

# H i C N Households in Conflict Network

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## Fourth HiCN Workshop Summary of Discussions: Linking micro- and macro-level conflict processes

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## First Session: The Geography of War Impact

### *Discussion of Jean-François Maystadt's presentation: Winners and Losers Among a Refugee-hosting Population*

- The model is missing three important independent variables: ethnic economies (if locals are the same ethnicity as immigrants this could impact results); violence (waves of immigrants must have an effect in terms of crime and political violence – local militia could take control and the government may encourage this), taxation (government should be interested in taxing new markets emerging in regions where immigrants arrive – could generate diff dynamic into the market of non-agricultural workers).
  - There is no way to check in the database to check the ethnicity/origin of those already in the area. Perhaps this could be controlled for.
- Regarding your results – it is puzzling trying to figure out how it is possible that a U-shaped relationship was found between where the village is versus where the camp is. The effects on the intermediate and furthest zones is not explained. More information is needed on how this mechanism works. You should try to take territory seriously, for example, perhaps there is rough terrain between villages and this is not controlled for.
  - Response: In camps of a certain size the UNHCR also allows the local population to benefit from services within the camps. But you have to be within a certain proximity of the camp – if you are too far away you may only receive the negative affects of the camp but not the positive.
- Militia activity/vigilante activity and taxation issues will complicate the labour market.
  - Response: The issue would be to know whether taxation has changed over time – otherwise it cannot be controlled for. Taxation by municipalities has increased greatly. This is one of the channels for positive effects – local schools, hospitals etc do improve. This could be investigated further, although it may not be possible to control for it. In terms of militias and violence – when refugees arrive there is a big influx of weapons. Do refugees commit crimes or is it locals using weapons to attack villages? One activity could be to become bandits: ‘bandit’ could be a non-agricultural activity, though it does not seem to be a wide-spread phenomenon.
- Have you tried to feedback into the model the results that you got – does the model need to change as a result of the counter-intuitive results? What is 1 standard deviation of the R index?
  - Response: this might be the next step. Self-employment in the non-agricultural sector was not as expected. One possibility is that entrepreneurs from other regions come and increase competition and local people are pushed out. In the model we need to allow for the mobility of entrepreneurs. One standard deviation of the scale index is about 35,000 refugees.

### *Discussion of Benedikt Korf's presentation: The Geography of War: Navigating through the Governable Spaces of Violence*

- I think you concentrate too much on the theoretical side, and I'm not sure of the goal of the paper. There are possibly two – 1) to try to impose a theoretical structure; or 2) to theorise about the relationship between structure and agency for civilians in conflicts. If it is (1) then the effort is incomplete, and Weinstein's and Kalyvas' findings are not mentioned. If it is (2) then too much weight is put on the structure.

- Response: I disagree that there is too much theory. Our idea is to try and better understand spatial issues. We look at the spatial dynamics in one place and compare them with other places. This perhaps is not clear enough within the paper. The paper was written for an anthropological audience. There is interesting literature in political science that could be included, that criticizes the Collier type of cross cultural analysis. Weinstein has another emphasis from what we are analysing, and we will try to make these points clearer.
- Civilians have a role in civil wars. The paper suggests that civilians just accommodate the consequences/governors of civil war. But some research suggests that it can be the other way round. Civilians have an influence on governance.
  - There is maybe too much emphasis on structure – we assumed that people would be familiar with Watts, who concentrates on structure. We are looking at tactical agency – how people make their living within the given structure. In this framework, every agent can influence structures and this needs to be made clearer in the paper: civilians influence structures too, and this is important. Also, logics are not fixed but change over time.
- The way to go with your project is to try to think of the specific characteristics of each situation, and then to think about empirical characteristics you expect to see. Multiple dimensions need to be included – but this needs to be done in an empirically tractable way.
  - Response: This is an important issue. Our research was largely anthropological, and ethnographic research on institutions is difficult to operationalise. The first step was to try to decompose the thickness of empirical research. We are still at the beginning and perhaps in two years time it will look different.

**First Keynote Address: Sebastian Saiegh: National Cultures and Soccer Violence**

- Violence is a pervasive aspect of life in the developing world, and 70 per cent of African countries have experienced civil war since 1980. Civil war is a major impediment to economic growth, and understanding its causes is necessary for crafting policy solutions.
- The main question that Sebastian’s research is asking is: Can some acts of violence be explained by a society’s cultural norms? Cultural norms are defined as a society’s standards of appropriate behaviour.
- There are some difficulties in addressing this question: It is difficult to disentangle the effects of cultural norms from those of institutions, due to problems of mutual reinforcement and co-linearity. Cross national crime data is also very poor, due to different reporting standards and missing data.
- The approach that his research takes is to examine levels of violence as captured by yellow and red cards in the major European soccer leagues to answer the question: Are players from more violent societies also more violent on the soccer field?
- Michel Platini stated that players approach soccer as “a way of being, a culture”, and in those countries where soccer is considered a national sport the game not only reflects social and cultural processes but it is a part of those processes.
- Cards seem to be a good measure of violence: in the Italian league around 70 per cent of cards are given for violent behaviour. This approach also allows us to look at players from over 70 countries, all operating under the same legal environment and there is extensive data to control for other explanations.
- To try to measure violent national culture he used the number of years of civil war in a player’s home country, and the attitudes to violence based on responses to the 1994-1999

wave of the World Values Survey, captured by the question, 'Is the use of violence to pursue political goals justified?'

- The research estimates the correlation between recent civil war history in a player's country, and yellow and red cards in the 2004/5 and 2005/6 seasons in five major European leagues, and the UEFA Champions League.
- A number of controls were used such as player characteristics (such as age, position, market value); home country characteristics (such as rule of law and income); league dummies (differences in style of play and refereeing across leagues); continent dummies (racial/ethnic discrimination); and team dummies (differences across good and bad teams).
- The main results are that there is a strong positive relationship between home country civil war and yellow/red cards received, and there is no relationship between civil war history and goals scored. Older players earn more cards in these leagues, but a standard deviation increase in civil war for a typical African player has the same effect as an increase in age of two years.
- There is a distinction between playing "hard" and playing "dirty" which varies across cultures.
- Additional questions could include: Is a culture of violence inherited from the distant past? Results were stronger for post-1980 wars, which might suggest that childhood and adolescent exposure to violence rather than deep-rooted history may be the channel. Do players unlearn national culture over time? There is no support for this from the data.
- In conclusion: a Time Series dataset would allow a control for culture when examining institutional influences on conflict. Perhaps greater attention should be given to the education of youths when building programmes for restoring peace/reducing crime.

#### *Discussion of Sebastian Saiegh's Keynote Address*

- I'm sceptical about your results: It's not clear whether this is a story about national cultures or about soccer cultures. Also to talk about 'national culture' in many of the conflicts you're talking about doesn't make much sense as they were often secessionist conflicts. You also need to theorise why civil wars might generate a violent culture after twenty years – the effect could well be the reverse.
  - Response: In Italy we have data on which regions people come from. We also tried dropping some big countries from the sample and the results were robust.
- Studies of soldiers from the First and Second World Wars show that after the wars they returned to their prior state. Although with a draft you have a cross section of people from across society, whereas with other wars the selection is different.
- There is a strong correlation here, but we need to try to understand the mechanism.
  - Response: You're right – in terms of theory we have a lot to learn from you, and the mechanism at the moment looks almost embarrassingly easy.
- Why don't you also look at crime data – maybe just for the countries with reliable data?
  - Response: We tried using crime data, but this meant we lost all of the African countries, which is the essence of the study.
- Football players will be treated differently and there will be different expectations of them depending on where they are from – so players from Africa will probably be treated differently by referees than European ones.

- Different cards can mean different things. People can pick up yellow cards for tactical reasons, and sometimes people are substituted after picking up a yellow card, for tactical reasons.

## **Second Session: Rebel Recruitment and Civilian Targeting**

### *Discussion of Eleonora Nillesen's presentation: Rebel Recruitment, Taxation and Violence in Civil War*

- You may want to split the paper to exploit all the information available. Another suggestion would be to look at the underlying mechanisms in more detail.
- You could give more background information on the Rwandan war and the characteristics of the rebel groups.
- The assumption of indiscriminate violence in 1993 seems questionable. Is the link between initial and subsequent violence a causal one?
- You might want to use village fixed effects instead of province fixed effects.
- You could include two further control variables: a) voting for Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye, b) existence of a main road in the village

### *Discussion of Laia Balcells's presentation: Behind the Lines: Explaining Direct Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars*

- You may want to clarify the definition of war and the division between conventional and irregular civil wars. There might be unobservable characteristics of the war that also determine patterns of violence.
- You could try to divide your sample in early and late war observations, i.e. differentiate between the spike in violence in the beginning and the later period when territory was taken over.
- You could extend your analysis by modelling the pre-war period and by looking at levels of violence and polarization.

### *Discussion of Juan F. Vargas' presentation: Military Empowerment and Civilian Targeting in Civil War*

- The idea of an exogenous empowerment of one of the war parties might be problematic. The conflict dynamics in the battle field are likely to be correlated with civilian deaths. The reduction of power of one of the conflict groups is likely to cause violence.
- You may want to explore in more detail the role of emotions and ideology. Which role do societal norms play and how do they impact on the set of choices available to civilians?
- Qualitative research can help to determine the power of different factions in different places.

### *Discussion of Chris Blattman's presentation: The Industrial Organization of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labour and Child Soldiering*

- What do children in different ages normally do when they do not become soldiers? What is the definition of "children"?
- Which characteristics of children do rebel groups use to figure out who is in the optimal age to be recruited – weight, body mass index?

- You might want to change the structure of the paper, beginning with the theoretical model followed by the empirical evidence.

*General comments to all presentations*

- We should think of the macro linkage of this type of research. Looking at different conflicts and drawing different conclusions might be considered as a simple description of history.
- There are three explanations for violence against civilians in the literature. We should bring these strands together and investigate different types of violence and of perpetrators.
- Looking at civilian targeting from the micro perspective is a main contribution to the literature, as the impact on the civilian population is not covered by most of the (macro) research.
- When investigating violence, the analysis should not be limited to killings, but should also comprise other forms of violence.

**Third Session: Migration and the Labour Market**

*Discussion of Olga Shemyakina's presentation: Migrant Remittances and Household Labour Supply in Post-Conflict Tajikistan*

- I have a problem with the instrumental variables. It's the percentage of households who have someone abroad. Are there hidden conditions that make it correlated with the error term?
- What about the time that passes between when the payment is made and when the survey is made? How regularly are payments sent? Your measure of employment is just a few days before the survey, but the payment may have taken place long before.
  - Response: The payments typically amount to around \$10 paid monthly.
- You need to acknowledge unreliability of newspaper data.
- Do you want to comment on the puzzling effect of the difference between men and women? What are the men doing when the women are working? Are they studying or doing something for the household? Are men's jobs more precarious?
  - Response: Women do not get paid more; they get forced jobs and get paid less. When they receive remittances they tend to withdraw labour from agriculture.
- You might want to think about splitting the paper in two
  - Response: Yes, we've discussed this.

*Discussion of Nathalie Williams' presentation: Betting on Life and Livelihoods: The Role of Employment and Assets in the Decision to Migrate During Armed Conflict*

- In the introduction you say you are proposing a theory of why people migrate. But really you are providing a hypothesis of what influences the decision to migrate. It raises expectations. How do you think about how the intensity of violence affects the decision to migrate?
  - Response: Gun battles increase migration, but bombs reduce migration. I do need to explain this. Bomb blasts are a very low level of violence. In this situation it might be a better decision to stay in the households.
- Have you thought of bringing the non-materialistic value of land into the analysis? Some people in Colombia will commit suicide rather than leave their land. Maybe you should

compare cases – it could be more important in some places than in others.

- Response: I've done some similar work on gender and how it affects perceptions. I found women are more fearful of the same risks, even though men actually have higher risks.

- You look at the opportunity costs of leaving, but not of staying.
- How do these different patterns of migration affect population settlements?
- I have an issue with your livestock finding. It can be difficult to find buyer for livestock, and can be difficult to take them to market. Or the price can be very low, with a general equilibrium effect driving the price down. Do you have data on the sales of livestock? There is evidence on Central Africa that suggests the opposite of what you're claiming.  
- Response: Good point. The biggest difference is that the conflict was low intensity in Nepal compared to Central Africa. In Nepal, selling livestock is not such a big problem, and prices did decrease during the conflict – I'll look into this more.
- How would your results speak to Valentina's? One paper is saying that displacement is voluntary, the other that it is forced, in similar conditions.  
- Response: There is a spectrum of motivations, not a sharp dichotomy.
- What is the meaning of owning livestock for the people in this environment? For example in some places, people with livestock might be nomads and moving has nothing to do with conflict.  
- Response: There are no nomads in this areas – it's a sedentary area.
- Some theories look at people who have a lot of property and migrate to split up the risk – you might want to consider this.

*Discussion of Valentina Calderón-Mejía's presentation: The Impact of Internal Migration on Local Labor Markets: Evidence from Internally Displaced Populations in Colombia*

- I'm not convinced by your instrumental variables. I think that massacres must be related to the overall economic situation of the country and of the region. And this affects labour. I expect investment to be affected by massacres. Massacres more than homicides are a sign that contests over territorial control are occurring between groups. Paramilitary governments may become unstable and massacres may be a sign that current arrangements are about to collapse.  
- Response: My co-author, Ana María Ibáñez, has worked with massacres and homicides as instruments.
- Do you have a sense of in-migration making locals target IDPs because they perceive them as taking their jobs?
- You say you only looked at forced IDPs. How do you know this is true? They might get support from the government for saying this. You define the arrival of IDPs as a shock, when they may arrive as a flow and therefore not as a shock.  
- Response: For a robustness check: We have half a million observations and only 3000 IDPs so I omitted everything except attacks on the local population.
- I think you may have some missing variables – for example IDPs might be becoming household servants and so show up as members of new household – or something similar.

*Discussion of Abbey Steele's presentation: Displacement and Targeting in Civil Wars*

- Your paper helps to explain why there are clusters of IDPs in big cities - a social network explanation. But often the cities are controlled by the same groups that IDPs fled from. Why do they not go to other areas – like rural areas?
- Is the paper really about the effects of violence, on displacement, on violence? Or is it about the effects of a particular type of violence, on displacement, on violence? Should the endogenous relationship between them shape the outcome?
  - Response: I'm not trying to say massacres are the only type of violence that IDPs face. I don't have a variable to measure whether people thought they were going to be targeted as a group, and how they reacted. Understanding the relative proportion of people moving because of perceptions of a particular kind of targeting is very difficult.
- I've worked with seven different IDP organisations. The type of violence tended to be selective social cleansing. I saw collective migration in Pakistan, and it was only women and children because men had been arrested. When they came back it was easier to bring the community to life because they had stayed together. Maybe in Colombia they were trying also to stay together. There were all sorts of fissures going on within groups of IDPs, between groups of IDPs and there is lots of violence that is not massacres – so there's a lot of noise.
- I have a question about the theory behind your findings: even if people are targeted collectively, why can't they go to a distant place and hide their identity? One can lie about things like being a unionist or in FARC.
- Your argument seems to be in three parts: Why don't you test the first part of argument? You have the data to test it.
- Are you thinking about alternative explanations? People are maybe migrating to people they know. Are the people moving because they are being protected in the new area?
  - Response: There are social network effects and economic reasons for why people turn up where they do. I hope to look at it more systematically and in terms of scope conditions. As paramilitaries came through there was definitely a sense of shock. And moving to a different municipality will not remove you from danger.

#### **Fourth Session: The Long Run Effects of War**

*Discussion of Kati Schindler's presentation: Time Allocation, Gender and Norms: Evidence from Post-genocide Rwanda*

- It would be useful to have a clearer connection between theory and predictions. Widowing affects social norms, which affect constraints – these are used to work out how to optimise in frameworks. More traction empirically could be possible and useful. Social norms operate both within and outside a household, and it would be useful to explicitly point that out.
- A comparison of widows and widowers would be useful. Interaction terms could be brought in to aid this comparison. You could also look at households in which the men become disabled.
  - Response: the analysis is constrained by the lack of widowers. Widows don't in general do worse than other households. But if you look at the extremely poor – female headed households are overly represented. So the group is not homogenous. It would be interesting to compare pre war to post war. Genocide was not the only war shock. There

is a lack of quantitative data from before the war. Post-war settlements were created from marginalised people. Households who live in these communities behave differently.

*Discussion of Marian Koster's presentation: Poverty in Post-genocide Rwanda: Do Female-headed Households Belong to the Poorest of the Poor?*

- You could take advantage of the richness better in your analysis. You don't really have enough observations for a large-N analysis – but there is rich data in the life histories. It would be useful to tell us more about how norms are constraining the way people are thinking. Are norms more important in the way that widows move into economic activities than other materialist based approaches suggest? You could move towards a more theory generation exercise rather than theory testing. Some of the claims you make are too strong given the nature of data, and you might want to change the language from 'I have shown' to 'this suggests'.
- You could ask another set of questions: What norms are there that shape land ownership? What is the effect of the land distribution discussed on economic activities? How does this affect widows that are given more land? Do widows take advantage of capital that they are given? How does age affect the economic activities of widows? How do widows take care of family members? Orphans etc?  
- Response: There is a large proportion of Tutsi refugees that have returned back. Specific policies return land to returnees – so Tutsi widows were able to benefit from national policy. This may or may not be the case throughout Rwanda: a cross regional comparison would be interesting. I have not looked at what female headed households looked like before the war. Since the genocide the government has made explicit efforts to improve the position of women through specific laws and policies. Because of government incentives the position of women has improved.
- I would be interested to know more about the role of divorce.  
- Response: Divorce is a very difficult subject to get into in Rwanda. It needs to be explored.
- Community norms rather than household norms seem to play a bigger part in women's behaviour. Women's networks are critical to surviving but don't provide support to help women get ahead, and women have more domestic responsibilities that constrain economic activities. In Rwanda – it is fascinating that women are holding on to the land that they are given. How and why do they do this? The comparison between Time 2 and Time 1 – what did female households look like before the war? Can you see if it is helpful to look at what the community level norms are for women and how they vary? Credit opportunities directed towards women, how do these work? Micro-credit could explain why women are able to hold on to land.

*Discussion of Gabriela Guerrero Serdán's presentation: The Effects of the War in Iraq on Nutrition and Health. An Analysis Using Anthropometric Outcomes of Children*

- It would be good to know more about the role of violence on people's economic activities. Public services were discussed but Iraq is an economy with a lot of private enterprise, which affects the budget constraints of family and the affect of that on nutrition.  
- Response: I will look into economic activities
- A selection affect discussed – MICS data – can be used to see what kinds of selection effects might exist.

- You might want to disaggregate the type of violence that happened. Deaths from shock and awe may have a different impact from sectarian violence – due to expectations and targeting of violence – changing behaviours. How much do we know about the children’s families?  
- Response: There is no information available for disaggregating types of violence.
- Thinking about selection into the sample – you could look at co-variants and look at differences between high and low intensity areas. You could look at propensity scores using those measures. Why don’t you use a continuous measure for war intensity?  
- Response: A continuous measure has been tried. There has to be a substantive amount of destruction to have an affect on children.
- The effect is strongest for the youngest babies – how is this possible as they could be breastfed exclusively – in which case it is the mothers who are struggling to meet the needs of babies. So you might want to look at maternal health.

*Discussion of Mevlude Akbulut-Yuksel’s presentation: The Long-Run Effects of Warfare and Destruction on Children: Evidence from World War II*

- I have two main concerns with your paper. Firstly the identification assumption: that places with greater destruction would have the same patterns of disruption of schooling/health. Big cities may have different results to rural communities: urban areas may be more polluted, rural areas may have better community cohesion. Secondly, the measurement of the treatment of destruction – I’m not so sure about using the amount of rubble per capita, some places may have smaller houses than others. Units per capita could work better. There may be a random fluke for one city to be targeted over another – it would interesting to do a regression to discuss this.  
- Response: I looked at urban/rural divide but it didn’t have any affect. I have two measures of destruction – rubble and destruction of units. They are highly correlated so I don’t expect any difference in data.
- Migration is a problem: looking at a long horizon, people may have moved a lot. Non-movers in the paper could have moved a few times before measurement started.  
- Response: I acknowledge that this is a problem – but I just looked at whether people react to destruction, and tried to see why people migrate. Germany has very low migration, so I do not expect people to move. This was the best I could do given the data. I do not find statistically significant different affects by gender.
- What happens to the people who came as refugees from East to West Germany? 5/6million people –how much were they affected by the war – the paper does not say anything about that.  
- Response: There is a lack of data, and no way to identify who fled.

**Second Keynote Address: Roger Petersen: Households and Violence**

- In his address, Roger summarized his own analysis and methods of studying micro-level conflict processes and then looked at that research in light of the macro-level studies that came to dominate political science during the earlier part of this decade
- Roger has a commitment to an analysis of mechanism and a micro-process approach. His emphasis is on causal specificity and maintaining realistic human actors in his analysis. Correspondingly, his emphasis is on individual level mechanisms. A mechanism can be

defined as a “specific causal pattern that explains individual actions over a wide range of settings”. A process is a sequence of mechanisms.

- In the late 1980s and early 1990s Roger was researching the question of how weaker peoples maintain resistance against stronger peoples and his primary case was Lithuania during the 1940s.
- The striking feature of this resistance was variation among communities. One community would have an extensive resistance organization while the one next to it would have no resistance. There was something going on at the local level driving this variation, which Roger’s research sought to understand.
- He visualises four different interacting levels of analysis: Individual, community, state and national: Community was critically important. He specifies mechanisms at the local level that drive people along a spectrum from collaboration, through neutrality, to resistance, and those that sustain their resistance once they are strongly resisting. He then tries to specify sequences of mechanisms, that is, processes.
- His results from the first round of fieldwork indicated there are 10 different mechanisms driving behaviour between nodes on the spectrum of resistance. Four mechanisms drive movements from neutrality to non-violent resistance: resentment formation, threshold-based safety calculations with society-wide referents, focal points, and community-based status rewards and sanctions. Two mechanisms provoke movements into armed, organized resistance organizations: threshold-based safety calculations based on community-wide references and community-based norms of reciprocity; and four mechanisms help sustain armed resistance organizations: Threats, along with psychological mechanisms: the value of small victories, the tyranny of sunk costs, and wishful thinking.
- He makes a number of general predictions based on the structure of the community that can facilitate rebellion, such as the density, centralization, and homogeneity of the community and the structural positions of first actors within the community.
- Roger then went on to talk about macro-variable approaches to conflict analysis. These tend to have a list of independent variables such as GDP, level of ethnic heterogeneity, lootable resources, terrain, population size, dominant group, “bad neighbourhood,” trade and political grievance. Explanations consist of some combination and interpretation of a subset of these variables that are correlated with onset or duration of conflict.
- These approaches generally assume one mechanism: rationality. One example is the GDP variable. Laitin/Fearon use this as a proxy for state power and constraints on rebels, Collier and Hoeffler use it to proxy opportunity costs for rebels. Both are basic rational choice considerations. The statistically significant variables are assumed to produce the constraints and incentives that affect the rational decisions of rebels in their pursuit of narrow interests, primarily economic goods.
- There are several problems with this approach. According to this research, there should not have been either the initiation or maintenance of violence in Lithuania and Kosovo. Both are tiny countries, neither have high mountains and both were fighting a well-armed and ruthless state.
- These variable-based approaches do not address the transformation of the local social order: they are too static. At a certain point in a process of conflict, normative mechanisms of communities and households helped overcome the constraints connected

with powerful states. People were dragged into participation through social norms, and stayed due to threats and psychological mechanisms.

- The emphasis on only one mechanism prevents them from observing the influence and interaction of other mechanisms. In the Lithuanian case, the alteration of risk considerations by social norms at a critical juncture is a key element. Likewise, political and historically based emotions have a role in generating resistance.
- We need to find a way to enhance interactions among those who practice micro-level mechanism-based qualitative fieldwork and those running the state-level quantitative studies.
- To do this we can meet in the middle, and concentrate on process. Variables shape and trigger mechanisms at different stages of a process. The variables' hypothesized effect will not be the same across a case. For example - an increasing level of violence and state threats changes the reference frame in the Lithuanian case, from state to community. The set of relevant mechanisms then can change from rationality and emotions to community norms. Under very high levels of state pressure and high chances of death or capture, then psychological mechanisms come into play. But the relationship between the hypothesized macro variables and the process of resistance and rebellion usually needs refinement.

#### *Discussion of Roger Petersen's Keynote Address*

- You mentioned the Minerva project – Should we get involved? I'm pessimistic about it, as I think it would be bad for our capacity to get too involved. It is important to maintain an autonomous capacity, and anthropologists working embedded with troops make life difficult for other researchers working in other environments.
- Why was the conflict different in Latvia and Estonia, from Lithuania?
- Were there any structural features of villages that would make them 50/50 Soviet/resister?

#### **Fifth Session: Winning the Post War Peace**

##### *Discussion of Esteban Klor's presentation: The Struggle for Palestinians Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada*

- Fatalities seem to matter when a family member is affected, but not fatalities in general. What activities accompany fatalities (meetings, proactive activities) and in what regard do interventions from NGOs have an impact?  
- Response: I did a similar analysis of the effect of Israeli fatalities on counter-terrorism and found a long-lasting effect, the reason being that attacks on Israelis are rare. Fatalities will not lower violence, but will lower radicalism. I should clarify that I used two independent Palestinian surveys for his study.
- In the presentation the topic is framed as counterterrorist violence, while in the paper the focus seemed to lie on state violence – they are not necessarily the same thing
- Why did you study violence on the basis of location since there was a lot of migration?
- You could improve the empirical tests by using multilevel estimation and serial correlation. The latter is based on the concern that your analysis does not capture the effect of an attack, but of an accumulative attack.

*Discussion of Eik Leong Swee's presentation: On War and Schooling Attainment: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

- It is innovative to use individual-level data to study your question. You might want to consider matching, and provide more description of the historical and cultural context. What was the schooling system like in general, what were considered as the benefits of primary and secondary schooling? Was it culturally necessary to go to primary school, but not to secondary school?
  - Response: Primary school was compulsory and secondary school mandatory.
- I wonder whether school duration matters--at age 10, would it be easier to catch up than at age 25? Also, I'm not sure about the mechanism of youth soldiering.
  - Response: Regarding the qualitative data on youth soldiering, there was some evidence for youth dropping out of school since the development of human capital does not pay off.
- I like the identification strategy but would like to know more about the mechanism that drives the outcome. The Bosnian war was not very long--why is it so hard to catch up with education after the war?

*Discussion of Sarah Zukerman's presentation: Achieving Post-War Peace: The Internal Politics of Colombia's Demilitarizing Paramilitary Groups*

- I was happy to see that you took out "peace" from the title of your talk since the outcomes that can be observed in Colombia are not necessarily peaceful.
- I think you need greater conceptual clarity in terms of framing the quantitative and qualitative analysis. I was confused by the way you described the characteristics of rearmament. You might want to call the process that you capture in your dependent variable "remilitarization."
- It is important to bear in mind that there is no dichotomous distinction between armed and unarmed groups and that groups can exercise many different forms of violence in order to maintain their economic, social, and political influence even if they are by definition unarmed. Some of the examples that you give in your paper of unarmed organizations seem to suggest that even unarmed groups use violence to attain their goals (kidnapping etc.). Moreover, the distinction between economic, social, and political activities was not clear.
- Your concept of networks is not particular to military groups since it comprises family and friends networks. How can one say that armed groups rearm on the basis of these networks?
- What is the main goal of DDR? Is DDR successful if an organization disappears? The disappearance of a group and the occurrence of high levels of violence can be connected to each other. This, however, would have to be considered an unsuccessful outcome of the DDR process. You seem to suggest in your paper that the disappearance of an organization is a successful outcome of DDR.
  - Response: The goals of the DDR process cannot be decided a priori. The integration program involved the commanders since if that is the case, foot soldiers are more likely to disarm. The success of DDR also depends on the actions of the state. When the state can fill the power vacuum, negotiate with the organization that has the power in the region, or challenge this organization, success is more likely. Also, when a group rearms it also has other kinds of (economic, political) control.

- How can one differentiate between criminal and violent activities that have different theoretical meanings and implications (e.g. drug-money organisations vs. military organisations)? Moreover, I find it hard to imagine different values of the dependent variable--how should one deal with organizations that have the same name but different leaders, are these rearmed groups or not? The dependent variable is not necessarily rearming vs. non-rearming, but variation in rearming. Also, when organizations control territory, it is not necessarily the arms that “do the work.”  
- Response: Arms helped the organizations to gain control. When an organization is not rearmed, its power is based on latent coercion. The difference between criminal and violent activity is hard to specify; often this is used for rhetorical reasons in order to (de)legitimize a group.

*Discussion of Steve Shewfelt’s presentation: Micro-level Effects of Trauma*

- I’m interested in the question of matching and of the disaggregation of different categories of trauma.
- It is important to be explicit that one level of analysis does not necessarily translate to other levels of analysis.

*General comments on the fifth session*

- These papers have some contradictory findings when compared to each other. While Esteban’s paper suggests that fatalities do not have a long-term effect, Steve’s paper suggests that there is a long-term effect. Swee’s reference to the youth-soldiering mechanism also suggests a traumatic effect. From Chris Blattman’s paper, we learn that youth soldiering has no effect. Is it the different settings that account for these contradictory findings, or do the analyses suffer from identifying the wrong effect? If it’s the former, then we should think more comparatively and think about the specifics of the respective cases that drive the outcome.  
- Response (Steve Shewfelt): Even in my own paper I found opposite effects of war on recurring violence.

**Summary of the workshop**

- It is important to be self-conscious about our observations. Researchers often don’t know about the places they are studying. In this workshop, the presenters collected their own data, and this has many benefits.
- However, there are two points to emphasise: Firstly, it is important to keep in touch with research outside our contexts, in order to understand which factors are specific, and which are general. Secondly, we need to understand certain kinds of choices, especially norms, culture and networks that exist and relations between networks. Otherwise sources of potential endogeneity can be ignored and we need to get more in touch with social anthropology and sociology to understand some of the strategic factors.
- Experimental economics can challenge rational choice economics, and we need to find new models of decision making.