, Eastern Indonesia

- You say that the original aim of the Muslims was not to appropriate the land, but that after a long process the Christians left and then the Muslims took their land. But you do not present any evidence to suggest that this was not their aim in the first place.
 - The original violence was ideologically motivated, and the Christians were not attacked by the inhabitants of neighbouring villages, but by Muslims from a different part of the island, and this led the Christians to leave their village. However, once the Christians had left, although the Muslims in the neighbouring villages had not sought to drive them from their land, they took the opportunity to seize the land.
- Is it possible that rising crop prices may have increased people’s interest in gaining control of land?
 - Yes this could be a factor. During the New Order government, Tommy Suharto had a monopoly on cloves, which kept prices very low. During the conflict, the price of cloves went up from 3,000 rupees a kilo to 60,000 rupees a kilo, which may have motivated some actors to take control of the land – not to cultivate the land but to tax the crops or to take part of the harvest.

Discussion of Els Lecoutere and Kristof Titeca’s presentation: The Opec Boys and the Political Economy of Smuggling in Northern Uganda

- Are the Opec Boys just a criminal group?
 - They are not really 'just' a criminal group – they have very strict internal guidelines on behaviour, and very strong internal enforcement mechanisms – this is one reason why they are respected.
- Is the smuggling an illegal activity, or is it informal – it seems to be outside the legal regulatory mechanisms of the state, and so has nothing to do with illegality.
- You talk about the Opec Boys as a vigilante group – but if this is true, why would they launch a rebellion? A rebel is different from a provider of security.
 - It is impossible to interview the Opec Boys about their roles and activities without the word 'rebel' coming up. Many of the Opec Boys have crossed over from being rebels in Eastern Congo, and vice versa. This is the main rationale for actors ceding to their demands, and the Opec Boys also explicitly threaten to take up arms if their demands are not met. The government also had to hold meetings to persuade them not to cross the border to join the LRA in Congo. They are unemployed, uneducated young men looking for the best option to survive, which may be joining a rebel group, but a more attractive option is being part of the Opec Boys.
- Who would be the loser in this game? You might have three players – politicians, the Opec Boys, and a third, perhaps an international oil company? Perhaps the first two could work together to extract rents from the third.
 - Of course there are people losing from this arrangement. For example, at a certain point their vigilante activities were getting out of hand – they were going so far as to set people on fire.

Discussion of Christina Clark's presentation: Borders of Everyday Life: Congolese young people's political identification in contexts of conflict-induced displacement

- What are the opportunity costs of rebelling for the young people in the refugee camps?
 - The opportunity costs were quite low, as people had little to lose from rebelling. People were given a small plot of land to farm, and for those who were farmers this was a way of life they were comfortable with, whereas those who did not have a history of farming were more dissatisfied.
- How does identity play out in this context? Do people identify as certain groups in order to access resources in refugee camps?
 - The main issue here is networks: People will self-identify in different ways according to the context. In this context it is very useful for people to self-identify as Congolese as they receive prima facie refugee status under the African Convention, and are thus eligible to receive services in settlements. However people in Kampala avoid self-identifying as Congolese as this will show that they are not where they are 'supposed' to be – in a refugee camp.

Second Session: Dynamics of Armed Conflict

*Discussion of Jean-François Maystadt's presentation: Does Inequality Make Us Rebel?
A renewed theoretical model applied to South Mexico*

- The interpretation of the Gini coefficient and the GDP is unusual: The Gini is the opportunity cost, and GDP is the looting – the standard interpretation is the other way around. Jean-François replied that inequality seems to be insignificant in some papers, within the greed and grievance debate. But here income inequality is not about grievance, it is really about opportunity costs. If you estimate income per capita alone, it will capture opportunity costs, which will mean that in the case of Chiapas, the opportunity cost effect will dominate the looting effect. When controlling for both the looting effect and the opportunity cost effect, I interpret it as a looting effect, as the opportunity cost effect has been controlled for.
- It might be helpful to use some proximity variables to look at proximity to areas where the army is present, and how that affects likelihood to rebel
- The independent variable is constructed in different ways for different regions – in one case using voting behaviour and in another using crime data. It might be better to run the regressions separately for different regions
- Recent literature argues that income inequality is not significant in causing conflict, except in the case of horizontal inequalities – how do you reconcile your results to this literature? Maybe there is some data available on inequality between groups that you could use. Jean-François agreed that examining vertical inequality at the national level could be misleading, which is why he focussed on the most disaggregated level, the smallest administrative level, in order to make the analysis, although this runs the risk of spatial dependency.
- Maybe what really matters with inequality is very rich people living close to very poor people, rather than if the rich are in one region and the poor in another. This may be why it does not show up in large ‘n’ studies.
- What data did you use for your first conclusion about relative deprivation – if there is data on people not wearing shoes there must be data on access to water etc? Jean-François replied that he had data on access to electricity, water and drainage services, which gave the same result as the variable of not wearing shoes. There was also access to education in the control variable. This yielded a strange result: on its own it was not significant, but when controlling for secondary education, the more secondary education people had received, the more likely they were to rebel.
- Why did you only look at income inequality and not at land inequality? Jean-François responded that studies have found that there was land redistribution shortly before the conflict – an analysis of enforcement of property rights might be more relevant than a study of land inequality – this could be an endogenous variable related to inequality.

*Discussion of Roman Hagelstein's presentation: Where and When Does Violence Pay Off?
The Algerian civil war.*

- How significant does something have to be to count as an event?
 - Essentially the event has to make it into the newspapers that were studied. It is difficult to code events. Some are one-sided events, such as the assassination of a

- civilian by an insurgent. Most cases are fairly clear, such as the detonation of a car bomb, or an assassination. Some cases are less clear, but hopefully in aggregate the result is not too biased.
- Variables are mixed between strategic factors related to the location of the violence, whereas others are related to the place of origin of the fighters. Perhaps you could build some information on the origin of the insurgents carrying out attacks?
 - I could find information on which group is most likely to have carried out the attack, but this is very shaky data, and is not included in most of the newspaper articles.
 - Is there any information on how the official figures are calculated? The figures are from two speeches by the President, and he probably drew them from his government's statistics.
 - The wealth variable that you use - the number of cars - does not change much over ten years and is only at the village level – so they are not really time series data.
 - This is true, which is maybe why there are difficulties in explaining much of the time series in the data. There is also a problem because the events data corresponds to an artificial grid on the map, whereas the data on cars is by province. It might be possible to use GIS data to map the position of villages, and to assign development indicators to these points.
 - What biases are possible when using data from newspapers, for example, under-reporting of incidents in rural areas, or the fact that you looked at French language publications?
 - The major newspapers in Algeria are in French, and so there should not be a language bias, though there may be an urban bias, which I am aware of – if this urban bias is corrected, the results stay more or less the same.
 - One of the problems of this kind of context is that actors try to disguise the violence – for example, if security services kill unarmed civilians, they may report the event as a battle with insurgents – resulting in the overcounting of the number of battles
 - Most of the violence from the state side in Algeria was through 'disappearances' – do you think this was captured in your data source?
 - I am aware of this bias, however data on disappearances is not included in my study, but I agree that they should be.
 - Do you have more fine grained data that would allow you to disaggregate further – for example by saying whether each event involved a civilian or the security forces as victim, whether it was a bomb being detonated, whether it was an accidental killing, etc?
 - It would be possible to disaggregate by actor, as information is available on this. However, this is difficult for massacres, as it is still unclear who perpetrated the largest ones. This is partly why I am more comfortable with aggregating events to the extent that I do.
 - How did you disaggregate your dependent variables?

- It was necessary to make some choices in coding: I tended only to code lethal violence, except in the case of government search operations in the woods against insurgents, where they did not provide information on whether they found anyone.

Discussion of Andrea P. Velásquez Guijo's presentation: The Formality in Property Rights: Determinant in the Military Strategy of Armed Actors

- Taking your results at face value, it seems plausible that if someone has formal property rights, it is more difficult to push them off their land. But it is not impossible to force somebody to sign over their land – and groups may carry out massacres in the area as a sign of intent to make people sign over their land. In this case it may be counterproductive for the state to run a large land titling programme unless they are willing to back it up with presence.
 - Finding data on the forced sale of land is one of my main problems in writing this paper. There are many reports in the newspapers of people arriving in refugee camps saying that they had been forced to sell land, but there is little data. This is a big problem in the conflict in Colombia – even if people have formal title to land, they are often forced to sell it. The state has to be more active in promoting property rights.
- It would be interesting to explore the relationship between informality and inequality – if it is true that further land titling could increase inequality, then land titling programmes could increase rebellion.
- It seems that formal property rights might be a proxy for elite control, and it may not be desirable to increase this.
- You seem to assume that formal property rights are a sign of institutional strength, and informal property rights are a sign of institutional weakness. Why do you make this assumption, considering that informal property rights can be institutionally very strong?
 - My interpretation is that if the state is strong, it will pursue formality in property rights
- Have you run an endogeneity test that will convince us of the causality you present in your paper, i.e. to demonstrate that informality is driving conflict, and not the other way around?
 - I do not argue that informality is a cause of conflict, but that it is a cause of its persistence, as it encourages land appropriation and provides resources for armed groups. With the data I try to sustain this hypothesis. My intuition for informal property rights as a cause of conflict is that when armed groups are making the decision of whether or not to attack an area, the informality of property rights is exogenous – which is why I do not consider there to be an endogeneity problem.

Final reflections – Stathis Kalyvas

- In the presentations so far, in the process of disaggregation and moving to the micro level, there is a strong emphasis on abstract theoretical modelling on one hand, and data at the micro level on the other. What is missing is what is in between: Who are the real actors? What are their real preferences? How do their strategies implement those preferences? Although the abstract theory at the micro level is there, the theorisation of the actual dynamics is missing. This is important

because there are now a huge number of projects studying conflict at the micro level, and as the quality and quantity of such work increases, there will be contradictory results. We need to recognise the heterogeneity of conflict, and to theorise how conflicts are different, and to theorise the actors and processes – to be theoretical at the micro level without abstracting from the reality at the micro level.

Third Session: Household Welfare and Coping Strategies

Discussions on Olga Shemyakina's presentation: Private and Public Transfers as a Coping Strategy Under Armed Conflict: The Case of Tajikistan

- What channels do the remittances come through: Is it through banks or through informal channels? This might be another way to explain differences in household expenditures.
 - A lot of remittance are sent through banks as this is easier, but still the majority is sent through informal channels.
- You could make a stronger case for why remittances are important
 - Remittances are very important in the coping strategies of poor households in Tajikistan: it is estimated that almost every household sends at least one migrant abroad. To some extent the government of Tajikistan should think about developing local opportunities for migrants through business development, and also about ways to improve the life of migrants abroad, as they are often not treated very well.
- You could summarise your paper as the positive effects of conflict
 - Migration could be seen as a positive effect of the conflict, but I have seen a qualitative paper that claims that it tends to be the losers who migrate abroad and who have strong networks outside the country, whereas the winners stay in the country for fear of reprisal. This is perhaps a perverse result, as the losers of the conflict become 'winners' in the future through the benefits of migration.
 - It may not be a positive effect of conflict, but it is a positive response the deprivation created by conflict – it is an active coping mechanism

There is a literature on how the effects of conflict creates new identities, and creates development, which is not very well developed. In this case a huge number of people are moving abroad – 18 per cent of the population – and while they are often badly treated abroad, they are building up constituencies at home for when they eventually return.
- A counter intuitive result you have is that households in conflict areas receive more remittances. It perhaps suggests that they have less income earning opportunities locally, and so need someone abroad to send money. This raises the question of who is sending people abroad? How do households select people to go abroad, and is this affected by the conflict? Maybe these are the households that are already wealthy enough to be able to afford flight tickets to the UK (for example).
- When we think of remittances, we often think of an economic strategy: people choosing to move away in order to be able to send money back. But in a conflict setting we have to look at this differently, as much migration may be involuntary.

It is much harder for these types of migrants to earn income, and so it is remarkable that they manage to send significant remittances back.

- Other remittance studies done in Mexico suggest that poorer communities in the south of Mexico are unlikely to have enough money to make it to the US, and so migrate internally. Those that make it to the US tend to be wealthier. Previous papers have found that the conflict affected areas tend to be wealthy, and so they are more able to send people abroad, which in turn leads to a higher level of remittances.

Discussions on Patti Petesch's presentation: Violence, Forced Displacement and Chronic Poverty in Colombia

- Are you basically asking people to say what has changed over ten years?
 - It was a retrospective study: we were relying on the household to recall what 'step' it was on ten years ago. We asked a range of questions about the community's welfare, and how these factors have changed in the past ten years. Differently from 'Voices of the Poor' we began with a closed question: Are things better, worse or the same as ten years ago? Then we would have five paragraphs of qualitative detail explaining this answer. In Voices of the Poor we only had the five paragraphs without a closed question, which made it more difficult to come back to the material and interpret it later on.
- Did you include people of different generations in the study?
 - Yes we did, although this was difficult because definitions of different generations vary between countries. However, we often found huge differences in perceptions between generations.
- The data gathered here is particularly useful, as it allows us to compare a subjective 'ladder of life' measure of changes in welfare with an objective economic measure.
- How did you measure social capital?
 - We used a crude measurement of organised groups, but we also had a lot of questions on social cohesion that covered more than just formal groups and their role in mobility
- It is interesting that you find that economic leaders seem to struggle once they leave their communities. This may make sense, as landowners may have inherited land and only knew enough to keep it going, whereas those who were only scratching a living may have been more used to improvising
 - This may well be true, but I want to be cautious about this as the sample size is quite small
- You have one neighbourhood in Cartagena called Nelson Mandela that is quite well established. There might be a difference between more established communities like this one, and ones that are newly formed
- This is why I compared Nelson Mandela with Pilar, which is also well established.

Second Keynote Address: Stathis Kalyvas: The Paradox of Governance in Civil Wars

- The motivation of Stathis' paper was to reflect on the best way to disaggregate: Is it better to start at the macro and project to the micro, or to start from the micro and connect to the macro. The first is problematic, due to issues of scaling, data and theoretical imputation. But how should we do the second? Governance in civil wars is used as an example in trying to answer this question.
- Civil wars are not necessarily sites of anarchy, but are rather places where multiple authorities compete, and rebel organisations may substitute for the state and even outperform it. This can make the groups more effective challengers.
- The hypothesis of the paper is that the more effective rebel governance is, the more resilient rebel groups will be, and the more likely that a civil war will drag on.
- The type of governance provided by armed non-state actors is poorly understood, and impressionistic evidence suggests that some types of rebels are much more invested in the creation of states compared to other rebels.
- The case of Colombia is used as an empirical illustration. The data suggest that both guerilla groups and paramilitaries have been engaged in provision of local governance, and practices are roughly similar across actors. This process is taking place in areas long neglected by the state, and turns out to be highly consequential for the conflict.
- How can this insight be linked to crossnational dynamics? The type of warfare may be a potential link.
- The theoretical intuition about the type of warfare is that a strong state against strong rebels represents a conventional war; a strong state against weak rebels is an irregular war; and a weak state against weak rebels is a symmetric non-conventional war.
- Conventional war exhibits primarily mechanized clashes across frontlines, and the state is divided. In an irregular war rebels avoid frontal clashes and the state is challenged from the periphery. In symmetric non-conventional wars there are frontal clashes between irregular militias, and the state has imploded. There is also a residual category of urban warfare.
- The following assumptions and hypotheses are tested: Irregular warfare proxies for stronger, stationary rebel governance; symmetric non-conventional warfare proxies for weaker, 'roving' governance; conventional and urban warfare should also be sites of weaker rebel governance as they are associated with processes of state collapse. The mechanism is 'vital space' due to state-rebel asymmetries. It is hypothesized that irregular wars should last longer than symmetric non-conventional wars.
- Empirical results show that: irregular war is the dominant type of warfare but not the only one. No type of warfare seems to be privileged by either ethnic or non-ethnic civil wars. Urban warfare is more common in countries with higher GDP per capita than the other types of warfare. Higher means of rough terrain privilege conventional and irregular warfare more than urban warfare and symmetric non-conventional warfare.
- In trying to determine what determines the type of warfare, taking into account regional factors can be useful: The end of the Cold War led to a shift towards

- conventional warfare in Eurasia, and a shift toward symmetric non-conventional warfare in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Warfare and civil war duration: multivariate regressions with duration in months of civil wars as the dependent variable confirm that irregular war is the longest type, followed by urban war. All the other variables tested for, ethnic fractionalization, GDP per capita, rough terrain, etc. are not significant with the exception of democracy. All the categories of warfare are statistically significant.
 - A potential microfoundation for this finding is the type of rebel governance. An implication of this is that the decline of civil wars after the mid-1990s may be due to the end of the Cold War via the pathway of the relative decay of the technology of irregular warfare.

Discussion of Second Keynote Address

- We've looked at data from 11 different modern wars, and the distribution of casualties was very similar in all of them – maybe they would all fit into one of your categories. If we were able to gather the data, would the behaviour be different across different types of war
 - There is no reason why distribution should be different across different types of war. We have done some work looking at the severity of human rights violations, and found that in symmetric non-conventional wars severity of violence was higher than in other types of war, although the data was not great so this finding should be treated with caution.
- What might be the effect of fluctuations in aid flows on these conflicts?
 - This would depend on the type of state – in Asia and Latin America, states have generally been strong enough to survive in cases where funding is suddenly withdrawn, which has often led to a decline in conflict as the state remained in place whereas the rebels were no longer able to fight. In Africa, however, my conjecture would be that when funding is withdrawn from weak states, it encourages rebels to challenge the state, and confirms civil war.
- Do you think that withdrawing funding from a rebel group like Hamas would lead it to be unable to fight?
 - Not really, because it is not a question of raw money. Hamas has managed to develop deeply embedded institutions which can function with very few resources, so it is not clear to me that cutting funding will change the situation. This is an argument that applies more to new organisations that evolve in new environments. It might be interesting to do a study on how rebel groups evolve under different conditions of external support. In general we have a very poor understanding of how international factors play out in civil wars, it is not a well developed area of research.

Fourth Session: Reconstruction and Integration in Post-conflict Settings

Discussions on Carlos Bozzoli's presentation: Health Outcomes and Displacement: Evidence from northern Uganda

- It seems that all of the diseases are taken together in the analysis – but diarrhoea is generally a water-borne disease, whereas the others are infectious diseases – so it is important to disaggregate.
 - I agree that it is important to disaggregate, and it could also be useful to see how water plays a role, both in water-borne diseases and to fever, so caution is definitely needed. I would also like to have information on the provision of health services in different places, to help tease out what is related to water and what is not.
- There are timing issues to consider, because this is a one off survey of a certain point in time. In regions such as this there is a rainy and a dry season, and this will affect the findings. Also, in humanitarian situations funding can be very fluid, and the health programmes that are in place can change very frequently, so it is important to take this into account.
 - Timing is also a concern. I have used a regional dummy to control for differences in rainfall patterns. Another thing I could do is to look at patterns of rainfall in the different place where this data was collected, and control for that too.
- Is there a plausible channel of reverse causation? Someone with an infectious disease may be put under pressure to leave the camp – this underlines the importance of disaggregating the infectious diseases from the non-infectious ones to see if it makes a difference.
 - I have a problem with trying to decide who is moving. My hypothesis is that more unhealthy people stay in the camps, but I cannot prove this yet.
- In the literature on the health of children in camps, it seems that the desirability of staying in or leaving camps depends on the conditions in the camps. Could you infer from your results the conditions in the refugee camp? If people were worse off staying in the camp, we could assume the conditions in the camp were bad.
 - I cannot look at the counterfactual – by putting the children who left back in the camp. But I could look at a different refugee camp.

Discussion on Elizabeth Paluck's presentation: Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict with the Media: A field experiment in Rwanda

- What evidence do you have on how long the effect lasted?
 - I went back to all of these places a year later, and did the measurement again. I noticed that the level of agreement with interview questions remained more or less the same. Although the soap opera became very popular after I left, which makes a comparison difficult.
- Ethnic composition – did you find systematic differences according to how communities were composed?
 - To the north communities were generally Hutu, and in the south they tended to be more mixed. I found the same marginal effects within each group, though there were different baselines, dependent on a number of variables such as region, whether people had been in prison, etc.
- The test on dissent seems not to be about reconciliation, but more about empowerment – people dared to speak out – are there also empowerment issues in

- the programme. Reconciliation is not necessarily about being soft with each other, but might also be about being able to argue with your neighbours or with authority.
- The terms ‘reconciliation’ and ‘empowerment’ are often poorly defined. You can fit a number of effects into both terms.
 - What mechanism did you have in place to keep forty adults listening to cassettes for an entire year?
 - This mechanism was generally a lack of entertainments, and we organised the groups at times when people were not working.
 - What are your thoughts on the generalisability of the findings?
 - From my other experience working in Rwanda, I do not think that these groups were particularly unusual, or that being in the experiment influenced them unduly. But the only real answer to this is more empirical work.
 - Do people have biases against radio, considering its seminal role in the genocide, and against other forms of communication?
 - The idea that radio played a seminal role in the genocide needs to be problematised. It is easy to blame the radio, especially because it requires a fairly simple intervention to solve the problem – blocking the signal. Radio was just one factor promoting an intra-group ‘peer pressure’ effect. Studies have shown that many perpetrators were not aware of propaganda messages, and that remote villages without radios had similar levels of violence to those with radios.
 - You brought large groups together answering potentially provocative questions, in what is a vertically organised society – how did you control for particular actors influencing others, or generating self-censorship?
 - I did not control for this at all – it was one of the factors I was interested in, and I made comparisons between individual interviews and focus group discussions.
 - We often think of differences in social life between culture and structure, but you are finding differences within culture, and at a very deep level. Does the literature in psychology talk about changes in norms leading to changes in beliefs?
 - There is a large literature on the functional interdependence between norms, beliefs and behaviour, and I think that you can use your own pet theory to support your personal view on this, as I think there is not enough good empirical evidence on the debate.
 - Did you think of using a control group who did not listen to the radio?
 - I did not want to use a control group for several reasons. Firstly, there are so many effects in this experiment – not just listening to cassettes, but also the social effects of bringing the group together. Secondly, it is an unrealistic control, because everybody in Rwanda listens to the radio. So I am not sure that a control group would tell me anything.

Fifth Session: New Data and Methods

Discussions on Philip Verwimp’s presentation: The Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment of the database

- The only thing that keeps getting repeated is that these are minimum totals and not complete estimates. These numbers have been growing all the time, but the growth has recently flattened out, and so it is quite likely that this database is almost certainly nearly comprehensive. So why do you make it a primary point of emphasis that these are minimum numbers?
 - The deaths are those that we are absolutely sure about, though we are fairly sure that this number will not change dramatically.
- Why do you put so much emphasis on only using this database in conjunction with other databases, when this database seems to have superseded the other sources you mention
 - We are fairly sure that this database is one of the best in Bosnia, but it does have shortcomings that other data sources may not have, and which may therefore also be useful.
- You had an interesting graph on the proportions of different communities that were killed in the violence – could you give some indication of how these groups are represented in society, so that we can see which groups are over-represented in the database?
 - I have not worked this out, but it could be easily calculated by looking at available population figures

Discussion of Michael Spagat's presentation: Bias in Epidemiological Studies of Conflict Mortality

- Do you really think that the discrepancy in the figures can be explained by sampling bias? The discrepancy seems to be too large, even if the sampling bias is potentially a significant problem
 - I have never thought that sampling bias could explain the whole discrepancy. I have tried to focus a little bit more on how the authors have tried to defend themselves, and the discrepancies and anomalies in this. For example, rather than being open and cooperative about their procedures, they denied using the procedures that they originally said they used in the article in the Lancet.
- We need to know the distribution of the Iraqi population – if they all live on cross streets then this study would be fine, but if they live in a variety of other places then there is a big problem.
 - You can use Google Earth to get a good idea of this. The Iraq coverage of Google Earth is good, because many Americans have family there. In the end though everything comes down to how you define what is or is not a main street – so knowing the sample design is important, and the authors have refused to make this public.
- Have you contacted the Lancet to see how the editors would react?
 - I have written a letter to the Lancet expressing concern, but the editors did not seem to be interested.

Discussion of Robert Muggah's presentation: Surveying Armed Violence, Arms and Victimisation in Southern Sudan: Findings and challenges

- Do you have the impression that those who have been disarmed trust the SPLA to be a security force that is beholden to their communities?

- We asked who people would go to, to seek security, and the SPLA seemed to be quite a credible actor.
- You mentioned the ethics of disseminating this data, but what about the ethics of collecting the data? Who were the locally recruited enumerators, and how were they perceived by respondents?
 - We deliberately selected enumerators from the areas where we were working, due to the extreme ethnic stratification from area to area. I am sure this gave certain levels of bias, and confidentiality issues.
- I am interested in the GPS coordinates – obviously these need to remain confidential, but is it possible to code them by distance to borders or distance to the capital? – these could be extremely useful instrumental variables.
 - This is an interesting idea, but we have not done any coding. These kinds of questions would be interesting, but there are ways we could think about coding GPS coordinates so as to make some of the data publicly available.
- The perceptions of the regions seem to be that people feel more insecure post disarmament, could you comment on this?
 - There is variation in how people have experienced their security after disarmament, the responses were highly dispersed and do not yield any firm conclusions. We did see that voluntary interventions yielded a high level of returns and no violence – so some combination of activities may be warranted.

Discussion of Kristen Dalen's presentation: Iraqis in Jordan: Their number and characteristics

- Globally the majority of refugees are not in camps but are in 'self-settled' situations in urban centres
- You mentioned that international organisations had built camps in preparation for an expected influx of Iraqi refugees, so why are these populations not now in camps?
 - Firstly they have taken the camps down. Also, most of the camps were built on the border, but many Iraqis arrived by plane, and it seems to be a well planned move in many cases, with networks and accommodation already in place.
- The figure of 800,000 Iraqi refugees seems to be a maximum figure rather than a conservative estimate, is this correct?
 - Yes, this figure seems to have been inflated by agencies seeking funding, and is far higher than the actual number of refugees.
- How did you sample self settling refugees? This is a big challenge in work on migration.
 - We did not specifically target refugees in this survey, the criteria for selection was that respondents had to self-identify as Iraqis. We had to do it this way because those who are registered as refugees with UNHCR receive an asylum card, but this card does not mean a lot in legal terms and does not provide much protection for them. We did not ask whether people were refugees or not, but 30 per cent of respondents had registered with UNHCR, and around 80 per cent said they had come to Jordan for security reasons.