

Causes and Consequence of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria

Ernest Ogbozor¹

HiCN Working Paper 227

July 2016

Abstract:

The consequence of violent extremism on rural livelihoods has received less attention in academic literature. This paper addresses three fundamental questions: What are the socio-economic causes of terrorism and violent religious movements? What is the root cause of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria? And what are the consequences of Boko Haram's violence on rural livelihoods? Based on a review of the literature and current studies in Nigeria, this paper contends that violent extremism has a correlation with the socio-economic conditions in Northeast Nigeria, and there are direct and indirect impacts of extremism on rural livelihoods. The paper concludes with a suggestion of further studies on the drivers of violent extremism, and the rural livelihoods strategies for coping with extremist activities in Nigeria.

Keywords: Causes, Consequence, Extremism, Livelihood and Nigeria

¹ Ernest Ogbozor is a visiting research fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS), Usmanu Danfodiyo University Sokoto, Nigeria. He is also a doctoral researcher at the School for Conflict Analyses and Resolution, George Mason University, Virginia. Ernest is currently leading two United States Institute of Peace projects in Nigeria: "Understanding Informal Security Sector in Plateau, Kaduna and Kano States" and "Strengthening Graduation Education in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Northern Nigeria. Ernest was a Ford Foundation Fellow at the Brandeis University from 2010 to 2012. He previously worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Prisoner's Rehabilitation and Welfare Action (PRAWA/Nigeria) and TechnoServe/Nigeria in different capacities. Ernest doctoral dissertation is titled "The Impact of Violent Extremism on Rural Livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin". Email: eogbozor@gmu.edu

Introduction

The factors that generate and sustain violence from terrorist groups have been widely studied all over the world. However, Denoeux and Carter (2009:1) points out that much of what we know about violent Islamic extremist groups is based on the experience in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), and South Asia. In contrast, there is less information about violent Islamic militant groups in sub-Saharan Africa compared to MENA and South Asia regions (Denoeux and Carter, 2009:1). Specifically, Paden (2009:3) notes that Nigeria is the least well known of the Muslim world's pivotal states despite having the sixth largest population of Muslims in the world, and the biggest economy in Africa (The Economist, 2014). There is, therefore, a lack of adequate information about violent Islamic militants in Nigeria, such as Boko Haram (aka the Islamic State of West Africa), and perhaps its relationship with the socio-economic conditions in the country. Though, recent scholarships have attempted to explain the link between socio-economic conditions and terrorist activities (Krueger, 2007; De Mesquita, 2008; Meierrieks and Gries, 2013; Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2006; Berriberri, 2003). But the case of the Islamic State of West Africa in Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, in general, remains relatively understudied.

Nonetheless, the rise in violence from militant religious groups led Juergensmeyer (2000:7) to say that he was puzzled, not because bad people do bad things, but rather why bad things are perpetrated by people who otherwise appear to be good. Gopin (2002) also questions why religion is a source of peace, and at the same time a source of violence. To Emerson and Smith (2001), religion could have both a positive and a disruptive face, "Religion can help to keep everything in place. But it can also turn the world upside-down." This paper mainly stems from these synopses, though; it's not why people who

otherwise appear to be good do bad things, but on the nexus between violent Islamic extremism and socio-economic conditions in rural Africa context. According to Newman (2006), there is a causal relationship between social, economic, political and demographic conditions and terrorist activities. Sandole (2010:107) explains that terrorism may be a manifestation or a symptom of deep-rooted origins of political violence. Rubenstein (1988) adds that terrorist is often responses of frustrated people, in his words; an average terrorist is “the guy next door” living on the edge of despair (Rubenstein, 1988). These assertions agree with the repercussions of the denial and deprivation of basic human need (Burton, 1990). Ted Gurr also argues that people become dissatisfied if they feel that they have less than they should and could have, and over time, such dissatisfaction leads to frustration, anger, and rebellion (Gurr, 1970). These explanations have relevance to the socio-economic conditions that led to the birth of Boko Haram.

Thus, understanding the relationship between violent Islamic extremist groups such as Boko Haram and their socio-economic determinants is important in explaining the root causes, consequences and response to the militant group. The specific questions addressed by this study starting with a definition of terrorism and violent extremism are: What are the socio-economic causes of terrorist movements? What are the causes of violent religious movements? What is the root causes of the Islamic State of West Africa (aka Boko Haram)? What is the consequence of Boko Haram’s violence on rural livelihoods? and conclusion.

1.0 Definition of Terrorism and Violent Extremism

According to Nasser-Eddine et al. (2011:5-9), the terms political violence, terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism have been used interchangeably in academic

literature, but the basis for the understanding of the terms have mostly developed over the years through scholarships, government, and security institutions. A sample of the definitions of the key terms used in this document such as terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization are discussed below.

What is terrorism? Terrorism is “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, cited by Sandole et al. 2004:4). The Department of Home Land Security (DHS) also defines terrorism as political violence perpetrated against civilians by sub-national groups or state agents, in order to influence their target audience (cited by Sandole et al. 2004:4). Different scholars and practitioners have also defined terrorism in various ways. However, an approach at harmonizing the different definitions of terrorism was carried out by Schmid et al. (2005); they collected and analyzed about 109 definitions of terrorism in literatures to identify their primary component. The three most significant factors that they found and their frequencies were violence (83.5%), political goal (65%), and inflicting fear and terror (51%) (Schmid et al, 2005). Cunningham et al. (2003) in response to this analysis said, while it provides an objective understanding of what constitutes terrorism; it is too broad for an operational definition. The difficulties in defining terrorism were widely expressed by scholars; terrorism was regarded as a difficult term to define and has no precise or generally accepted definition.

Also, the definition of violent extremism has generated interesting debates. According to Holmer (2013), the term violent extremism means different things in different contexts. The Australian National Counter-terrorism Committee Framework defines violent

extremism as "a willingness to use or support the use of violence to further particular beliefs, including those of a political, social or ideological nature" (cited by Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011:9). Neumann et al. (2011:16) defines extremism as political ideologies as well as a method that oppose a society's core values and principles. Borum (2011) contends with this definition, but asserts that it could be applied to an ideology that advocates the religious supremacy and opposes the core principle of democratic governance and human rights. These definitions of violent extremism emphasize the use of violence to further religious ideologies, political or social goals.

The term radicalization is widely used, but poorly defined (Borum (2011:7). Borum (2011) referred to radicalization as the exposure and acceptance of ideological messages, and the change in individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist viewpoints. The Department of Home Land Security (DHS) also defines radicalization as "the process of accepting an extremist belief system, and a willingness to support or facilitates violence as a method to effect societal change." From these explanations, it can be deduce that radicalization is a process of accepting extremist belief and not violent action taken.

To sum up, the terms terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization are often used interchangeably, but they do not mean the same thing. However, one can argue based on the analysis above that terrorism entails the use of violence against civilians and other target groups to achieve political objectives or social change. Also, Newman (2011) and Borum (2011) rightly captured the difference between violent extremism and radicalization; radicalization is a process, whereas violent extremism is an action taken. These definitions apply to this project. Let us now discuss the socio-economic causes of terrorism and violent extremism.

2.0 Socio-Economic Causes of Terrorism

The theories that have been used to explain the causes of terrorism include the failed state theory (LeFree et al., 2008), structural theory (Crenshaw, 1990; Galtung, 1996), rational choice theory (Eager, 2008), root cause theory (Newman, 2006), relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), basic human need theory (Burton, 1997), identity theory (Tajfel, 1971) and others. However, Schmid and Jongman points out that these theories are like other social science theories, reflections on the types of debate and conversations that are occurring in the discipline and not a formal proposition that have been empirically and conclusively tested (cited by Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011:10). Hence, these theories are not devoid of gaps and limitations.

According to LeFaree, there is a correlation between state failure and terrorism (cited by Sandole, 2010:105). The fail state theory according to Sandole (2010:105) is a conceptual repository on multiple variables such as poverty, corruption, and unemployment that makes an environment conducive to terrorism. This theory has been applied to explain terrorism in some countries classified as a failed state, for example, Somalia (David, 2013). However, this theory is inadequate in explaining the motivation of terrorism in countries that did not fall into the failed state category. According to Onapajo and Uzodike (2012), the Nigerian case is unique because it has some characteristic of "failed state". In 2013, Nigeria ranked 16th in the world in the failed and failing state category (Fund for Peace, 2013). Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:12) contends that the inability of the Nigeria government to deliver positive political goods such as infrastructures, security; healthcare services and employment opportunities relegate its position to a failing state. However, designating the country as failed state is debatable (David, 2013:7); giving the fact that

Nigeria has the biggest economy in Africa (The Economist, 2014).

The rational choice theory is often used to explain the economic motivation for participation in terrorism. According to Eager (2008), involvement in terrorism is often based on the assessment of the cost and benefit; if the benefit is high, individuals participate. However, the flaw in this theory according to Eddine et al. (2011:10) is when the group behavior is compared to individual choice. Eager (2008) maintained that whether or not an individual participates in-group action, they could still benefit, thus becoming a 'free rider.' In the Nigeria case, Boko Haram has been associated with bank robberies and thefts, but these criminal behaviors are at variance with the group's overall grievances against the Nigeria State. According to AFP, Boko Haram has warned "Nigeria will not know peace until sharia (Islamic law) is strictly enforced." Although it can be argued that the proceeds from some illegal Boko Haram's activities are channeled to fund the sect's activities. But it is difficult to reconcile the group's objective with any individual member's goals. This deficiency questions the relevance of this theory to the Nigeria context.

Most scholars cited the root cause theory and the relative deprivation theory as more relevant to the explanation of the socio-economic causes of terrorism. According to Newman (2006), there is a causal relationship between the underlying social, economic, political and demographic conditions and terrorist activities. Newman (2006:751) further adds, factors such as poverty, social inequality, exclusion, and political grievance, are the independent variables on which the emergences of terrorist organizations are dependent. Sandole (2010:107) also add that terrorism may be a manifestation or a symptom of deep-rooted origins of political violence. More recent literatures have also emphasized the

significance of understanding and addressing the underlying causes of violent extremism (Denoeux and Carter, 2009); as an effective preventive measure.

The relative deprivation theory is a belief that individuals or group are deprived of socio-economic resources compared to others. Gurr (1970) argues that people become dissatisfied if they feel that they have less than they should and could have, and over time; such dissatisfaction leads to frustration, anger and then rebellion. Gurr (2005: 20) concludes that structural poverty and inequality in some countries are the breeding grounds for violent political motivated movements in general and terrorism in particular. Many scholars cited the relative deprivation theory to explain the emergence of Boko Haram. Aigbibo (2013) maintain that the Boko Haram's challenge can be resolved by addressing poverty and economic deprivation in the northeastern region of Nigeria where Boko Haram originated. He further said, "A swelling population amid economic despair not only creates an environment in which radical extremist groups can thrive but also legitimizes their actions." (Aigbibo, 2013). Let us now examine some empirical studies to test these theories.

Generally, there are several approaches to understanding the causes of political violence, terrorism and violent extremism – political, psychological, psychosocial and socio-economic approaches (Crenshaw, 2010). However, the socio-economic causes have generated interesting debates, particularly on the link between poverty, education, and terrorism. According to Mesoy (2013:2), the debates on the relationship between poverty and terrorism can be categorized into three groups: "No link" (Kreuger, 2007; Piazza, 2006), "weak link" (Hegghamer, 2010; Wiktorovicz, 2004) and "link" (Seddon and Hussein, 2002; von Hippel, 2009). These different classifications represent the

divergence of opinions on the issue.

James Piazza (2006) assessed the hypothesis that poverty, inequality, and poor economic conditions were the root causes of terrorism using a quantitative study of 10 countries cases. He found that there was no correlation between economic development and terrorism. Piazza study shows that factors like ethno-religious diversity and state repression were important determinants of terrorism. This study agrees with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on US Report 2004 "Terrorism is not caused by poverty" (cited in Krueger, 2007:3). Krueger (2007) also used data from public polls and the US counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the position that terrorism is not caused by poverty and low level of education. Krueger (2007:89) maintains, "civil liberties are an important determinant of terrorism." Thus, Piazza (2006) and Krueger (2007) main argument is that poverty and low-level education does not correlate with terrorist activities.

Contrarily, in the case of Maoists insurgency in Nepal, Seddon and Hussein (2002) found that the failures of the ruling government created the pre-conditions – poverty, inequality and social discrimination that led to widespread discontent, and ultimately Maoist insurgency. Additionally, von Hippel (2004) uses the cases of Somalia and Pakistan, where young people have been recruited to join extremist groups in poor communities to argue that the poor can be lured to terrorist beliefs. According to von Hippel (2004), terror groups can offer social services that the governments cannot provide thereby attracts support from the poor and alienated populations. The main argument by Seddon and Hussein (2002) and von Hippel is that there is a correlation between poverty and terrorism, particularly in poor communities.

Hegghammer (2010) neither agree with Krueger (2007) nor von Hippel's positions as expressed above. His study shows that most members of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia were from the middle class and not poor backgrounds or elites in the society. De Mesquita (2005b) also argued that terrorist organization recruitments are based on terrorist ability. According to de Mesquita "Better educated people make better terrorist", he concludes that there is a positive correlation between socio-economic status and terrorist activities. These different opinions make the debate on the relationship between terrorist activities and socio-economic conditions interesting but inconclusive.

In an attempt to provide an explanation for these different opinions, Tom Parker explains that terrorism and violent extremism come in many forms and has multiple and overlapping causes and therefore poses tremendous challenges for explanation (cited in USIP, 2014). Sinai (2007) also argues that the root causes are dynamic, fluid and constantly changing. These attributes, therefore, make explanations of the underlying causes difficult. Gurr and von Hippel suggested a way forward to the explanation of the relationship between socio-economic conditions and terrorist activities. According to von Hippel (2004), local contexts and groups must be studied individually to avoid complexity. Gurr, (2005: 19) also asserts that "terrorism today has local and transnational costs, thus, requires coordinated local, national, regional, and global policy responses." Based on these assumptions, it can be argued that explaining the underlying causes of terrorism is complex, but Gurr and von Hippel suggested approaches to managing the complexity. Let us now turn to the specific causes of violent religious movements.

3. Causes of Violent Religious Movements

Juergensmeyer (2000:10), made us understand that religion is not innocent, but at the same time does not necessarily lead to violence. According to him, violence happens when religion mixed with violent expressions of social aspirations, politics, and personal pride. Seul (1999) in "Ours is the Way of God," maintains that religious conflicts are not supposed to be about religion, and has non-religious causes. He argues that religion often supplies the fault line for intergroup conflict by serving as mobilization factor, but there is nothing like religious conflict (Seul, 1999: 558). The question of whether religious violence actually exists has particular relevance to the Nigeria situation.

Tsogo (2011) suggested that the social movement theory (SMT) rightly explains the use of religion as a unifying and mobilizing factor for violence in Nigeria. Nigeria is equally divided between Islam and Christianity and the cleavages to these religions often supply the fault line for ethnic, election and other political motivated violence in the country (Tsogo 2011). However, Tsogo (2011) said that in the Nigeria case, the social movement theory does not explain the specific root causes or motivations and triggers that induce collective groups to take action; it only describes the use of religion as a mobilization factor for mass violence. Thus, it can be deduced that religion is not the root cause of religious conflict but can serve as the fault line for group mobilization for violence.

Nevertheless, the question that remains unanswered is the motivation for the current rise in violent religious groups, such as Boko Haram and other Islamic militant groups. To Kressel (2007), it is not only Islam that fosters religious extremism; Christianity and Judaism have their share of anti-secularists also. Though, Kressel contends that Islamic

extremists are far more frequent and dangerous today than other religious fundamentalist groups. The instrumentalist and expressive approaches have generally been used to explain the motivations for the rise in violent religious movements (Rubenstein, 2002). However, Rubenstein (2002) maintains that neither the instrumentalist nor the expressive approaches explain the complexity of terrorist motivations and thinking. This agrees with Juergensmeyer explanations about the limitations of the rational or emotional approaches. Juergensmeyer said that picturing the terrorist, as rational actors will make it impossible to communicate with them as well as to understand the roots of their struggle. Juergensmeyer further describes religious terrorism as a struggle that links political issues with a timeless battle between the forces of good and evil, a phenomenon he referred to as “cosmic warfare”. Rubenstein and Juergensmeyer conclude that the rational and emotional explanations of the violent religious movements are inadequate.

Rubenstein further argues that modern religious terrorist groups like secular terrorism can be understood as Respond of individual or group situation which they are dominated; opportunities for which they are violent or non-violent are limited; and their oppression is perceived as desecration, demanding purifying action. Rubenstein (2002:17) also argued that a key precondition for the rise of religious terrorist movements is the absence of potentially effective forms of mass resistance to oppression. He concludes that depending on the circumstance; oppressed populations may respond violently or non-violently to oppressions.

In contrast to Juergensmeyer argurement, Rubienstein (2002) said that it’s not clear if religious violence is savage and relentless as described by Juergensmeyer. He maintained that many characteristic considered peculiar to religious terrorism also characterize

secular struggles. He suggested identifying psychological state that correlates with socio-political context of conflict and its religious dimension for a more practical approach at resolving violent conflict with a religious dimension.

In this direction, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Project on the "Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism," provides practical suggestions on how to understand the root causes of violent Islamic extremism (Denoeux and Carter, 2009). According to this framework, the drivers of violent Islamic extremism can be categorized into three major categories: socioeconomic drivers, political drivers, and cultural drivers (Denoeux and Carter, 2009: ii). This approach, according to Loada and Romanium (2014) identifies a range of causal factors of violent extremism. Denoeux and Carter (2009) further notes that these factors can also be disaggregated in the stage of analysis into "push" and "pull" factors. Push factors are the root causes that supports in "pushing" vulnerable people onto the path of violent extremism such as poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy (Ibid). "Pull factors" are the attractive attributes and benefits that extremist groups use to lure or "pull" vulnerable people to join them such as group's ideology beliefs (Ibid). This approach provides a useful framework for understanding the root causes of violent religious extremism. Nonetheless, it's still new; there is need for additional research in this regard.

4.0 The Cause of Boko Haram's Violence in Northeast Nigeria

From a historical perspective, Falola and Heaton (2008) said that Nigeria's recent troubles could be explained through an examination of the history of its pre-colonial (pre-1900), colonial (1900 – 1960), and post-colonial (1960 to date) periods. These periods in the

Nigeria's history are critical to understanding the current dynamics of political, economic and social issues in the country (Falola and Heaton, 2008). In line with this, Tsogo (2011) used historical narrative to show that Nigeria is vulnerable to violent religious extremism based on a long history of ethno-religious violence in the country. Before the current Boko Haram's problem, Adesoji (2011) said that the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 1985 were the first major manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. Isichei (1987) asserts that over 4,179 people were killed during the Maitatsine conflict that lasted for about five years. Without digging deeper into the Nigeria's political and economic history, let us review the socio-economic challenges in Nigeria in relation to the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the country.

Socio-Economic Issues in Nigeria

In mid-2014, Nigeria rose to become the biggest economy in the African continent and the world's thirteenth largest crude oil producer (The Economist, 2014). Presently, the Nigeria's economy currently has a gross domestic product of over \$500 billion per annum, and a stable economic growth rate of 7 percent (Premium Times, 2014). However, Nigeria is a delicate state; its economy is entirely dependent on the exports of oil and gas (ICG, 2006:1). According to Peter Lewis, the continued reliance on the petroleum revenues as the sole export commodity makes the country vulnerable to economic shocks (Lewis, 2011:1). The International Crisis Group (ICG) also added that a failure to diversify the economy of the country also exposed the country to "a development trap" (ICG, 2006). More recent studies also emphasized that Nigeria's economy is growing due to the abundant oil resources, but poverty and other socio-economic problems are prevalent in the country.

To the Council on Foreign Relations (CfR), Nigeria's economy is growing, but the standard of living is falling in reverse order (CfR, 2014:16). According to CfR, 64 percent of Nigeria's population is categorized as living under the poverty level, with an estimate of 73 percent poverty rate in the rural areas (CfR, 2014:6). Poverty affects more than half of Nigeria's population, despite the abundant oil wealth, a malaise ICG (2006) referred to as “want in the midst of plenty”. The ethnic and religious unrest and the Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria are manifestations of the falling standard of living and structural disparities between North and South regions of the country (CfR, 2014:4). According to McLoughlin and Bouchat (2013), the centrifugal forces that have acted against Nigeria’s unity and the centripetal forces that have kept it together are not properly understood and are rarely examined. This brings us back to what Paden (2009:3) said earlier that Nigeria is the least understood among the Muslim world pivotal states, and a pointer to the need for further investigation on the alleged link between the level of poverty in Nigeria to the Boko Haram insurgency, despite the economic potentials of the country.

Nevertheless, there is also need to reconcile the alleged link of Boko Haram to poverty and the falling standard of living in the country with the ideological statement by Osama bin Laden in 2003. The deposed leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Ladin, in a translated speech by the Associated Press (2013) said:

“I also assure those true Muslims should act, incite, and mobilize the nation in such great events, hot conditions, in order to break free from the slavery of these tyrannic and apostate regimes, which are enslaved by America, in-order to establish the rule of Allah on Earth. Among countries ready for liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, the country of the two shrines (Saudi Arabia), Yemen and Pakistan”(Osama bin Laden, 2003, cited in AP

2003).

Nigeria was one of the countries mentioned by the late al-Qaeda leader to be ready for Islamic liberation in sub-Saharan Africa. More so, Boko Haram (also known as Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati wal - Jihad) emerged as an Islamic splinter group in 2002 (Meehan and Speier, 2011), shortly after 9/11 and the start of the global war on terror (GWOT).

These different views from economic and ideological standpoints illustrate the complex nature of the explanation of the causes of Boko Haram. Onapajo (2012) said that the explanation of causes of Boko Haram's is complicated due to the group's shadowy sponsors. Also, there is a need for an explanation about the economic growth that Nigeria experienced in the last 5 years in spite of the Boko Haram's insurgency. According to Meierrieks and Gries (2013:91), "the causal relationship between terrorism and economic growth is apparently complex". The unexpected rise in Nigeria's economy despite the insurgency contradicts Meierrieks and Gries (2013) finding that in a post cold war era terrorism is detrimental to growth for African and Islamic countries with low level of political openness, high level of political instability, and strong terrorist activity. They reached the conclusion through an analysis of the causal relationship between terrorism and economic growth using panel data. Let us turn to how the theories have helped or failed to help us to understand the Boko Haram insurgencies and the questions that my project will ask.

The Root Causes of the Boko Haram's Insurgency

There are several explanations about the causes of the Boko Haram uprising; ranging from

political statements to theories and empirical studies. In February 2012, the past Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Sanusi Lamido said that structural imbalance” between the north and south of Nigeria was responsible for the violent conflict in the northern part of the country (The Punch, 2012). In line with this view, Herskovits (2012) also asserts “the underlying cause of violence and anger in both North and South of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness” (The Vanguard, 2012). A former American President, Bill Clinton adds, “Poverty remained the primary driver for the attacks by Boko Haram and needed to be addressed by strong local and Federal Government programs” (The Punch, 2012). Mr. Jonnie Carson, former American under Secretary for Africa concludes that the only way out of the trap of Boko Haram is for the Nigerian government to address the extreme poverty in the northern region of the country. These statements by notable politicians within and outside Nigeria link the root causes of Boko Haram to the deplorable economic conditions in the North of Nigeria. However, these statements were not supported by empirical evidence and did not tell us about the other contributory factors. More so, the views were not specific to Northeast Nigeria, and the community perspectives about the causes of Boko Haram were left out.

Notwithstanding, the politician’s statements reflect similar opinions made soon after the 9/11 attacks on the US. George Bush, a past president of the United States, said that poverty, lack of education and failed governments are conditions that gave rise to terrorists (cited by Krueger, 2007:12). Tony Blair, a former British PM also said: “The dragon’s teeth of terrorism are planted in the fertile soil.....of poverty and deprivations” (cited in Krueger, 2007:13). Lastly, James Wolfensohn, the past president of the World Bank further said “The war on terrorism will not be won until we have come to grips with the problem of poverty and thus the sources of discontent” (cited by Krueger, 2007:12).

These notable politicians linked the causes of terror to poverty. The views about the causes of Boko Haram from the politician's standpoint are similar to the statements made after the 9/11 terror attacks on the US. However, the circumstances of the cases are different; the US attack is internationally linked, but Boko Haram is a local terror organization.

Contrarily, Krueger (2007) and Piazza (2006) used empirical studies to demonstrate that there are no correlations between poverty and terrorism. In the Nigerian case, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, the national president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) disagrees with the politicians on the link between poverty and Boko Haram. Oritsejafor said, "It's an insult to say that the poor people are turning to extremist because they are poor." He further cited the failed amnesty program and the subsequent emergency rules in three states in Northeast Nigeria to support the fact that poverty is not the sole cause of insurgency in Northern Nigeria. More so, according to the Associated Press (AP), Boko Haram said that the Nigeria government would not know peace until it adopts sharia law. This suggests that ideology plays a role in the group's motivation, but the views of the politicians did not reflect this dimension.

In addition to the political statements, there are several conspiracy theories about the causes of Boko Haram particularly from the ruling and the opposition parties in Nigeria. The ruling party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) view is that the opposition party, All Progressive Alliance (APC) is the sponsors of Boko Haram, a ploy to discredit the present government headed by a President from the southern region of Nigeria (Metuh, cited in Premium Times, 2014). The APC on the other hand, argues that the Government is the sponsor of Boko Haram, due to its failed effort to contain the group, some serving

government officers have also been linked to the group activities (Ameachi, cited in Sun, 2014). Although these views were considered politically and ethnically motivated, it did not represent the opinion of the entire Nigerians. These views also require empirical evidence to support the arguments.

The causal link between the Boko Haram insurgency and the underlying socio-economic conditions in Nigeria can be explained by the root cause theory, basic human need theory, and the relative deprivation theory (David, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013). Newman (2006) postulates that there is a causal link between terrorism and the underlying socio-economic conditions. Newman further asserts that factors such as poverty, social inequality, exclusion, and political grievance, are the independent variables on which the emergences of terrorist and extremist group are dependent (Newman 2006:751). Applying this to Nigeria, it can be inferred that the primary causes of conflicts in Nigeria are the inability of people to meet their basic needs (Burton, 1997). The CfR (2014) earlier points to the falling standard of living in the country despite the growing economy. This is relevant to Burton (1997) argument that if the basic needs are not met it cause frustration, and people seek alternatives to satisfy them. Agbiboa (2013) further explains, “a swelling population amid economic despair not only creates an environment in which radical extremist groups can thrive but also legitimizes their actions.”

As a remedy to Boko Haram insurgency, Aigbiboa (2013) suggest that the Nigeria government should look at the deplorable living condition; poverty and economic deprivation especially in the northeastern region where Boko Haram originated. This agrees with Gurr (1970) argument; people become dissatisfied if they feel that they have less than they should and could have, over time, such dissatisfaction leads to frustration

and then rebellion. The relative deprivation theory enhances understanding of the disparities between South and North of Nigeria, occasioned by the oil wealth in the southern region. The rebellion from the northern parts of the country can be likened to the perceived unfair benefits from the proceeds of the oil revenue (Aigbobia, 2013).

The structural disparities between South and North of Nigeria can be further explained using the poverty and the unemployment profiles in Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) poverty assessment report 2006 reveals that poverty was regarded as an important phenomenon in the northern region of the country. The CBN report shows that the ‘top ten’ poverty- riddled states in Nigeria are in the north; Jigawa state tops the list as the poorest state in the country with 95% high incidence of poverty, followed by Kebbi with 89.7%, Kogi 88.6%, Bauchi 86.3%, Kwara 85.2%, Yobe 83.3%, Zamfara 80.9 % Gombe 77%, Sokoto 76.8% and Adamawa 71.7% (CBN, 2006).

A further analysis of the poverty statistics in Nigeria using the National Bureau of Statistics (2011) data indicates that the northeastern region of the country where Boko Haram originated ranked among the area with the worst poverty incidence in the country as depicted in the table (1) below:

S/N	Regions	1980	1985	1992	1996	2004
1.	South South	13.2	45.7	40.8	58.2	35.1
2.	South East	12.9	30.4	41.0	53.5	26.7
3.	South West	13.4	38.6	43.1	60.9	43.0
4.	North Central	32.2	50.8	46.0	64.7	67.0

5.	North East	35.6	54.9	54.0	70.0	72.2
6.	North West	37.7	52.1	36.5	77.2	71.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics

(2011)

The table (1) shows the poverty profiles for the Nigeria regions for selected years from 1980 to 2004. The figure shows that the northeast and northwest zones of the country have the worst poverty profiles in the country. In 2004, for example, the northeast poverty level was 72.2 percent, compared to the south east of 26.7 percent.

Similarly, the analysis of the unemployment trend in the country shows that from 2008 to 2010 the rates of unemployment for all the northeastern states (38.0) were above the national average (21.7) (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). It shows that the Northeast region ranks among the zones in the country with the highest poverty and unemployment rates in the country. The period of the maximum unemployment rate also coincides with the outbreak of violence in 2009 from the militant Boko Haram groups as indicated in the NBS data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). These analyses show the disparities in the poverty and unemployment rates between the North and South of Nigeria.

The root cause theory, basic human need, and the relative deprivation provide relevant explanations about the link between the alleged Boko Haram insurgency and the socio-economic conditions in Nigeria. The evidence from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 2006 and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2011 data sheds light on this causal relationship. However, the other contributory factors such as ideologies were not captured in these explanations. More so, these explanations did not tell us about the impact of

insurgency on livelihoods and how the affected rural populations are coping with the events. The communities or the affected population perspectives are also lacking. These issues, in my opinion, are the gaps in these studies. Although, Denoeux and Carter (2009) categorize the drivers of violent extremism into three broad categories: socioeconomic drivers, political drivers, and cultural drivers. They further said that these drivers could be separated at the level of analysis into “Pull” and “Push” factors. But this framework has not been applied to Nigeria. My project will utilize this framework to provide a robust explanation of the root causes of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria.

5.0 The consequence of Boko Haram’s violence on rural livelihood

Carolyn Nordstrom in her book “A Different Kind of War Story,” said, the devastating impacts of terror warfare on people, societies, and cultures are shared across nations (Nordstrom, 1997: xvii). However, in the case of Tamil in Srilanka, Nordstrom said that she was frustrated because there was no information in the literature on how to carry out ethnographic study in violent areas. In relation to the Darfur conflict, Young et al. (2005: vii) asserts, “livelihoods are integral to the causes of conflict and the impact it has had, and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the conflict”. Young and Osman (2006) conclude, “Conflict and peoples livelihoods are inextricably linked”. Thus, it can be inferred that there are similarities across nations on the impact of violence on livelihoods. Therefore, it can be assumed that the effect of Boko Haram can be understood through a review of similar contexts. Let us now examine some studies on the consequences of conflict on livelihoods and their limitations.

In a high-level meeting of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Justino (2012:2)

said, conflict and violence impact on the lives and livelihoods of individuals, households and communities directly and indirectly. Nigel (2002) adds, “Conflicts destroy livelihoods, either directly through causing death and destroying property, or indirectly by limiting freedom of choice and adaptive behavior, thereby hampering the pursuit of successful survival strategies.” Justino (2012:2) further note that direct effects of conflict include changes in household composition and economic status; whereas indirect channels includes changes in local and national markets and social relations. With regards to poverty, Collier (2007) asserts that the violent conflict creates cycles of conflict and poverty. Thus, it can be deduced that violence can have direct or indirect consequences on livelihoods, as well as short and long-term effects. However, irrespective of the nature of the impact of conflict, Justino (2012:3) conclude that violent conflict kills and disables people, destroys productive assets, and block individuals and households access to their sources of livelihood and economic survival. Let’s examine the impact of Boko Haram’s insurgency in Northeast Nigeria.

The UN Security Council report (2014) acknowledges the increasing insurgent attacks targeting civilians and livelihoods in the northeastern states of Nigeria, seizing towns and compelling large numbers of people to flee to neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The Human Rights Watch report (2014) adds, the Boko Haram attacks have been on the increase since the beginning of this year, with almost daily killings, bombings, kidnappings, thefts, and the destruction of livelihoods, Churches, Mosques, schools, homes, bridges and businesses. The Human Rights Watch also asserts that the effects of violence are more pronounced in local communities in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. According to USAID (2005:3), the effects of conflict are increasingly felt in the rural community and the individual levels. However, a survey of literature shows that there

have not been empirical studies on the consequence of Boko Haram on rural communities in Northeast Nigeria due to security challenges in the region.

Nevertheless, the studies on the impacts of conflict on livelihoods in Liberia, Rwanda, Nepal and Srilanka provide relevant information on the effects of conflict on rural populations. Longley et al. (2003) described the impact of war on rural livelihoods in Kambia District, Liberia, notes that there were huge displacements, but at the same time some communities were resilient in negotiating peace and reconciliations. In the case of Burundi and Rwanda, there were increases in the prices of staple foods as a result of the destructions of agricultural lands and subsequent scarcity of farm produce (Bundervoet, 2006; Verpoorten, 2009). Seddon and Hussein (2002) on the impact of Maoists insurgency in Nepal said the main local effects of the conflict are: rural exodus on the part of the local elite, and the local government officials, and the destruction of economic activities and local infrastructures. These three cases points to: Direct effects (displacements in Liberia) and indirect effects (rise in prices in Burundi and Rwanda) and associated responses (mass exodus in Nepal) by the affected populations, among others.

Contrarily, Korf (2001) in a study of the livelihood strategies of war-affected communities in Sri Lanka, concludes that war can be both a threat and an opportunity; hence, civilians in conflict situations are not all victims. Schafer (2002) supports this argument, notes, “certain livelihood strategies are part of the dynamics that can contribute to, and sustain conflict and instability.” According to Keen (1998), people affected by violent conflict can also benefit from the proceeds of looting during armed conflict. These suggest that livelihood strategies can also contribute or fuel conflict. Thus, it can be inferred that conflict has a negative and positive impact on some populations, unlike the negative

effects as its in the cases of Liberia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Nepal. In the case of Sri-Lanka, livelihoods strategies, also feed into the conflict. In the case of Northeast Nigeria, Campbell (2012) alleged that Boko Haram is having support from the impoverished and alienated Northern Nigeria communities, but it lacks empirical evidence.

On the coping mechanisms, Patricia Justino asserts that people usually leave places of more severe fighting to refugee and displacement camps, or move to safe areas or travel abroad (Justino, 2012:2). However, Justino also contends that numerous people stay behind in conflict zones and survive, carrying on their daily livelihood tasks in the midst of conflict and violence. In the case of Somalia with a dysfunctional government and weak institutions, FAO notes that: “Somalis rely on their resilience as individuals, households and communities to protect their lives and livelihoods.” De Waal, (1997) concludes that local coping strategies are the most important component of people’s survival in many conflict situations. It can be deduced that people often flee from violence, but at the same time some are resilience. The rationale for the different choices is therefore important, particularly on the source of resilience or copying mechanism.

In the case of Nigeria, The UNHCR estimates that as of October 2014, 4.6 million people have been displaced in Northeast Nigeria, and many children are suffering from malnutrition. However, there are little information about those that remains in the affected areas in Northeast Nigeria, and most important, how they are coping with livelihoods tasks in the midst of the militants. These points to the need to understand the sources of resilience and the livelihood strategies use by the communities to cope with extremist events.

6. Conclusion

This paper discusses the socio-economic causes and consequences of terrorism and violent religious extremism with particular reference to the Boko Haram's violence in Northeast Nigeria. The study contends that the theory of basic human need and the relative deprivation theory is relevant in explaining the socio-economic disparities that have led to the emergence of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria. However, this study argues that the drivers of violent extremism, the consequences on livelihoods, and the strategies adopted by rural communities cope with the Boko Haram's insurgencies in Northeast Nigeria remains relatively understudied. The study contributes to literature on countering violent extremism programs in Northeast Nigeria in particular and the sub-Saharan communities in general.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adesoji, Abimbola. "Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State." In *Africa Today* 57, no. 4 (2011): 99–119.
- "Africa's New Number One." *The Economist*, April 12, 2014.
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly-supersized-economy-indeed-wonder-so-are-its-still-huge>.
- Agbiboa, Daniel. "Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective." *The African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review* (ACPR) 3, no. 1 (2013): 144–57.
- Amnesty International. *Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence*. London, England: Amnesty International, 2012.
- Anucha, Chris. "2015: Jonathan, PDP Sponsoring Boko Haram to Stop APC –Amaechi." Accessed January 3, 2015. <http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=93171>.
- "Anxious Wait for Nigeria Girls after Boko Haram 'Deal.'" *Business Insider*. Accessed December 23, 2014. <http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-anxious-wait-for-nigeria-girls-after-boko-haram-deal-2014-10>.
- Baumann, Pari. *Sustainable Livelihoods and Political Capital: Arguments and Evidence from Decentralisation and Natural Resource Management in India*. Published by the Overseas Development Institute, 2000.
- Bjelopera, Jerome. "Countering Violent Extremism in the United States." *Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief*, February 2014, 1–29.
- Borum, Randy. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories." *JSS Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36.
- Brockett, Charles. *Land, Power, and Poverty: The Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
- Bundervoet, Tom. *Livestock, Activity Choices and Conflict: Evidence from Burundi*. Households in Conflict Network (HCN), 2006.
- Burton, John Wear. "Needs Theory" *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention*. Published by the Manchester University Press Manchester, 1997.
- Campbell, John. *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.

- Council on Foreign Relations (CfR). *U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria's Boko Haram*, 2014.
- Carney, Diana. *Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contribution Can We Make?* The British Department of International Development (DfID), 1998.
- Central Bank of Nigeria. *First Quarter Economic Report* , Abuja: Central Bank of Nigeria. 2006a, N.d.,
- Chaliand et al. *The history of terrorism: from antiquity to al Qaeda*. Berkeley: Published by the University of California Press, 2007.
- Chambers, Robert. *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. London; New York: Longman, 1984.
- Collinson, Sarah., (England). *Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case Studies in Political Economy Analysis for Humanitarian Action*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2003.
- Crenshaw, Martha. "The Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 4 (December 1, 1987): 13–31.
- . "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century." *Political Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2000): 405–20.
- Cunningham, William G., Adina Friedman, Charles Hauss, Matt Hersey, R. Scott Moore, Dennis J. D. Sandole, and Sascha Sheehan. *Terrorism: Concepts, Causes, and Conflict Resolution*. U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2003.
- Daily Trust. "allAfrica.com: Nigeria: Over 13,000 Killed in Boko Haram Crisis - Jonathan." Accessed December 24, 2014. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201409260828.html>.
- David, James Ojochenemi. "The Root Causes of Terrorism: An Appraisal of the Socio-Economic Determinants of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria." University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa, 2013.
- De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno. "The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work." *The Political Economist* 10, no. 1 (2008): 1–12.
- Denoeux, Guilain, and Lynn Carter. *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism*. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2009.
- De Waal, Alexander. *Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*.

Published by the Oxford & Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997.

DfID, U. K. "Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets." *The Department for International Development*, 1999.

Duyvesteyn, Isabella. *The Role of History and Continuity in Terrorism Research*. In M. Randstorp (Ed.), *Mapping Terrorism Research State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction*. London; New York: Routledge, 2007.

Eager, Paige Whaley. *From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists Women and Political Violence*. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008.

Egiegba Agbiboa, Daniel. "Living in Fear: Religious Identity, Relative Deprivation and the Boko Haram Terrorism." *African Security* 6, no. 2 (2013): 153–70.

Emerson, Michael O., and Christian Smith. *Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America*. Published by the Oxford University Press, 2001.

Falola, Toyin, and Matthew M. Heaton. *A History of Nigeria*. 1 edition. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Francis, Elizabeth. *Making a Living: Changing Livelihoods in Rural Africa*. London; New York: Routledge, 2000.

Fund for Peace. "The Failed States Index 2013." Accessed December 24, 2014.
<http://www.ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable>.

Galtung, Johan. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91.

Gelsdorf, Kirsten, Daniel Maxwell, and Martina Santschi. *Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social Protection in South Sudan*. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2012.

Gopin, Marc. *Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East*. 1st ed. Published by the Oxford University Press, 2002.

Gurr, Ted. *Why Men Rebel*. 40th anniversary ed.. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010.

Hassan, Muhsin. "Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of Al-Shabab and Somali Youth." *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, 2012, 18–19.

Hegghammer, Thomas. *The Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*.

Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Heydemann, Steve. “*The State of the Art: Countering Violent Extremism as a Field of Practice*” in *Insights by USIP*. Center for Applied Research on Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, 2014.

Hoffman, Bruce. “Change and Continuity in Terrorism.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24, no. 5 (September 1, 2001): 417–28.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Published by the Columbia University Press, 2006.

Holland, D, W Johncheck, H Sida, H Young, and ODI. *Livelihoods and Chronic Conflict: An Annotated Bibliography*. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002.

Holmer, Georgia. “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective.” *USIP Special Report* 336 (2013).

Human Rights Watch (HRW). *Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks Cause Humanitarian Crisis* | *Human Rights Watch*. Accessed September 21, 2014.

International Crisis Group (ICG). *Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty*. Dakar; Brussels: International Crisis Group Report, 2006.

Isichei, Elizabeth. “The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited.” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 17, no. 3 (October 1, 1987): 194–208.

Jaspars, Susanne, and Jeremy Shoham. *A Critical Review of Approaches to Assessing and Monitoring Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict and Political Instability*. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) London, 2002.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. *Comparative Studies in Religion and Society* 13. Berkeley: Published by the University of California Press, 2000.

Justino, Patricia. *Exploring Coping Mechanisms and Resilience of Households, Communities and Local Institutions*. FAO High Expert Forum. Rome, 2012.

Keen, David, and London Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*. Published by the Oxford University Press, 1998.

Korf, B. “Livelihoods at Risk: Land Use and Coping Strategies of War-Affected Communities in Trincomalee District.” *Integrated Food Security Programme (IFSP), Trincomalee, Sri*

Lanka, 2001.

Kressel, Neil J. *Bad Faith: The Danger of Religious Extremism*. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 2007.

Krueger, Alan B. *What Makes a Terrorist : Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*. Lionel Robbins Lectures. Published by the Princeton University Press, 2008.

Kulatunga, Sasini T. K., Rajith W. D. Lakshman, University of Oxford., and Refugee Studies Centre. *Livelihoods under Protracted Conflict: A Case Study of Sri Lanka*. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2010.

Lawal, Muhammad. "Boko Haram, Poverty: Between Carson and Oritsejafor." *MuhdLawal*. Accessed December 19, 2014. <http://muhdlawal.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/boko-haram-poverty-between-carson-and-oritsejafor/>.

Lewis, Peter. *Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011.

Loada, Augustin, and Peter Romanium. *Preventing Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso: Towards National Resilience Amid Regional Insecurity*. Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2014. www.globalcenter.org.

Longley, Catherine., and Victor Kalie. Kamara. *The Rural Livelihoods in Kambia District, Sierra Leone: The Impacts of Conflict*. London, 2003.

Longley, Catherine, and Daniel Maxwell. *Livelihoods, Chronic Conflict and Humanitarian Response: A Synthesis of Current Practice*. ODI London, 2003.

McLoughlin, Gerald, and Clarence J. Bouchat. *Nigerian Unity: In the Balance*. DTIC Document, 2013.

Meierrieks, Daniel, and Thomas Gries. "Causality between Terrorism and Economic Growth." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 1 (2013): 91–104.

Mesoy, Atle. *Poverty and Radicalisation into Violent Extremism: A Causal Link?*. NOREF Expert Analysis. The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), 2013.

Metuh, Olisa. "APC Responsible For Insurgency - PDP - Premium Times Nigeria." Accessed January 3, 2015.

Nasser-Eddine, Minerva, Bridget Garnham, Katerina Agostino, and Gilbert Caluya. *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review*. DTIC Document, 2011.

National Bureau of Statistics. (2011). *Statistical News: Labour Force Statistics No. 476*. Abuja: The NBS Publication., N.d., n.d.

Neumann, Peter, Bipartisan Policy Center., and National Security Preparedness Group. *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*. Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011.

Newman, Edward. "Exploring the 'Root Causes' of Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 8 (December 1, 2006): 749–72.

Nigel, John. "Livelihoods in a Conflict Setting." *Norwegian Journal of Geography* 63, no. 1 (March 2009): 23–34.

"Nigeria Slashes Oil Price Assumption by 11 Pct to \$65 per Barrel." Accessed December 18, 2014. <http://sunnewsonline.com/new/?p=93953>.

Nordstrom, Carolyn. *A Different Kind of War Story*. Published by the University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.

Nwozor, Agaptus. "Media, Ethnicity and the Challenge of Peace: Exploring the Crisis of State-Building in Nigeria." *Journal of Pan African Studies* 6, no. 9 (2014).

Onapajo, Hakeem, and Ufo Okeke Uzodike. "The Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the State, and the International System." *African Security Review* 21, no. 3 (2012): 24–39.

Paden, John N. *Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2008.

Piazza, James A. "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 159–77.

"Poverty Fuelling Boko Haram Insurgency – Clinton." *The Punch - Nigeria's Most Widely Read Newspaper*. Retrieved on December 19, 2014. <http://www.punchng.com/news/poverty-fuelling-boko-haram-insurgency-clinton/>.

"Premium Times Special: Bitter Truths About the Nigeria Economy" *Premium Times Nigeria*. Accessed December 23, 2014. <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/173629-premium-times-special-bitter-truths-about-economy-the-jonathan-govt-does-not-want-nigerians-to-know.html>.

Rennie, J. Keith, and Naresh C. Singh. *Participatory Research for Sustainable Livelihoods: A Guidebook for Field Projects*. Iisd Winnipeg,, Canada, 1996.

Robert Chambers, and Conway. "Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century." *IDS Discussion Paper 296*. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex., 1992.

Rubenstein, and Richard E. *Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World*. Basic Books, 1988.

Rubenstein, Richard. "Alternative Theoretical Foundations: Critical Theory and System Transformation." School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Unpublished Lecture note, Fall Term 2013.

———. "Conflict Resolution and the Structural Sources of Conflict,' in Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process, and Structure, Ed. Ho-Won Jeong (Ashgate, 1999)," n.d.

———. "Purification and Power: The Psycho-Political Roots of Religious Terrorism." *American Psychological Association, Chicago Illinois*, June 2002.

Sandole, Dennis J. D. *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the Post-Cold War Era*. 1 edition. London; New York: Routledge, 1999.

———. *Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex World*. War and Conflict in the Modern World. Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2010.

Sandole, Dennis, Kimberly Ruff, and Evis Vasili. "Identity and Apocalyptic Terrorism." In *Apocalyptic Terrorism: Understanding the Unfathomable*. U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2004.

"Sanusi in the Eye of the Storm." Accessed December 19, 2014.
<http://www.punchng.com/politics/sanusi-in-the-eye-of-the-storm/>.

Schafer, Jessica. *Supporting Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict and Political Instability: Overview of Conceptual Issues*. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) London, 2002.

Schmid, Alex , A. J. Jongman, and Irving Horowitz. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*. 2 edition. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2005.

Seddon, David, Karim Hussein, (England), *The Consequences of Conflict: Livelihoods and Development in Nepal*. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2002.

Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Knopf, 1999.

- . *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Published by the Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Seul, Jeffrey R. “Ours Is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict.” *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1999): 553–69.
- Tajfel, Henri, M. G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 1, no. 2 (June 1971): 149–78.
- The Associated Press. “Transcript of Osama Bin Laden Tape Broadcast on Al-Jazeera Originally Published Tuesday, February 11, 2003,” n.d. <http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/CCT510/Sources/Bin-Laden-trans-2-11-03-AP.html>.
- Tsogo, Jacques Alain Ba’ana, and Perry Lee Johnson Jr. *How Vulnerable Is Nigeria to Islam Extremism?*, n.d.
- UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa, 26 June 2014, S/2014/442*, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/53bea76c4.html>, n.d.
- USAID. *Livelihood and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention*. Washington DC, 2005.
- USIP. *Insights*. Center for Applied Research on Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, 2014.
- Vanguard Newspaper. “Between Herskovits, Azazi and Jonathan - Vanguard News.” Accessed December 19, 2014. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/between-herskovits-azazi-and-jonathan-2/>.
- Verpoorten, Marijke. “Household Coping in War-and Peacetime: Cattle Sales in Rwanda, 1991–2001.” *Journal of Development Economics* 88, no. 1 (2009): 67–86.
- Von Hippel, Karin. “The Role of Poverty in Radicalization and Terrorism.” *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses*, Ed. Stuart Gottlieb (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 2009, 60.
- Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam.” In *The Roots of Islamic Radicalism Conference, Yale. Devji, F (2005) Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality and Modernity*. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2004.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. New York:

Published by the Cambridge University Press, 2003.

World Commission on Environment and Development. *Our Common Future*. Published by the Oxford University Press, 1987.

Young, Helen, and A Osman. "Challenges to Peace and Recovery in Darfur." *A Situation Analysis of the On-Going Conflict and Its Continuing Impact on Livelihoods*. Medford, MA 2006.

Zartman, I. William. "Negotiating with Terrorists." *International Negotiation* 8, no. 3 (September 2003): 443–5