Research and policy implications from a micro-level perspective on the dynamics of conflict, violence and development¹

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The last few years have witnessed an important shift in international policy focus to a growing consensus that development and poverty reduction efforts cannot be disassociated from the challenges created by conflict and violence. Often in the past development actors were concerned with violent conflicts only insofar as they affected the security of states and the capacity of states to provide services, public goods and to maintain the rule of law. Less attention was paid to the individuals that lived in areas of violent conflict, beyond their immediate humanitarian needs. Yet, 1.5 billion people in the world are currently affected by persistent forms of conflict and violence (World Bank 2011). We need to ask: Who are the people affected by violent conflict? How do they live? What do they do to secure lives and livelihoods? What options do they have? What choices do they make? Why are they affected by violence and how? How does violence change their options and choices? Are they part of the conflict and if so what led them into it?

The collection of chapters in this volume has explored analytically and empirically how cycles of violent conflict are rooted in complex interactions between processes of violence and the behaviour, choices, aspirations, perceptions and expectations of ordinary people living in areas of armed conflict. Two common threads emerge from the range of issues discussed in this volume. The first is that cycles of violent conflict not only exert considerable influence on the lives of people affected by violence, but are also profoundly shaped by the levels of agency exercised by local populations in their daily interaction with armed actors and the organisation of violence. The second thread is related to the ways in which the use of violence (in its various forms and across time) transforms institutions and norms at the local level. These two factors provide important theoretical and empirical micro-foundations to explain the onset, duration,
transformation, ending and possible renewal of violent conflict, as well as the sustainability of
development processes in conflict-affected contexts.

**Ordinary people matter: agency and resilience in the face of conflict**

A key message of this volume is that, at a fundamental level, processes of violent conflict are
closely linked to the choices, perceptions, behaviour and motivations, not only of elites and
states, but also of ordinary members of society living in conflict areas. Research and policy
interventions tend to focus predominantly on the victimisation aspect of violence, for obvious
reasons. Much less attention has been paid to those that just get on with their lives, even under
the threat and fear of violence. People living in areas of conflict and violence are more than
victims: individuals, households, groups and communities suffer greatly from the effects of
violence, but they also build tremendous resilience in the face of extreme forms of uncertainty.
Their choices (voluntary or involuntary) shape important dynamics of conflict and violence on
the ground, and set the stage for how interventions to build peace, stability and economic
prosperity in conflict-affected contexts may succeed or fail.

There are evidently important macro-level factors that explain the onset and feasibility of violent
conflicts, including military, financial and technological power, ideological beliefs, mobilisation
capacity, the strength of state presence, among others. However, processes of violent conflict
are also deeply related to what happens to people during violent conflicts, and to how they secure
lives and livelihoods. Some individuals and households move away and some remain in their

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2 This literature is comprehensively reviewed in Blattman and Miguel (2010).
communities despite – or sometimes because of – the outbreak of violence, carrying on with their
daily lives in many cases across generations and decades of conflict. These people – a good few
hundred million human beings – adapt to processes of conflict and violence in order to survive.
They adapt their livelihoods to survival needs, join in informal exchange and employment
markets (sometimes legal, sometimes illegal), form strategic social and political alliances, and
negotiate with armed actors. Some people succeed in ‘navigating’ the conflict, others do not
(Justino 2012c; Zetter and Verwimp 2011; see also chapter by Roger Zetter and co-authors and
chapter by Tim Raeymaekers in this volume). But, overall, processes of adaptation, agency and
resilience closely explain conflict outcomes and processes, including decisions about where to
fight, with whom and for how long.

The strategies adopted by people in areas of conflict and violence to secure their lives and
livelihoods are typically a function of two important variables (Justino 2009). The first is related
to initial characteristics, which determine people’s levels of vulnerability to poverty. The second
is the likelihood of being targeted during conflict, in other words their vulnerability to violence.
The economic, social and political status of individuals and their immediate social group at the
start of the conflict are important determinants of how people may be able to adapt to the effects
of violence by, for instance, making use of savings, livestock or other assets, accessing new
opportunities, or moving to safer areas in the country or abroad. Therefore, those that are
wealthier or able to rely on suitable social and political networks at the start of the conflict may
potentially be better able to secure their livelihoods and welfare, and protect themselves and their
close relatives from physical harm. However, it is common that specific individuals, households
and communities are targeted during episodes of armed violence because of their ethnic or
religious affiliation, their geographical location, their wealth or other characteristics salient to local or national conflict cleavages. Anticipation of these selective forms of violence (Kalyvas 2006) may lead people to adopt strategies that are in accordance their material needs, but also with their (perceived or real) prospects of being killed, displaced or looted, i.e. according to their level of vulnerability to violence (Justino 2009).

The interaction between material and physical forms of vulnerability may create important trade-offs in how people adapt to violent contexts. For instance, episodes of crop burning, destruction of livestock or voluntary displacement that prevail in many conflict areas may appear on the surface to be irrational decisions from an economic survival perspective. However, these decisions may make sense when physical survival is at risk. These choices in turn have important implications for the evolution of cycles of violence, the duration of violent conflicts and the sustainability of peace and development processes in post-conflict settings.

The participation and support for armed groups is an important example of how the interplay between levels of vulnerability to violence and to poverty may influence the duration of violent conflict (Justino 2009). Individuals and households in conflict areas provide human and material resources, shelter and information to armed groups because this is often the only way they have of protecting themselves and their families from severe destitution, as well as from being targeted by violence (Justino 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007), notably when state presence is weak or abusive (Goodwin 2001; Petersen 2001). The way in which armed groups manage these relationships determines in turn how forms of collaboration or resistance (peaceful or violent) may emerge. These interactions may influence, even if partially, the
outbreak, recurrence and duration of warfare because they have an important bearing on the strength of armed groups and the feasibility of their strategies before, during and after the conflict.

The nature and levels of victimisation of individuals and households affected by violent conflict may also affect the sustainability of peace after the end of violent conflicts. Adverse economic and social impacts of violence may push some people into permanent forms of destitution, exclusion and discontent that may result in persistent cycles of poverty and violence (Justino 2012a). Exclusion and disenfranchisement, particularly among ex-combatants, refugee populations and weaker factions, have been shown to affect the potential for the renewal of armed violence in post-conflict countries (Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997), while the dynamics of violence may in contrast benefit some groups that develop interests in preserving war economies (Keen 1997).

Recent research has suggested that although experiences of recruitment and victimisation may have adverse effects on people’s welfare, these may also result in increased individual political participation and leadership once the war is over (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009). Voors et al. (2010) find that direct individual experiences of violence during the Burundi civil war have resulted in more altruistic behaviour. Bauer et al. (2011) report a similar result, but show that increases in forms of altruism and fairness took place within communities, but not
between communities. Although still in its infancy and far from being conclusive, this emerging literature suggests that experiences of violence may be central mechanisms driving changes in how social relations and political structures are organised during and after episodes of violent conflict. This is a very important area of future research because organisations and norms that emerge from violent conflict will shape the ways in which societies evolve and the institutional structures that may restrain or encourage the use of violence in the future. We take up this issue in more detail in the next section.

The transformative nature of conflict: institutional change and the strategic use of violence

The second important message from the micro-level perspective on the dynamics of violent conflict developed in this volume is that understanding societies and economies affected by armed conflict is not possible without an in-depth understanding of the nature of the violence and, crucially, the *nature of the institutional changes caused by it*. This appears to be a very obvious message, but is frequently absent from both research and practice. On the one hand, with the exception of some recent pioneering studies (Brass 1997; Cramer 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Lubkemann 2008; Nordstrom 1997; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003), social scientists have for a long time analysed the causes and consequences of violent conflict by reducing conflict – often civil wars – to discrete events that mark the onset or the end of specific violent episodes. This

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3 Cassar et al. (2011) discuss similar strengthening of parochial attitudes in the case of individuals exposed to violence during the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s. See also Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011) for the case of Uganda using survey data.

4 Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Justino (2012a) review this literature.
An interesting feature of the research discussed in this volume – and of micro-level research on violent conflict more generally – is the observation that violence has an instrumental role beyond destruction. In particular, violence is used strategically by political actors to transform or appropriate the state institutions that determine the current and future allocation of power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Cramer 2006; Justino 2012a; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009).
Conflict-affected countries are sites of intense institutional change, rather than areas of destruction and anarchy that ‘breed terror’. Institutional change takes place in particular when different actors contest and sometimes win over existing state institutions in certain areas, or over the whole country, transforming social, economic and political structures, organisations and norms. These institutional changes have profound impacts on the survival and security of ordinary people, and the emergence of social, economic and political organisations and structures in contested areas.

Largely ignored in post-conflict policy interventions, processes of institutional transformation during violent conflict are central to explaining why armed conflicts persist, why they may mutate into different forms of violence and criminality, and why sometimes peace prevails. Following the influential World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank 2011), policy programming in conflict-affected countries has taken a strong institutional approach to creating stability and promoting democracy. The emphasis has been on ‘building institutions’, to promote ‘state-building’ and ‘peace-building’. Although much can be said for the need to build strong institutions in conflict-affected contexts, this approach risks viewing conflict-affected countries as blank slates where institutions can be built from scratch. This approach is akin to trying to build an apartment block on quicksand: the accommodation may be needed, but the building is likely to collapse before long. This is because institutional change is endogenous to conflict processes, and institution-building processes in post-conflict settings must first and foremost understand and build upon the institutions that emerge from the conflict itself. There are two important questions around understanding the endogenous role of institutional transformation during violent conflict: When is violence used
strategically to change former institutions? And what type of institutions emerges from that process?

A number of actors and organisations have used conflict and violence as a means to try to take advantage of potential opportunities offered by armed conflict, or to try to readdress the way in which societies and political systems are organised. Building on the pioneering research of Charles Tilly (1975, 1978, 1990), a series of recent studies have analysed the central role of violence in understanding how modern societies have emerged. A common thread across these studies is that modern societies have developed with respect to the nature of the institutions and organisations that are set in place to limit the use of violence as the means to solve social conflicts. According to North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), different social orders emerge as forms of controlling violence. In ‘open access’ societies, the indiscriminate treatment of all citizens allows for political and economic competition that limits the emergence of exclusion and its translation into violent outcomes. In ‘limited access’ societies, or ‘natural states’, political manipulation of economic systems creates elite privileges that will limit the use of violence when elites have a lot to lose. The threat of violence remains, however, because the state has no monopoly over its use. Besley and Persson (2011) show how violence is endogenous to state capacity, and highlight the significance of common interests in the transition from conflict-ridden states towards more inclusive development processes. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2012) discuss the role of inclusive institutions in promoting virtuous cycles of innovation, economic growth and peace, away from collapsed states, violence and extractive institutions. Boix (2003) discusses how redistributive systems and democratic political institutions emerge as a form of restraining violence and political conflict.
An important point made in this body of literature is that violence is endogenous to how institutions emerge and are sustained. In that sense, violent conflict produces the very processes and structures that will determine the rise of inclusive or exclusive institutions once the conflict is over (Justino 2012b). Another central point is that the nature of existing and emerging institutions in any given society will determine how (or whether) violence will be used. A large literature has highlighted the close relationship between forms of state weakness and the emergence of violent conflict (see Fearon and Laitin 2003). While the policy literature has described these processes as a symptom of ‘state collapse’ (Milliken 2003; Zartman 1995) or ‘state failure’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Milliken 2003), what happens in reality is that the ‘collapse’ of state institutions is not necessarily accompanied by the collapse of order and governance (Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008). In reality, different actors tend to replace weak or nonexistent institutions in the provision of local public goods, the enforcement of property rights and social norms and the provision of security, often through violent means but not at all times, nor everywhere (Arjona 2009; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly forthcoming; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008; Mampilly 2011; see also chapter by Timothy Raeymaekers in this volume).

The acknowledgement that conflict-affected contexts are not blank slates rising from anarchy and disorder significantly affects the way we understand the types of society that emerge in the post-conflict period. This in turn provides important micro-foundations to understand peace and conflict processes in the aftermath of armed violence. The surge of strong, legitimate and inclusive institutions – even if outside previous state institutions – may give rise to democratic
and inclusive societies, as exemplified by Western European countries following the devastation of WWII. In contrast, strong but ‘extractive’ institutions, in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), may limit the use of violence, but may collapse under the effects of external events if processes of legitimacy and accountability are weak. This was the case with the Soviet Union, as is the case with several post-conflict countries in Africa, Latin America and South and Southeast Asia where authoritarian regimes and systems of patronage prevail.5 The persistence of weak social, economic and political institutions, on the other hand, is unlikely to restrain the use of violence, and will lead to a vicious cycle of state weakness and violent conflict, characterising many of the countries where the ‘bottom billion’ live (Collier 2007).

Understanding processes of institutional change from a micro-level perspective underscores the important endogenous nature of the relationship between violence and state weakness. State weakness is both a cause and a consequence of the use of violence to solve social conflict. Externally imposed ‘institution-building’ processes are therefore unlikely to break cycles of conflict, unless institutions that emerge from the conflict itself are well-understood and are an integral part of how peace- and state-building processes are structured in the aftermath of violent conflict. Similarly, these forms of institutional transformation also determine how development processes succeed or fail in reducing poverty and promoting economic stability.

**Development policy in the midst of violence and conflict**

5 A wealth of examples has been highlighted by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their book and blog on ‘Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty’:

http://whynationsfail.com/.
The effects of violence on local populations are well-known and interest in ‘conflict-affected and fragile countries’ has risen in recent years among international institutions, NGOs and donors. One-third of all aid to developing countries in 2009 was directed to fragile countries, mostly countries affected by violent conflict (OECD 2011). As a result, there is now a large humanitarian and development industry that addresses the impact of armed violence on local populations through a variety of programmes that aim to rebuild communities, reintegrate ex-combatants, refugee and displaced populations, recover agriculture production systems and markets, reconstruct health systems and basic infrastructure, control the spread of infectious diseases, support nutrition interventions, integrate women in labour markets, reconstruct education systems and programmes, implement cash transfers and other safety nets, and so forth. However, both humanitarian and development interventions in conflict-affected countries have been widely criticised due to their low levels of effectiveness, inability to protect vulnerable populations, lack of coordination, and failure to break vicious cycles of violence and underdevelopment (see, for instance, Addison and Murshed 2002; Addison and Brück 2009; and OECD 2011). Part of the reason for this failure may be the limited understanding of key institutional and normative changes that take place in conflict-affected contexts.

First, there is understandably a tendency for early development interventions in conflict-affected areas to include in their programmes predominantly those that are most vulnerable to poverty, typically identified by some measure of geographical location (refugee status or living in an IDP camp), or ethnic identity. Although the threat of poverty is a very important factor in how people make (or are forced into making) decisions in situations of conflict and violence, people are also
very concerned with their levels of vulnerability to violence. In these circumstances, it is
important to understand that violence and conflict are constant factors in people’s lives and not
sporadic shocks, and that what makes people poor and what kills people may be quite different
factors and may lead to contradictory outcomes. Interventions that focus only on economically
vulnerable populations may exclude large numbers of people that may become targets of
violence, or may themselves lead to renewed cycles of violence.

There is also a widespread predisposition in post-conflict interventions to assume rather than test
factors that underlie popular policies. Two key examples are interventions around the return of
displaced populations (as discussed in the chapter in this volume by Roger Zetter and his co-
authors), and the demobilisation of ex-combatants (discussed in the chapter by Yvan Guichaoua).
In the first case, policies towards refugee and displaced populations assume that the return to
original sites is in most cases the best and most desired option for those that abandoned or were
forced to leave areas of armed violence. However, displacement and other forms of forced
migration take place for a variety of complex reasons and so far there is hardly any rigorous
evidence that supports the wisdom of return policies. Fear of new violence, distrust and new
opportunities elsewhere may make displaced populations not want to return (see Deininger,
Ibáñez and Querubin 2004; Lindley 2010).

In the case of ex-combatants, new evidence clearly shows that individuals join armed groups or
support their actions (voluntarily or involuntarily) in order to manage the dual risks of economic
destitution and of violence (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007;
Weinstein 2006). The demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants
are of central importance to post-conflict reconstruction programmes. DDR programmes aim at
demobilising combatants into civilian structures (or incorporating them into the state military),
focusing for their most part on dismantling military structures, in return for seed money, social or
psychological support and employment training for those that demobilise. The effectiveness of
such programmes is at best mixed (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006), often because the
motivations for why individuals join or support armed groups are not well understood
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Guichaoua 2011). As discussed in several places in this
volume, armed groups may often provide important social structures and safety nets for their
members and their families, including protection against violence, provision of basic needs and
of information, and resources to survive in war zones. These factors are typically absent from
DDR programmes, which continue to focus on the more military aspects of recruitment, rather
than considering the multiple motivations and multiple forms of vulnerability that drive
individual choices and behaviour.

Second, the current approach to development policy in conflict-affected countries is to look at
development processes as a way of promoting security locally, in order to hopefully avoid
insecurity elsewhere (Duffield 2001, 2007; DFID 2011). This objective is addressed through aid
flows to particular projects that may entail potential outcomes in terms of peace and stability
(DFID 2011; OECD 2011). The research discussed in this volume suggests that the success of
this global development approach is very much dependent on how the international community
engages with new and emerging power structures and actors, ranging from ordinary people to
non-state armed actors. These structures and actors are central to understanding why conflict
may persist or transform itself, how peace may emerge, and how the survival and security of ordinary people may be supported.

There is a very large literature on international and national-level interventions to end or limit violent conflict (see Weinstein 2006, chapter 9, for a review). However, efforts to end armed violence require not only the strengthening of state capacity or the elimination of resources available to armed groups, but also addressing how institutions and norms change locally during conflict processes. These ‘micro-foundations’ are important factors in explaining the widespread phenomenon of conflict re-ignition. They are also key to the successful promotion of legitimacy of new political, economic and social institutions in cases where the conflict served to establish more inclusive and accountable forms of state- and nation-building (Justino 2009). In either case, development policy in conflict-affected contexts cannot disassociate itself – as it is doing now – from the social, economic and political institutional transformations brought about by the conflict itself. This disassociation is largely driven by the concern of development institutions about who to partner with to deliver programmes (the state), rather than a focus on what processes may deliver the best results to those in need (the people). As Severine Autesserre (2010: 39-40) writes in her landmark book on the limitations of international peacebuilding in the Congo: “The dominant international peacebuilding culture shapes the interveners’ understanding of peace, violence, and intervention in a way that overlooks the micro-foundations necessary for sustainable peace. The resulting inattention to local conflicts leads to unsustainable peacebuilding in the short term and potential war resumption in the long term”.
A better understanding of the local institutional dynamics associated with violent conflict has important theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, it provides important micro-foundations to understand the duration and termination of violent conflict and the sustainability of peace processes. At the policy level, understanding processes of institutional transformation during violent conflict is important for creating the space for internal and external peace- and state-building interventions to engage with a range of actors, views and local realities that highly influence the sustainability of peace processes.

This is particularly important because these institutional outcomes and processes tend to be very persistent and do not disappear once the conflict is over. One poignant example is that of recent events in Somalia, where local armed groups eventually played key roles in how humanitarian actors accessed vulnerable populations, sometimes providing relief themselves. Although not all rebel groups and other non-state actors that operate in areas of conflict intend to replace incumbent government structures, there are several examples of non-state actors (including traditional authorities, community groups and non-state armed groups) that attempt to replace important state functions such as security provision, access to basic needs, services and public goods, building infrastructure, regulating market access and norms of conduct, among others (see Mampilly 2011 for a discussion). Understanding how and when to intervene in conflict-affected countries requires detailed and systematic knowledge of how state and non-state actors interact and compete throughout the conflict, how they negotiate, intimidate or establish relationships with local populations and how they shape organisation structures and social norms during cycles of violent conflict. These institutional changes are important because they shape how interventions to establish elections, enforce property rights, reform justice and security
structures, and improve systems of food distribution, employment and social service provision may support, or fail to support, local populations. Such forms of institutional transformation are also pivotal in explaining why violent conflict may persist in many societies, why it often mutates into different forms of violence and criminality, and why some societies have historically successfully established systems of cohesion and inclusiveness, while others have not.

**The way ahead: reflections on a new research agenda**

The new micro-level perspective on the dynamics of conflict, violence and development advocated in this volume does not intend to challenge the importance of national and international policy processes in conflict-affected contexts. We fully recognise that the outbreak of violence, the emergence of new actors, and the (eventual) establishment of inclusive societies are not purely driven by local factors. The point we want to make is that neither are local processes, outcomes and dynamics entirely dependent on broader political strategies of state and non-state factions that fight for sovereignty and legitimate authority at the macro level. These micro-level factors are in fact key to the design of development policies that may break the long-term negative legacies of violent conflict, and bring about positive structural transformations.

We have, however, only started to open up the black box of institutional transformation in areas of conflict and violence. The processes whereby institutional frameworks shape the likelihood of the use of violence, or the types of institutional change promoted by different processes of armed violence are yet to be well understood in the literature. This is an extremely important area of
future research, and an important challenge to us all, because these factors are at the centre of how we understand processes of transition from conflict-ridden societies to inclusive, legitimate and accountable states.

The key challenge for a future research agenda on the complex institutional dynamics linking conflict, violence and development processes is the establishment of more rigorous knowledge of how the micro-level processes of transformation discussed here may influence and be shaped by macro-level policy and political processes. While the early literature on violent conflict focussed on issues of state capacity and state security, there is a risk that the new emerging literature on micro-level conflict processes concentrates excessively on local dynamics, without much reflection on how these local processes may shape and be shaped by global and national perspectives and agendas (Kalyvas 2008).

We hope that this volume has gone some way to establish that the behaviour, choices and aspirations of individuals, households, groups and communities in contexts of violence often develop independently of how the conflict progresses at the national and even international levels. These forms of local dynamics may in turn have important consequences for how political negotiations progress at the national level since economic, social and political choices made locally may impact significantly on the strength and level of authority exercised by state and non-state groups, the level of support they can expect from local populations, and the ability of different actors to operate and intervene locally. However, the ways in which local populations behave, make choices and interact with local social networks and institutions are not local events
entirely. They depend to a large extent on how fighting and negotiations between different factions unfold in the wider political arena.

Linking micro and macro processes in conflict analysis, or in any other areas of social science research, involves considerable methodological challenges. Wider political and economic processes such as the establishment of elections, restructuring of property rights, justice and security reforms, demobilisation and reconstruction programmes, and social service provision are difficult to measure in order to precisely identify and isolate their impact at the micro-level. Local dynamics of conflict such as individual and household exposure to violence and other aspects of people’s security are also not easily observable or attributable to specific macro processes. Bringing together these two perspectives is essential as the international outlook on security becomes increasingly complex. Some progress is starting to be made in political science literature around the political micro-dynamics of civil wars (Balcells 2010; Balcells and Kalyvas 2010; Kalyvas 2006, 2008). Hopefully other social sciences and the development community in general will follow suit in order to better understand how the security and capacity of states may be closely entwined with the security and welfare of their people. This represents a considerable challenge for conflict research and the international development community alike, but one that we need to embark upon for the sake of promoting and supporting peace, justice and inclusiveness for the hundreds of millions of people locked in vicious cycles of conflict, violence and underdevelopment.

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