

IDENTIFYING VICTIMS FROM CIVIL CONFLICTS: AN EVALUATION FOR FORCED DISPLACED POPULATION IN COLOMBIA

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Abstract

The dynamics of forced migration pushes households to extremely vulnerable conditions; therefore, the need to design particular policies for the displaced population is unquestionable. However, forced displacement poses several challenges to policy-makers. During low intensity conflicts, such as the Colombian case, the main obstacle arises when identifying the victims of forced migration to funnel aid. In these cases, since victims migrate individually and spread over the territory, the identification of victims is difficult and channeling aid through supply-driven mechanisms is prohibitively expensive. In order to locate the victims during low intensity conflicts, an alternative, adopted by the Colombia government, is to provide aid through demand-driven programs. In Colombia, a demand-driven mechanism, named SUR by its Spanish acronym, was designed to assist the displaced population. Displaced household must approach government offices to declare, under oath, the facts of displacement in order to have access to SUR and thereby state programs. This paper evaluates SUR and identifies whether demand-driven approaches to assist the displaced population reach the entire displaced population. The paper uses a survey applied to 2.322 household located in 48 Colombian municipalities. We identify to what extent a demand-driven approach, like SUR, exclude particular groups of the displaced population; we examine what household characteristics determine the decision to declare and final registration in SUR; and, we analyze whether exclusion of some groups is caused by behavior of displaced households or by deliberate targeting of government offices. Our results reveal that exclusion from the demand-driven approach adopted in Colombia is mainly caused by households' decisions while institutional determinants play a lesser role. The decision to declare is shaped by vulnerability of the household, previous economic status in the municipality of origin, and the migration process.

Key words: Demand-driven mechanisms, forced migration, targeting, civil conflict.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Because armed groups attack directly the civil population as a war strategy, forced displacement has risen *pari passu* with the growing incidence of internal conflicts during the last decades. During intra-state conflicts, attacks to civil population is an effective war strategy adopted by armed groups to consolidate territorial strongholds, to weaken civil support to opponents, to terrorize the civil population at a low cost, and to augment the loot (Azam and Hoefler, 2002). A noteworthy expression of these attacks is the growing numbers of forced displacement during the last decades to 25 million people in 2005 from 17.5 in 1997 (UNHCR, 2006).

The need to design particular policies for the displaced population is unquestionable. Forced displacement constitutes an overt human rights violation; thus, its victims are entitled to protection and reparation policies. Furthermore, forced displacement pushes households to extremely vulnerable conditions. Losses of assets, limited access to social services, destruction of social networks, family disintegration, high unemployment rates, and poor conditions in reception sites, are among the many impacts caused by displacement (Cohen and Deng, 1998; Ibáñez and Querubín, 2004; Ibáñez et. al. 2006; Mooney, 2005)

However, forced displacement poses several challenges to policy-makers. The first obstacle arises when identifying the victims of forced migration. During high intensity conflict, displacement often occurs massively, victims are located in refugee camps, and tracking beneficiaries of aid is straightforward. On the other hand, locating displaced population during low intensity conflicts is difficult because victims rarely migrate massively. Since migration is individual and victims spread over the territory, authorities face difficulties detecting forced migrants.

In the latter case, identifying displaced population to funnel aid is complicated. Instead of providing aid through supply-driven mechanisms, like in the former case, programs are demand-driven. These programs require households to approach government offices and prove their conditions as victims of forced displacement. By relying entirely on households decisions, demand-driven approaches must overcome two obstacles. On the one hand, the displaced population lives usually in marginal areas where spreading information regarding government programs is costly. Moreover, many displaced households mistrust government programs and official since a weak state could not prevent their expulsion in first place. On the other hand, entitlements for displaced population create incentives for other vulnerable groups of the population to

stand as displaced victims in order to receive aid. The design of demand-driven programs must consider incentives to encourage displaced households to approach government offices, yet enough safeguards should also be crafted to restraint access of other groups.

Colombia offers an interesting example of this conundrum. Colombia has faced a long-standing civil conflict for the last 40 years. Escalation of the conflict during the last 15 years heightened attacks to the civil population, causing the displacement of more than 1.8 million people in the period spanning between 1995 and 2006. Forced displacement occurred in 90 percent of Colombian municipalities and most migrations were individual (76.1% from a total of 1'814.964 displaced individuals¹). To mitigate the impact of forced displacement, the country developed a progressive legislation which contemplates a complete package of aid for the victims of forced migration. Access to benefits defined in the Colombian legislation is contingent upon registration in a system called SUR. The objective of SUR is to legally recognize displaced households and quantify the real demand for aid. SUR is a demand-driven instrument in which displaced household must approach government offices to declare, under oath, the facts of displacement. After declaration is completed, government officials validate whether the declaration is truthful and, if so, the legal status of a displaced person is granted.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether demand-driven approaches to assist the displaced population accomplish their main objective; namely, reaching the entire displaced population without excluding any particular group of households. We explore three issues. First, we identify to what extent a demand-driven approach, like SUR, leave out particular groups of the displaced population. Second, we examine what household characteristics determine the decision to declare and final registration in SUR. Third, we analyze whether exclusion of some groups is caused by behavior of displaced households or by deliberate targeting of government offices. To investigate these questions, we use household surveys applied to 2.322 displaced Colombian households.

We find exclusion from the demand-driven approach adopted in Colombia is mainly caused by households' decisions while institutional determinants play a lesser role. A little more than 70 percent of displaced households were registered in SUR, near eight

¹ Red de Acción Social. June 30, 2006

percent were not registered because of voluntary decisions and 15 percent were in fact excluded. The decision to declare is shaped by vulnerability of the household, previous economic status in the municipality of origin, and the migration process. By mitigating the impact of forced migration and creating opportunities to receive compensation for lost assets, incentives to declare are higher for these households. Targeting from government officials after declaration seems limited and restricted to increase the chances to be registered for vulnerable households.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section Two, we describe global trends of forced displacement, detail the Colombian case and explore international and national approaches to address forced displacement. Section Three explains the model for the decision to declare, describes the data, and analyzes the econometric results. Finally, section four concludes.

2. FORCED DISPLACEMENT: TRENDS AND POLICIES

2.1. Forced displacement: the international case

Forced migration has exhibited a growing pattern in the last decades, contrasting with the limited efforts of national governments and international organizations to prevent this phenomenon and mitigate its impact. In this section we discuss forced migration patterns worldwide and analyze the response from international organizations and local governments.


Since the end of the Cold War, inter-state conflicts have diminished while the incidence of intra-state conflicts shows an increasing pattern². Although inter-state wars have diminished, civil conflicts have increased since 1950 to the end of last decade and the nature of civil conflicts has changed. Attacks on civilians have increased as a military strategy of left-wing guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and the State to expand their territorial control and to weaken their opponents' popular support (IDMC, 2006).

As a consequence, the civilian victims have increased with the rise of civil conflicts. Millions of people have left their homes, either as refugees or as internally displaced people (IDPs). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

² Wars between states have diminished 40 percent in the last 50 years and in 2005 the number of intra-state went down from 37 to 24 (IDMC, 2005).

(UNHCR) estimates that nowadays, the refugee and internally displaced population³ is over 30 million people. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the internally displaced and refugee population since 1990 to 2004. During the last years, IDPs and refugee population have followed opposite patterns: as the refugee population has diminished, internal displacement has been increasing. The highest number of refugee population was in 1992, rising to 18 million people, and today is around nine million. In contrast, the internally displaced population has been rising since the last decade and today the magnitude of this phenomenon is around 25 million people, increasing in 1.6 million during 2004 and more than twice the refugee population (UNHCR, 2006). This trend is explained by the highest incidence of inter-state conflicts and the growing hostility to refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2006).

Figure 1. Dynamics of refugees and internally displaced persons: 1997-2004



Source: UNHCR and IDMC

Table 1 shows the regional distribution of the internally displaced population in 2004. During 2004, Latin America and the Caribbean were responsible for 16.9 percent of the total IDPs in the world. According to *Red de Acción Social*⁴ (RAS), forced displacement in Colombia reached in 2004 a magnitude of 1'598.632 people in 2004,

³ The Interamerican Commission of Human Rights (1999) defines an internally displaced person as "anyone who has been forced to migrate within the national boundaries, living aside her residence or her habitual economic activities because either her life, her physical integrity or her freedom have been either violated or threatened by situations such as armed conflict, generalized violence, violations to human rights, and any other situation that may alter public order." On the other hand, the refugee population migrates for the same reasons but they have crossed an international border and they are eligible to receive international protection under the United Nation's 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (IDMC, 2005).

⁴ Red de Acción Social is the state agency in charge of the internally displaced population.

around 40 percent of the Latin American aggregate and 6.7 percent of the world. Africa is the most affected continent with 12.1 million of IDPs, more than 50 percent of the 23.7 million of the world. The countries with the largest number of displaced population are Sudan, Colombia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Iraq. These figures are better understood in relative terms: the internally displaced population in Sudan is the 14.8 percent of total population, 6.9 percent in Uganda, 4.5 percent of Colombian population, more than 4 percent of the Iraqi population and almost 3 percent in DRC.

Table 1. IDPs estimates by region – 2004

Region	Internally Displaced Population	Percentage
Africa	12,100,000	51.05%
Asia	2,800,000	11.81%
Europe	2,700,000	11.39%
Latin America and the Caribbean	4,000,000	16.88%
Middle East	2,100,000	8.86%
Total	23,700,000	100.00%

Source: IDMC, 2006

Although the migration process of refugees and displaced persons is similar and the consequences are analogous, the international and national response is significantly different. National governments are the sole responsible for the assistance of internally displaced population, and the international response is permitted only upon States's approval. On the other hand, the international legislation crafted to protect the refugee is instrumental to migrate to receiving country, offers humanitarian emergency assistance, and provides support either in the resettlement or the return process (UNHCR, 2006).

Moreover, the assistance of National Governments is weak in contrast to the growing forced migration trend. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, although national governments have improved their efforts to protect internally displaced persons, in 80 percent of the displacement situations governments did not provide complete assistance, or none at all (IDMC, 2006). Moreover, around 13 governments lack legislation protecting the displaced people and, in a quarter of IDPs situations, governments have restricted international aid (IDMC, 2006). On the other hand, countries that offer assistance for the displaced persons focus their public programs in humanitarian assistance, which is addressed to cover basic needs of victims during the first months of displacement.

To understand the growing pattern of forced migration and identify policies to mitigate its consequences, a first step is to explore the dynamics leading to forced migration. Early literature has focused on developing theoretical models to explain the causes of the conflict, its origin and its negative impact on forced migration. The consequences of displacement - like economic and social losses -, the effectiveness of public programs for IDP, and proposals of public policies to improve their conditions are rarely analyzed. However, some political scientists have investigated forced migration processes. These studies analyze forced displacement as a military strategy of armed groups, not as a by-product of conflict, where armed groups and the civil population interact and are involved in decision-making processes.

Azam and Hoeffler (2002) assert that during internal wars the civilian population becomes military objectives, causing forced displacement as result. By displacing civilians, armed groups can exert easier territorial control, and identify supporters of the opposing group. The authors propose a model based on the evidence of African countries in which the State is the main responsible of the displacement process. When the government is the main group causing forced migration, donor funding to governments could increase forced migrations, producing the expected opposite effect. Since the Azam and Hoeffler model is valid only when governments play an active role in the displacement process, their results can not be generalized to all the countries where displacement occurs. For example, in Colombia rebel groups are the main forces provoking forced displacement and, even though the government causes a small percentage of displacement, the expulsion of civilians has not been adopted by the government's military forces as a war strategy. However, attacks on Colombian civilians are also used by armed groups as a way of weakening the support to enemy forces and exerting terror upon the civil population at a low cost.

Opposed to the Azam and Hoeffler model, other studies state that the violence against civilians constitutes a way of augmenting resources to expand the loot and finance war activities of involved groups. Rebel groups, use terrorism against the civil population to expand financial sources (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). By deliberately displacing population, armed groups may strengthen territorial control and appropriate valuable assets (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2005). Terrorism *per se* is not a financial source, rebel groups increase their economic capacity through threats and attacks on civilians that force migration, easing their operations in the regions. In many countries, such as in Colombia, Somalia and Sudan, rebel groups

choose their victims in order to gain control over their lands and obtain control over valuable natural resources (IDMC, 2006).

The studies described above analyze the behavior of armed groups and the strategic, political and financial benefits from forcing out population. Their results show that forced migration is a military strategy of armed groups in order to gain territorial control or augment their resources, in contrast to theories that consider forced displacement as a by-product of the war.

Another strand of the literature explores the behavior of the civil population and their reactions when confronted to violent attacks from armed groups. Hence, by identifying the behavior of the civilian population, policy makers may craft policy programs to prevent forced displacement and mitigate its consequences. Moore et al. (2004), Lubkemann (2005) and Engel and Ibáñez (2006) offers an initial approach to understand the behavior of households, confronted with internal conflicts and under the attack of armed groups.

Moore et al. (2004) analyze the process that leads households and individuals to migrate involuntarily in order to avoid the violence of the conflict. The authors develop a model that identifies the determinants of the migration probability, considering violence in their hometown as the main cause of forced migration. The model is based upon three behavioral assumptions. First, the model assumes that the probability to migrate increases when the expected utility of leaving is higher than the expected utility of staying. Second, since individuals are rational, they value their liberty, physical security, and life. The last assumption suggests that individuals have the capacity to recognize possible threats against their life and liberty. Following these assumptions, the authors estimate aggregate models of forced migration which incorporate measures of violence from governments and from rebel groups, as well as the democracy level (political freedom and rule of law) as determinants. Results show that traditional economic variables, like income⁵ and democracy, do not influence the flows of forced migration. On the other hand, violence⁶ significantly increases forced migration.

Lubkemann (2005) explores forced migration throughout Mozambique during the civil conflict which took place between 1977 and 1992. Based on social, political and cultural variables, the author analyzes how local conflicts and local political

⁵ Income variable measures economic opportunities; therefore the best variable could be wages. However, authors employ gross national product (GNP) per capita as a proxy, because of data restrictions.

⁶ Violence measures are used at aggregate level. Two measures are used: genocide and violations of human rights.

interests interact with war dynamics producing different patterns of wars (“fragmented wars”). As a result, forced migration in Mozambique followed different patterns shaped by diverse political conflicts, social struggles, and different cultural constructs at the local level.

Engel and Ibáñez (2006) present a first attempt to analyze the determinants of displacement at the household level for the Colombian case. As in Moore et al (2004) and Lubkemann (2005), this model assumes that households migrate when the expected utility from displacement is greater than the expected utility of staying in the place of origin. Utility depends on the perception of security at origin and reception sites, income and standards of living in origin or reception municipality, migration and information costs, and socio-demographic characteristics of the household. Results indicate that illegal armed groups in Colombia target specific groups of the population like landowners, community leaders, and young household heads. By targeting these particular individuals, armed groups follow a deliberate war strategy to augment the loot and terrorize the population at a low cost. Although economic variables are significant, their results show that perceptions of security have a stronger impact in migration decisions. Moreover, even though economic variables play an important role, violence outweighs economic variables by a large amount.

The impact of displacement on its victims is substantial. Displacement weakens family ties, destroys social networks and limits access to education, health services, food and shelter (UNHCR, 2006). Displaced persons must abandon their lands and other productive and unproductive assets, increasing significantly their vulnerability (Mooney, 2005). Moreover, typical family roles change when families lose their main breadwinners: in many cases women become household heads, and children must interrupt school to contribute in income generating activities.

Forced to abandon their assets, IDPs have scarce resources at reception sites, and, in addition to the limited access to basic services, access to labor markets is not easy due to their rural training. In most cases, IDPs find jobs in the informal sector, which does not offer stability in the long run and increases the risk of falling into chronic poverty (Ibáñez et al., 2006). A study undertaken in Colombia finds unemployment rates for displaced households rocket after forced migration and, a year after displacement, unemployment rates are still higher than those of extreme poor in urban areas. Furthermore, access to social services and living conditions are below those of poor in urban areas (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006).

Since attacks against the civil population constitute a military strategy of armed groups during civil wars, civilians are the major victims of conflict. Consequently, forced displacement has grown steadily throughout the last decades. This population faces extreme vulnerability, because displaced households lose assets and the settlement process is slow. Although the United Nations developed a legal framework to address the situations of IDP, assistance programs for IDP are the responsibility of national governments, which in many cases have not adopted any measure to address the needs of this population.

2.2. Forced displacement in Colombia

Escalation of the internal conflict in Colombia led to a steep increase in forced migration. Sometimes forced displacement is an unanticipated by-product of conflict, but in most instances displacement is a military strategy to clear territory from the presence of opponents, to expand territorial control, and to appropriate valuable land (Reyes and Bejarano, 1998). In addition, forcing out population has become a war strategy to impede collective action, to damage social networks and to intimidate and control the civil population (Henao et al, 1998).

Forced displacement in Colombia affects 1'814.964⁷ persons, equivalent to 4.4 percent of the Colombian population and to 13.7 percent of the rural population. Displacement now reaches almost all municipalities⁸ in the country: 997 municipalities have received or have forced out civilians, which amounts to more than 90 percent of total municipalities. However, expulsion and reception is higher in certain municipalities: 57 percent of expulsions happen on 78 municipalities and only 44 municipalities receive 66 percent of IDPs⁹. The municipalities with the highest pressure index¹⁰ in 2005 were: Quibdó, Sincelejo and Florencia, with an index ranging between 20 y 26 percent. On the other hand, municipalities with the highest intensity index¹¹ were Bojayá, Cocorná, and El Tarra, with indicators ranging between 82 and 94 percent.

Rebel armed groups are the main responsible of forced displacement in Colombia. Until December 2005, almost 42 percent of total expulsions were initiated by

⁷ Red de Acción Social. June 30 2006

⁸ Municipalities are the smallest administrative units in Colombia and departments are similar to States in the United States.

⁹ More than half of IDPs comes from Antioquia, Bolívar, Magdalena, Cesar, Chocó and Putumayo and 47.7% migrate to Antioquia, Bolívar, Sucre, Valle, Magdalena and Bogotá.

¹⁰ Displacement pressure is calculated as the aggregated number of displaced population arriving to a receiving municipality over the local population.

¹¹ The intensity indicator measures the number of displaced people over the inhabitants of the expulsion municipality.

guerrilla groups, 17 percent by paramilitary groups, 0.5 percent by government armed forces and 15 percent by unknown actors. In June 2006, the responsibility of guerrilla groups dropped to 30 percent, and that of paramilitary groups to 10 percent. Surprisingly, displacement from unknown actors increased to 26 from 50 percent between 2005 and 2006. Unlike other countries where people displace collectively, most migrations in Colombia are individual: 76.1 percent are individual and 23.9 percent are collective.

The economic and social costs of displacement are sizeable. As the migration occurs hastily, households are not able to sell their assets and must abandon their properties. The average loss of assets, including housing and other assets but not land properties, is around US\$ 3.700¹² per household. The average value of abandoned land properties per household is around US\$ 1.200 and losses from idle land are estimated in US\$ 833 per year (Ibáñez et. al., 2006). At an aggregate level, assets loss represents 1.7 percent of GDP, 1.2 million hectares have been abandoned¹³ and losses from idle land amount to 2.1 percent of agricultural GDP.

Forced displacement causes considerable welfare losses. First, households often break up as a consequence of the migration process, or during their settlement in reception sites. Some members are assassinated; others stay in their hometown to protect assets; while others migrate before in order to avoid attacks from armed groups. Almost one quarter of households splits up due to displacement; 31.5 percent of these households seem to split to diversify income sources either by leaving some members in their hometown or by allowing some members to return after displacement. The latter strategy seems effective to improve somewhat the economic conditions of households (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006). On the other hand changes in household composition are sometimes an adverse consequence of forced displacement and not a strategic decision: 19 percent of fragmented households are now headed by women because the former head was assassinated, died or abandoned the family. When households are fragmented after traumatic events, the social and economic impact is significant because women are obliged to become the main breadwinners of the household, and the number of members generating income declines. This group of households faces extremely harsh conditions in reception sites.

¹² With an exchange rate of 2.398,83 pesos per dollar.

¹³ This figure is equivalent to two times the number of hectares allocated in agrarian reform programs.

Access to labor markets is limited. Since the displaced population migrate from rural areas, their labor skills are adequate for agricultural production, but not highly valued in urban labor markets. Labor markets absorb the displaced population at an extremely slow pace and unemployment rates for the displaced population are therefore high. Moreover, employment is usually in the informal sector in low-skilled and underpaid tasks. Results for Colombia indicate that unemployment rates rise significantly after displacement to 16.1 percent from 1.7 percent (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006). Furthermore, unemployment rates are higher than those of urban poor and, after a year of settlement, they hardly reach the rates of urban extreme poor.

Given the pronounced asset loss and the difficulty to access labor markets, displaced households face a significant drop in income and consumption. Labor income declines significantly to US\$ 400 from US\$ 917, meaning that households experience a drop of 57 percent. However, labor income seems to improve as settlement in the reception site is longer, yet after a year of settlement labor income still is less than half of their income before displacement. Aggregate annual consumption per equivalent adult drops from US\$ 750 at the origin municipality to US\$ 458 at the reception site, which represents a loss of 35.7 percent (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006). Moreover, consumption per equivalent adult exhibits a steady decline during the first year of settlement.

The limited capacity to generate income derives in poor living conditions in reception sites. Although access to education and public utilities is better in reception municipalities, living conditions for the displaced people are much worse than those of urban poor and even extreme poor. School enrollment for members under 18 years of age increases from 54 percent in origin to 72 percent in reception, however, this percentage is below school enrollment for the urban poor (89%) and the urban extreme poor (87%). Indeed, school attendance increases just for children in primary school, but falls for those in middle and high school from 74.8 percent in origin to 68.2 percent after displacement. Children between 12 and 17 years must abandon their studies to help generate income. On the other hand, coverage of health services improves significantly after displacement and is larger than for urban poor. However, health conditions of IDPs deteriorate due to the poor living conditions and the migration process.

Results from Ibáñez and Moya indicate welfare losses from displacement are significant. First, asset losses are substantial and changes in household composition occur frequently. Second, conditions in reception sites are harsh and, in most cases,

worst than urban poor and extreme poor. Third, time of settlement does not appear to improve conditions in a significant manner. Consequently, displaced households are extremely vulnerable and face a high risk of falling into chronic poverty.

2.3. Policies and programs for the Internally Displaced Population

The growing pattern of forced displacement and the substantial welfare losses its victims endure are not consistent with the insufficient development of policy programs for their assistance, both from national governments and from the international community. Although some consensus has emerged regarding the need of policy programs for IDPs, little agreement has been reached about the type of assistance required. In many countries, governments have not designed special legislation to protect and assist IDPs, and, in countries where legislation is available (e.g. Colombia), its implementation faces many obstacles.

Contributions and interventions from the international community are limited because the assistance of IDP is the sole responsibility of national governments. However, the United Nations' Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, by defining a minimum standard for the assistance of IDP, are contributing to promote the design of national legal frameworks. In fact, national legal frameworks draw on many of the concepts developed by the Guiding Principles. Colombia, Perú, Angola, Burundi, Filipinas, Sri Lanka and Uganda have strengthened their national legal frameworks based on these Principles. However, the effectiveness of these laws is unclear. For example, Colombia, despite having a highly praised national legislation to assist IDP, is far from being an exception (UNHCR, 2006).

Weiss (1999) identify some difficulties when implementing such laws. First, the budget earmarked to implement IDP programs is insufficient given their needs. Second, as displaced people are migrating regularly, the target population is extremely difficult to track and to monitor. Lastly, the right of nation's sovereignty limits the capacity of international organizations and impedes international interventions when human right abuses are so severe that international intervention is indeed necessary.

In Colombia, the policy to assist the displaced population follows three stages: prevention, humanitarian emergency assistance, and socioeconomic stabilization¹⁴. The Humanitarian Emergency Assistance (HEA) provides help in order to generate the minimal subsistence conditions during the first months of displacement¹⁵. Once the

¹⁵ The HEA provides, food, water, housing, medical services, psychological help and nutritional support.

period of Humanitarian Assistance ends, the focus shifts to socioeconomic stabilization, which seeks to generate the necessary conditions for the displaced population to regain their productive life¹⁶. Once displaced households are able to regain their productive life and do not need special assistance, the condition of forced displacement ceases and victims are no longer beneficiaries of special aid (Ibáñez y Moya, 2005).

México, Perú and Guatemala have also faced similar forced displacement processes. However, the legislation designed to assist IDP differs widely from the Colombian approach. In Peru and Guatemala, the protection of the displaced population is eluded, and the legislation does not incorporate mechanisms for land restitution and socioeconomic stabilization. Moreover, although in both countries the conflict ceased, IDP still face poor conditions and are significantly discriminated. Government services for IDPs are therefore limited to general programs targeted to the poor population and, not to their particular needs (UN, 2004).

In Africa, the continent facing worldwide the worst situation, governments' response has been inadequate (IDMC, 2006). Problems arise due to the weak or practically non-existent reaction to the displacement phenomenon, limited humanitarian assistance, lack of economic resources, and a poor coordination among international organizations. Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Uganda integrated the Guiding Principles into their national legislation. Nevertheless, implementation of the Principles is weak as a consequence of the problems mentioned above (IDMC, 2006). In other cases, although the Guiding Principles have not been implemented, national governments have adopted an active response to address the needs of IDP. In Ghana, the government confiscated weapons to halt violence causing displacement; Mozambique allowed international organizations to undertake programs for IDPs; and, Rwanda established permanent settlements for IDP (Cohen and Deng, 1998).

Forced displacement is becoming a phenomenon of large dimensions, affecting nowadays more than 25 million people and imposing large welfare losses upon its victims. National governments are responsible to assist their IDPs, through the design of adequate legal frameworks and its effective implementation. Colombia, although exhibits an unquestionable progress in the consolidation of its legal frameworks, faces difficulties implementing the programs.

¹⁶ During the socioeconomic stabilization, the government should provide access to land, credits, technical assistance, labor training, basic infrastructure, health coverage, education, job opportunities and housing.

3. AN EVALUATION OF SUR: WHO DECIDES TO DECLARE IN SUR? IS THE PROCESS TARGETING SOME PARTICULAR GROUPS OF HOUSEHOLDS?

Access to displaced programs in Colombia is contingent upon registration in SUR. The purpose of SUR is to legally identify IDP and quantify the real demand for government assistance. In order to register in SUR, displaced households must declare, under oath, in any office of the Public Ministry. The statement covers information about the expulsion and reception municipalities, dates of displacement, the facts leading to displacement, and households' socio-demographic characteristics. Once the declaration is completed, the Territorial Units of RAS evaluate within 15 days whether the declaration is valid. An application is denied when the information provided is false, when displacement is not consistent with the definition established in the State's Law, or when victims declare more than a year after displacement. Upon registration in SUR, households have the right to receive government assistance.

What determines registration in SUR? The process to declare and finally register in SUR depends on households decisions on whether to declare or not, and government officials, who must decide whether the declaration complies with legal standards. Since displacement in Colombia occurs mostly at the individual level, tracking the beneficiaries of government is extremely costly. Thus, a supply-driven approach to provide aid for the displaced population is not a feasible option in Colombia. Demand-driven mechanisms to overcome this obstacle were designed, whereby displaced households approach government offices to declare and be registered. Although this system is the best option, problems still arise due to under-registration, and the possibility of excluding particular groups of the population.

The purpose of this section is to explore the declaration and registration process, to identify which households receive help from the State, and to evaluate the role of institutional variables in this process. The decision to declare is defined in a behavioral model which allows us to define the determinants of this process and later estimate the probability of declaring and being registered in SUR.

3.1. The decision to declare

Declaration and registration in SUR partially depends on households decisions. Before declaring, households must be informed about SUR, the procedures to declare, and the benefits from being registered. Information is however a necessary but not a sufficient condition to declare. Some households decide not to declare because they

deem benefits from declaring as low, the red tape procedures as excessive, or they prefer to preserve their anonymity at the reception place. Lastly, registration in SUR becomes effective when displaced households comply with the characteristics established in Law 387 of 1997.

With the purpose of evaluating the registration process, we analyze three stages: (i) the probability of being informed about SUR, (ii) the probability of declaring; and (iii) the probability of being registered. Each stage allows us to identify possible flaws during the registration process. By analyzing the probability of being informed about SUR, we can establish whether all displaced groups are properly notified about their rights and benefits, or whether information is only reaching particular groups. Furthermore, exploring the probability to declare reveals the decision processes of displaced households, and how this process influences the decision to search government aid. Lastly, the probability of being registered sheds some light regarding the randomness of registration in SUR. As displacement is an outright violation of human rights, SUR covers population legally protected and entitled to humanitarian assistance; thus, registration in SUR should not be targeted to particular groups. The probability of being registered determines if SUR is randomly assigned, or if there is a concealed targeting process which benefits some particular groups of the displaced population on a greater basis.

The probability of being informed about SUR depends on households characteristics (Z), on the displacement process (M) and on the characteristics of the reception municipality (R). Education levels for member above 18 years of age, higher income, links with community organizations and access to labor markets, may increase the probability of gathering and understanding information regarding SUR and its benefits. On the other hand, most vulnerable households, with limited access to social networks and facing harsh conditions, may have fewer opportunities to gather this kind of information. The displacement processes may affect partially the capacity to accumulate information about SUR; for example, according to the Colombian legislation, when households displace massively, registration in SUR is automatic. Finally, receptor municipalities play an important role when implementing the IDP programs. A municipality actively involved in social programs, with a strong institutional capacity, and with resources to spend in social programs, may have strong links with its communities, initiate information campaigns regarding the rights and

benefits for IDP, and be actively involved in programs for IDP. The probability of household i living in municipality j of being informed about SUR is defined by

$$prob(\text{information SUR})_{ij} = f(Z_i, M_i, R_j)$$

The probability to declare in order to be registered in SUR is determined by the benefits and the costs derived from declaring and possibly being registered. When households are registered in SUR, they immediately become beneficiaries of IDP programs. The benefits households derive from registration are contingent upon socioeconomic conditions in the receptor municipality, on how the programs respond to IDP needs, and on incentives to recover assets at the origin site. Poor socioeconomic conditions like unemployment, inadequate housing, bad health conditions, absence of public services and deficient nutrition, increase the need of State support; thus, pushing households to declare and obtain tangible benefits from their possible registration. Likewise, households with small children, newborns, pregnant mothers or senior members, receive higher benefits from government aid. Finally, since registration in SUR implies a legal recognition of being a displaced person, benefits may arise when reparation and compensations processes during post-conflicts are implemented and recovery of assets is possible. Thus, households that faced heavy losses of assets, such as lands, housing and non productive assets, have clear incentives to declare.

Monetary costs, opportunity costs and the loss of anonymity constitute the main costs of declaring. In order to declare, household heads must travel more than once to a State Office, which implies high monetary costs for displaced households given their limited income. In addition, declaring requires sacrificing time that could be dedicated to generate income. This opportunity cost may be particularly high for the displaced population whose jobs are usually in the informal sector, and as day laborers. Lastly, some households prefer to be anonymous at the reception municipality to avoid new attacks from armed groups. For the displaced population, registration in SUR entails leaving behind the anonymity in reception municipalities, and involves costs for some households¹⁷. Households willing to preserve anonymity are usually those who migrate as a consequence of direct violence, who suffered direct threats, the murder of some member, or other kinds of violence.

¹⁷ An example of anonymity loss was mentioned by the surveyed displaced people in this research. A displaced man mentioned that, at the time he was making the line to declare, appeared the armed groups responsible from their displacement. As a consequence he stopped the declaration process.

Given the discussion, the probability that household i declares in order to be registered later in SUR in municipality j is defined as

$$prob(\text{declaring}) = prob(\{B(x_i, y_{ij}, w_i, z_j, \varepsilon_{ij}) - C(x_i, y_{ij}, w_i, z_j, \mu_{ij})\} > 0)$$

where x_i represents households characteristics, y_{ij} is a vector that represents the conditions of household i in municipality j , w_i is the economic status in the origin municipality and z_j are the conditions at the reception municipality, ε_{ij} and μ_{ij} are random terms.

The vector of socio-demographic characteristics of households included as determinants of the probability of declaring is described below. Gender of the household head, household fragmentation as a consequence of displacement, household composition, human capital, and being part of an ethnic minority determine the costs and benefits of declaring.

Female headed households are usually more vulnerable than male headed households. However, Núñez and Espinosa (2005) find that the likelihood of being poor is not larger for female headed households. Moreover, welfare losses from displacement are similar for female and male headed households (Ibáñez and Moya, 2006). Nevertheless, qualitative studies show some female headed households of the displaced population are particularly vulnerable. A high percentage of female household heads are widows as a consequence of conflict. In addition to facing the loss of their husband and becoming the main breadwinner of the family, women must confront new challenges: adjusting to an unknown place, searching for jobs, and working (UNHCR, 2003)¹⁸. Some benefits from government programs, as a consequence, may have a stronger impact on families with female heads. On the other hand, the costs from declaring may be higher for this group for two reasons. First, declaring implies a halt in income generation activities for some hours, and female heads may be the only breadwinners of the family. Second, as contact with family and friends is scarce in reception municipalities, the care of children while declaration occurs may involve an additional cost.

By limiting the support of other household members and reducing the number of adults generating income, household fragmentation increases the vulnerability of

¹⁸ According to a testimony reported in a study of UNHCR, the lack of land, the discrimination, the lack of solidarity and have to face a different society and a limited and unknown labor market, which does not require their skills, leave them in a worst situation than those of men's.

households. However, vulnerability may differ according to the reasons causing the fragmentation in the first place. Some households are fragmented because members stay in their hometown to protect assets and diversify income generation strategies. In such cases, the family may receive financial transfers, which reduces vulnerability. This fragmentation is voluntary. Other households face an involuntary fragmentation because the household head is murdered, or because he abandons his family after displacement. If the latter occurs, women are obliged to become household heads, increasing their vulnerability significantly. Access to governmental aid becomes essential to avoid further erosions of households' assets and wealth.

The composition, an indicator of households' vulnerability, is also a determinant of the probability of declaring. Family size, dependency ratios and the age of the household head are characteristics that should be considered. Because vulnerability of the household increases for larger families or with higher dependency ratios, the probability to declare may be higher for these households. On the other hand, the impact of the age of household heads over the probability to declare is difficult to establish *a priori*. Although young people have less experience and finding a job could be harder for them, young people are, on the other hand, more flexible and can easily learn new tasks.

The stock of human capital, formal and informal, shapes the benefits and costs to declare. Formal human capital is represented by the educational level of the household head and the spouse. Better educated individuals may have a greater capacity to accumulate and process information regarding access to government programs, reducing as a consequence the costs from declaring. On the other hand, the occupation of the household head at the origin site is a proxy for informal human capital. As mentioned earlier, households previously dedicated to agricultural activities are less suited to compete in urban labor markets; thus, displacement process implies depreciation of this type human capital. Given the difficulty to generate income, these households are more vulnerable and the benefits from declaring are high. Moreover, once registration is completed, households become beneficiaries of income generation and training programs. Better educated households may reap larger benefits from these programs. In addition, individuals dedicated previously to agricultural activities may acquire new skills to increase competitiveness in urban labor markets. Finally, the costs to declare may be lower for more educated households.

Qualitative studies identify ethnic minorities as an extremely vulnerable group of the displaced population. Ethnic minorities are victims of discrimination, fare worse than the average displaced household, and face difficulties during the registration process. Consequently, ethnic minorities are more vulnerable, and their access to social services and labor markets is particularly difficult. Registration in SUR may constitute a first step to reduce this gap, but cultural and language barriers have proven to be an obstacle to register in SUR (UNHCR, 2004).

Socioeconomic conditions in the reception municipalities may also determine the probability to declare. The stock of social capital in the reception municipality, represented by personal contacts and membership in local organizations, and health conditions of households' members may influence the decision to declare. Since personal contacts are accustomed with the reception municipality, and may provide services as caretakers, their presence may reduce the costs from declaring. Conversely, benefits from declaring may be lower since personal contacts may offer support to households, in particular during the first months, and the urgent need to declare may be postponed. When some member of the household is an active member of an organization, households can obtain information about public programs for IDPs and legal advice to declare. Health conditions of displaced people are deteriorated as a consequence of bad nutrition, severe socioeconomic conditions and the displacement process. If some member of the family has a physical incapacity or a mental illness, the vulnerability of the household increases. Because these individuals require special medical care and large monetary investments, the benefits from declaring are evident: registration in SUR permits immediate access to health services.

Economic status at the origin municipality and asset ownership – characterized by the percentage of lands abandoned, housing ownership in origin, and consumption in origin – are variables that influence the benefits to declare. Land losses could increase the probability to declare for two reasons. By declaring, the chances of recovering land lost are higher. On the other hand, incentives to recuperate previous welfare levels are high since the loss of land, which constituted the main income generating asset, means a substantial drop in income. Recovering housing ownership in the origin municipality constitutes also an incentive to declare. Consumption in origin is a strong indicator of the former economic status of households. Better off households may have more information and have more economic incentives to recuperate their previous welfare levels.

Finally, displacement characteristics may also influence the decision to declare. When displacement is massive, households are immediately informed about the rights of the displaced population, and are registered automatically. On the other hand, when households are displaced as a consequence of a direct attack of armed groups (reactive displacement), the probability to declare may be lower for the fear of losing anonymity in the reception municipality, which may cause a new attack of armed groups¹⁹. Lastly, the time of settlement in the reception municipality may have a negative or positive influence over the probability to declare. As time of settlement increases, the vulnerability of households may decrease and the need to access public programs diminishes. However, households acquire more information as time of settlement increases and the procedures to declare and register may become more familiar, reducing as a result the costs from declaring.

Although declaring in States Office is the first step to register in SUR, declaration does not constitute a guarantee to registration in SUR. As mentioned earlier, RAS has 15 days to accept or deny the registration of the household in SUR. Households are excluded from SUR when the declaration is untruthful, when the displacement did not occur according to the definition of Law 387 of 1997 conditions, or when the declaration was made after a year of settlement. Excluding these three exceptions, every household that declares must be registered in SUR because, as established by national and international law, humanitarian assistance can not be denied neither to an individual or a household.

To establish whether the government undertakes a concealed process of targeting registration in SUR towards certain groups of the displaced population after their declaration, we estimate the probability of being registered in SUR. If the determinants of the probability to declare are similar in magnitude and significance to the determinants of being registered in SUR, hidden targeting from government offices is not taking place. Households that are effectively registered in the SUR should have the same characteristics of those who declare. When the system is working properly, registration in SUR should not discriminate or treat favorably households with specific characteristics. Thus, we estimate the probability of being registered with the same group of variables included in the probability to declare.

3.2. The data

¹⁹ The loss of anonymity and the consequent attacks of armed groups are mentioned frequently by displaced households and NGO.

The empirical analysis uses data from a household survey we applied in 2004 to 2,322 displaced households located in 48 municipalities and 21 departments (EDHD-2004). The surveys were applied by Catholic Parrishes located in each municipality. Enumerators were staff from each Parrish working with the displaced population trained by University of Los Andes to apply the surveys. Since available figures about the magnitude and regional distribution of displacement are biased samples, we design a sample to correct the bias.

The sample designed by *Universidad de los Andes* is representative of the displaced population and is based on the RUT System. This information system collects information about displaced households and is applied and managed by the Catholic Church. The data contains information for 32,093 households and nearly 150,000 people. The survey elicits information to identify the causes and actors responsible of displacement, household characteristics, land tenure, access to labor market and education before and after displacement as well as the different needs of the displaced population. The questionnaire also includes information regarding the participation in organizations and willingness to return of the displaced households. The detailed questionnaire is applied to displaced households that request assistance in any of the 3,764 parishes of the Catholic Church.

To correct the bias of the RUT sample, the sample was divided into two sub-samples. The first sample is based on the RUT system and we selected as a stratified sample of 3,000 RUT households that had to be relocated by Church enumerators. For each RUT household surveyed, the enumerator had to apply the survey to a Non-RUT household located in the closest neighborhood. The final sample is composed by 794 RUT households and 759 Non-RUT households. Once the surveys were applied, we calculated expansion factors based on RUT and SUR²⁰.

Finally, we designed a sub-sample in order to evaluate the impact of income generation programs for IDPs. We selected 769 beneficiary households from USAID programs implemented by three organizations²¹. Beneficiaries of income generation programs were surveyed in the same municipalities as in the RUT and non-RUT sample and were randomly selected from a beneficiary list.

3.3. Descriptive Statistics

²⁰ A comparison between RUT and Non-RUT samples is available upon request.

²¹ CHF, PADF and IOM.

The purpose of this section is to analyze the registration process in SUR. We examine coverage indexes in each stage of the registration process, as well as the time elapsed among the different stages of the process. We analyze as well the characteristics of households that have information about SUR, that declare and that are finally registered in SUR.

Table 2 shows the coverage indexes in each stage of the process. Figures show during the first stages a wide percentage of households are informed about SUR and declare, but these figures decline for later stages. First, a high percentage of displaced households (85.13%) are informed about SUR. Second, almost 78 percent decide to declare in order to be registered in the SUR. The main reasons for not declaring are unawareness regarding the benefits of registering in SUR (36.9%), and registration requirements (34.2%). Therefore, massive information campaigns conveying the benefits of registering in SUR and the registration requirements may increase SUR coverage. A lower percentage (12%) does not declare because they consider that procedures are too difficult, and six percent believes that the declaration will not change their situation. A small proportion of displaced population does not declare to protect anonymity in the reception municipality, which demonstrates that security problems are less an issue during this stage of the process. Third, near 71 percent of displaced households are registered in the SUR. Lastly, only 56.3 percent of the registered households effectively receive some type of government aid, indicating a flaw in this stage of the process since almost half of displaced families, after engaging in a costly declaration process, do not reap the benefits from registering in SUR. Understanding the causes of insufficient coverage in SUR is important not only to improve the program, but also to identify mechanisms to encourage other IDPs to declare.


Table 2. Registration Process – SUR

Variable	Percentage of households
Being informed about SUR	85.1
Declaring in State Offices	77.7
Reason not to declare – No information about benefits	36.9
Reason not to declare – No information about registration requirements	34.2
Reason not to declare – Difficult red tape procedures	12.4
Reason not to declare – Deem registrations as useless	6.2
Reason not to declare – Preserve anonymity	2.2
Registered in SUR	70.4
Received government aid after registration	56.3

Source: Author's calculations based on ENDH-2004

The gap between declaring in State Offices and registration, around 7.3 percent, represents the rejection index. Figures reveal an increasing trend of this gap to almost ten percent in 2004 from three percent in 1999 (Figure 2). Although from 2002 to 2004 the percentage of households that declare has dropped near 22 percent, the fall for households effectively registered has been larger (near 28%). By possibly signaling a purposive rationing of the government to state aid, this increasing trend is indeed worrisome.

Figure 2. Gap between declaration and registration



Source: Author's calculations based on EDHD-2004

Time elapsed between the different stages of the declaration process also indicates a critical drawback of the program. As Table 3 reveals, time elapsed between each stage is lengthy. Between declaration and registration, the time spanned is on average more than a month and two months between registration and provision of government aid. Altogether, more than three months pass between declaration and provision of government aid, months in which support is certainly urgent.

Table 3. Time between different stages

Variable	Number of days
Time between declaration and registration in SUR	46.52
Time between registration in SUR and provision of government aid	62.12
Time between declaration and provision of government aid	108.65

Source: Author's calculations based on ENDH-2004

Furthermore, although registration in SUR is a necessary condition to receive government aid, registration does not seem to be a sufficient condition to receive aid.

Despite legal provisions regarding the array of government aid the displaced population is entitled to, only a small fraction of households are beneficiaries of all the services. Table 4 shows that beneficiary households are awarded, in most of the cases, just one of the many services the government provides. Moreover, coverage of government programs, in contrast with non-government programs, is higher for social services, like health and education. These services are usually provided by the government to the poor population; thus additional capacity or new programs are not necessary. On the other hand, assistance purposively designed for IDPs is limited and smaller than non-state organizations assistance. For instance, non-government organizations cover 11 percent of income generation programs, while government aid covers 3.7 percent. Because some income generation programs are operated through non-government organization, these figures number should be analyzed with caution.

Table 4. Provision of government aid

Aid provided	% households that received aid	
	Government	Non-Government
Humanitarian Emergency Assistance	29.4	62.4
Health coverage	26.0	6.6
Education	12.9	5.2
Income generation programs	3.73	11.0
Housing	5.2	4.5
Land and agricultural training	1.0	0.8
Psychological support and nutrition programs	2.9	8.6

Source: Author's calculations based on ENDH-2004

Table 5 presents the socio-demographic characteristics of households informed about SUR, households that declare, households registered in SUR, and household beneficiaries of government aid. Being informed about SUR seems to be linked with economic status in the municipality of origin, household composition, and to some characteristics of migration process. Housing ownership in origin, an indicator of the economic status before displacement, is more frequent among households aware of SUR. Better off households may collect easier information regarding government programs as their education levels are higher and may be have denser social networks.

Households with older household heads and with larger sizes, indicators of households' vulnerability, are more likely to be informed about SUR. Government programs may target vulnerable households more often. On the other hand, the need of having access to government programs is larger for vulnerable households, pushing these households to seek aid more frequently.

Massive displacement occurred more often among households informed about SUR. This result is not surprising because when massive displacement occurs government officials travel to the reception municipality to collect the declaration and, they immediately register displaced families in SUR. Finally, as time of settlement increases families are more likely to be informed about SUR.

The same differences emerge for households who decide to declare and those who decide not to declare. The migration process seems to shape the decision to declare. Reactive and massive displacement is more common for households declaring, yet the days of settlement are no longer significantly different. Surprisingly, reactive displacement is larger for households declaring. We expected the costs from losing anonymity and being again the target of rebel groups may discourage declaration.

A better economic status in the origin municipality appears as an important determinant to declare. Because asset losses may be higher for better-off households, the incentives to declare are larger as government programs to reconstitute assets may be implemented. As a consequence, landownership is more frequent for households that declare. However, a higher proportion of larger households²² and female heads among families that declare show that vulnerability may also be a strong determinant for declaring.

Who is effectively registered in SUR? Differences are evident when we analyze the characteristics of registered and non-registered households. Larger households and households with members mentally ill or physically challenged are variables revealing that vulnerable households are more likely to be registered. Also, registered households are more frequently land and housing owners. Average days of settlement are larger for households registered in SUR, which is an expected result because over time access to information becomes easier.

Once registration is approved, all households registered in SUR are entitled to government aid. Nevertheless, only 56.2 percent of households receive government aid. Which households are beneficiaries of government aid? Descriptive statistics in Table 5 show that households with larger size, better economic status and those who migrate in a massive way are beneficiaries of government aid more often. Belonging to an ethnic

²² According to the testimony of a displaced African Colombian woman in Bogotá: “Because we lack land, we have to construct our home in small spaces where we live with our families. In our culture families are big; most of African Colombian families are composed by 5 or 8 persons, because in our lands we have enough space to have the number of children that we want. Houses in our hometown are big and in the cities we have to live in reduced spaces and with other families”. (UNHCR, 2003)

minority is the only variable which before was not significantly different for the previous stages and now emerges as a different. Ethnic minorities are less likely to receive government aid.

The analysis above sheds some lights about the determinants of each stage in the registration process. However, we will estimate regressions controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, economic status at the municipality of origin, and feature of the migrations process to identify which variable are in fact significant.

Table 5. Descriptive statistics for households informed about SUR, declaring, registered and beneficiaries of government programs

Variable	Not informed about SUR	Informed about SUR	Do not declare	Declare	Not registered in SUR	Registered in SUR	Non beneficiaries government programs	Beneficiaries government aid
Male household head	64.03%	62.56%	63.86%	62.49%	60.96%	63.27%	61.34%	63.49%
Female household head after displacement	7.19%	9.35%	6.51%**	9.65%**	7.92%	9.45%	8.05%	9.66%
Households still in contact with members living elsewhere	0.36%	1.37%	0.48%	1.42%	0.74%	1.41%	0.98%	1.40%
Age household head – years	43.50	42.43	42.94	42.48	42.05	42.72	42.44	42.63
Education household head – years of education	5.51	5.70	5.51*	5.71*	5.58	5.70	5.61	5.71
Ethnic minority	22.66%	24.42%	24.58%	24.13%	24.13%	24.24%	0.22*	0.25*
Agriculture activities in origin – Household head	57.91%	57.95%	60.24%	57.45%	55.62%	58.66%		
Household size	4.69***	5.22***	4.81***	5.24***	4.78***	5.28***	5.05**	5.22**
Dependency ratio	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.34
Percentage abandoned lands	0.21**	0.27**	0.20***	0.28***	0.21***	0.28***	0.23***	0.28***
Access to informal credits in origin	9.68%	11.93%	11.30%	11.74%	11.72%	11.65%		
Housing ownership in origin	56.63%***	69.46%***	60.1%***	69.62%***	60.44%***	70.21%***		
Consumption per equivalent adult in origin	1,783,071	1,750,907	1,741,174	1,757,699	1,710,904	1,768,123	1,952,135	1,646,977
Membership in organization – Reception	30.22%	31.18%	32.05%	30.85%	30.94%	31.10%	0.31	0.31
Leadership in organization – Reception	3.24%**	6.17%**	6.51%	5.67%	6.26%	5.68%	6.83%	5.26%
At least one member mentally ill or physically challenged	7.91%	9.40%	7.23%	9.65%	7.18%**	9.84%**	8.66%	9.53%
Personal contacts in reception municipality	67.74%	70.63%	69.47%	70.46%	69.78%	70.44%		
Days of settlement in reception municipality	1242.72*	1359.38*	1272.73	1361.20	1232.05***	1380.08***	1312.98	1363.15
Reactive displacement	79.57%***	87.14%***	82.69%**	87%**	83.88%*	86.95%*		
Massive displacement	3.23%**	6.87%**	2.4%***	7.31%***	2.56%***	7.61%***	3.16%***	8.22%***

Source: Author's calculations based on ENDH-2004

*Significant at 10%

** Significant at 5%

*** Significant at 1%

Table 6 shows the estimation results for the probability of being informed about SUR, the probability of declaring, the probability of being registered in SUR, and the probability of being beneficiary of government programs. Results of estimations confirm some of the conclusions derived from the descriptive statistics. A larger probability of being informed is associated with vulnerability of the household, economic status in the municipality of origin, and some characteristics of the migration process. Larger households, female headed due to displacement or, those with older household heads, though at a decreasing rate, are more likely to be informed about SUR. Vulnerable households may be more active searching government assistance precisely to mitigate the impact of displacement.

The probability of being informed is greater for households that were better off in the municipality of origin. Housing ownership increases the probability of being informed about SUR. Two reasons may explain this result. First, asset and welfare losses are larger for previously better off households; as a consequence, incentives to access government assistance are high, either to recover assets or their original welfare levels. Second, better off households have larger stocks of information and channels to acquire information regarding government programs for IDPs.

Estimations of the probability to declare confirm the results described above, yet new determinants emerge. Other variables characterizing vulnerability of the household and economic status at the origin become significant. Larger households, female headed due to displacement and families with older household heads continue to be significant. The likelihood to declare is also greater when the household head was previously dedicated to agricultural activities, or when a member is mentally ill or physically challenged; confirming therefore the necessity of vulnerable households to seek for government aid.

As before, economic status in the municipality of origin is a strong determinant of the probability to declare. The probability to declare is larger for housing owners, families that abandoned a larger proportion of their lands, and those who had access to informal credits in origin. Once more, the incentive to recover lost or abandoned assets, like land and housing, pushes household to declare. On the other, access to informal credits may represent access to informal risk-sharing mechanisms, which may be instrumental to support displaced households and postpone the need to apply for government aid.

Reactive displacement and massive migration have a positive impact over the probability to declare. The positive impact of massive migration is expected given the provisions contained in the legislation. Given the costs that imply losing anonymity as a consequence of registration, the sign of the coefficient estimate for reactive displacement seems counter intuitive. However, reactive displacement usually obliges households to migrate hastily; thereby, assets loss and welfare losses may be large, increasing vulnerability of the household.

By comparing the estimation results for the probability to declare and the probability of being registered, we can identify whether deliberate targeting from government entities during registration is occurring. Since declaring is voluntary and depends entirely on household decisions, results for the probability of declaring allow us to identify which behavioral patterns lead households to declare. Once households decide to declare, government officials screen each declaration and decide whether the household should be registered in SUR. During this process, government officials may assign registration based on targeting criteria. Results from the probability of being registered identifies whether different determinants from the probability to declare emerge. When new determinants emerge, purposive targeting from government officials may be taking place during the registration process.

The estimation results for the probability of being registered suggest government offices are not targeting registration in SUR towards particular groups of the displaced population. The significant variables for the probability of declaring, which emerge as a result of households' behavior, are significant also during the registration stage: vulnerable households, families with higher economic status in origin, and some characteristics of the migration increase the probability of being registered. This suggests the registration process depends more on the decision-making process of the displaced population than on institutional decisions.

The probability of being a beneficiary of government programs shows a different picture since some variables previously insignificant now are significant determinants. Female headed households, age of the household head, the percentage of abandoned lands and massive displacement continue to be significant variables; indicating that behavioral processes are still important to access government programs. On the other hand, membership in community organizations in the reception municipality is now significant, but its impact is negative. By receiving support from other organizations, households with dense social networks may fare better.

Table 6. Probit estimates for the probability of being informed about SUR, declaring, be registered and being a beneficiary of government programs


Variable ^a	Probit			
	Coefficient (t-statistic)			
	Being informed	Declare	Being registered	Being beneficiary of government aid
Male Household head	0.0666 -0.72	0.1163 -1.45	0.1380* -1.82	0.1422** -2.18
Female household head due to displacement	0.2694* -1.81	0.4165*** -3.13	0.3733*** -3.08	0.3187*** -2.88
Households still in contact with members living elsewhere	0.7955* -1.68	0.6340* -1.68	0.4133 -1.36	0.2946 -1.1
Age household head – years	0.0352** -2.13	0.0271* -1.81	0.0234* -1.64	0.0418*** -3.18
Age household head squared – years	-0.0004** (-2.51)	-0.0003** (-1.98)	-0.0002 (-1.6)	-0.0004*** (-3.19)
Education household head – years	0.0088 -0.47	0.0076 -0.46	0.0085 -0.56	0.0022 -0.15
Ethnic minority	-0.1347 (-1.24)	-0.1052 (-1.09)	-0.1373 (-1.53)	0.0669 -0.83
Agricultural activities in origin – Household head	-0.0412 (-0.49)	-0.1285* (-1.73)	-0.0257 (-0.37)	
Household size	0.0404** -2.09	0.0364** -2.1	0.0541*** -3.27	0.0138 -0.94
Dependency ratio	0.239 -1.4	0.2199 -1.44	0.0576 -0.4	0.1646 -1.24
Percentage abandoned lands	0.093 -0.98	0.1792** -2.17	0.1504** -1.95	0.1411** -2.07
Access to informal credits in origin	-0.0592 (-0.45)	-0.1758* (-1.61)	-0.2681*** (-2.62)	
Housing ownership in origin	0.2192*** -2.6	0.1688** -2.25	0.0955 -1.35	
Consumption per equivalent adult in origin	0 -0.33	0 -0.33	0 -0.35	0 (-1.19)
Leadership in organization – Reception	0.2783 -1.45	-0.1699 (-1.22)	-0.1578 (-1.19)	-0.2114* (-1.64)
At least one member mentally ill or physically challenged	0.1523 -1.1	0.2241* -1.82	0.2276** -1.99	0.0998 -1
Contacts in reception municipality	0.1289 -1.58	0.0668 -0.92	0.0374 -0.55	
Days of settlement in reception municipality	0 -0.05	0 (-0.03)	0 -0.23	0 -0.34
Reactive displacement	0.2631*** -2.61	0.2030** -2.16	0.1470* -1.65	
Massive displacement	0.1725 -0.87	0.6240*** -3.43	0.5795*** -3.52	0.5874*** -4.13
Constant	-0.7829 (-1.79)	-1.0325*** (-2.62)	-1.3102*** (-3.50)	-1.620*** (-4.76)
Number of observations	2257	2280	2310	2309
R squared	0.1482	0.1197	0.1342	0.1197

Source: Author's calculations based on ENDH-2004
a Departmental controls. *Significant at 10%, **
Significant at 5% , *** Significant at 1%

Figure 3 illustrates the marginal effects for the discrete variables statistically significant for the probability to declare and being registered. This graph examines the magnitude of the coefficients for variables influencing the decision to declare and the final stage, and how the magnitude of the coefficients varies from declaring to being registered. Female household heads due to displacement and massive displacement exhibit the largest coefficient estimates for both stages, implying a higher impact during the registration process. Furthermore, the coefficient estimate for massive displacement has the strongest effect both when deciding to declare and in the registration process; suggesting that an active policy of the government in the registration process is instrumental to extend the coverage of SUR and to access to government aid.

By comparing the marginal effects of coefficient estimates in both stages, we find some targeting to vulnerable households seems to be taking place. The marginal effects for variables characterizing vulnerable households become stronger during the registration process whereas the marginal effects for economic status in the municipality of origin weaken. Figure 3 shows how the marginal effects for female household heads, members with an illness and massive displacement rise during the registration process.

Figure 3. Marginal Effects: probability of declaring and being registered in SUR




Source: Author's calculations based on EDHD-2004

Figure 4 and Figure 5 confirms this finding. The marginal effect of household size, a clear indicator of vulnerability, is steeper for the probability of being registered in contrast to the probability to declare (Figure 4). On the other hand, the marginal effect of the percentage of abandoned land weakens in each stage; the difference


between the marginal effect on the probability to declare and the probability of receiving government aid is around 20 percent (Figure 5).

Figure 4. Effects of household size on the probability to declare and being registered in SUR



Source: Author's calculations based on EDHD-2004

Figure 5. Effect of the percentage of abandoned lands on the probability to declare, being registered in SUR and having access to aid



Source: Author's calculations based on EDHD-2004

Conclusions from analyzing the registration process in SUR are diverse and identify adjustments to carry out in the assistance policy for IDPs. On the one hand, the coverage indexes for the registration process, despite not covering the total displaced population, are reasonable since near eight percent of households voluntarily decide not

to declare and, seven percent are denied access. However, during the last stage of the process important flaws surface as just over 56 percent of displaced household effectively receive aid. Moreover, aid is concentrated in social services typically provided by the government, like education and health, whereas programs specially designed for IDPs are indeed weak.

Econometric estimations reveal that vulnerability of the household, a higher economic status in the municipality of origin, and characteristics of the migration process increases the likelihood of being registered in SUR and receiving government aid. While the decision-making process of households appears to be instrumental during the registration process, institutional decisions play a lesser role. Thus, purposive targeting to particular groups of the displaced population is minor and seems to be concentrated towards vulnerable households.

4. CONCLUSIONS

During internal conflicts, identification of victims, like displaced population, is necessary to direct protection, humanitarian and reparation programs correctly. When countries are confronting low intensity conflicts, identifying the victims of displaced population is a complicated task because migration often occurs individually and not massively as in high intensity conflicts. In Colombia, where displacement affects near 4.4 percent of the population, a demand-driven approach to identify the victims of displacement was adopted.

Results of the paper show that adopting a demand-driven approach implies limiting the coverage of government programs to the displaced population. More than 30 percent of displaced households in Colombia are not registered in SUR and therefore are not beneficiaries of programs specially designed to mitigate the impacts of forced migration. Near 22 percent of households are not registered due to involuntary reasons, like not being informed about SUR or being denied access, whereas voluntary decisions explain the remaining eight percent.

Because households need to approach government offices and declare in order to be registered in SUR, registration in SUR is determined to a greater extent by households' decision to declare. We find that vulnerability of the household, a higher economic status before displacement, and some characteristics of the displacement process determine the decision to declare. Incentives to declare for vulnerable households are clear cut: vulnerable households require government aid with greater urgency. For

better-off households before displacement, the incentives to recuperate lost assets and to recover their previous welfare levels increase the likelihood of declaring.

The determinants of the decision to declare and being registered are similar. Nevertheless, the influence of the variables reflecting vulnerability becomes stronger in the probability of being registered whereas the effect of the variables for economic status in origin weakens. These results suggest some indiscernible targeting towards vulnerable households may be taking place.

Based on the results described above, a relevant question to ask is whether demand-driven approaches are a good alternative to identify victims of forced displacement. Countries confronting low intensity conflicts like Colombia, where the displaced population may become invisible due to individual migration, have little options. The costs of supply-driven approaches in which government officials search displacement victims actively are prohibitive. Moreover, although SUR presents some failures, coverage reaches 70 percent of the population and only 22 percent were involuntary excluded. By implementing some adjustments, the coverage of SUR may expand to become almost universal.

However, demand-driven approaches have limitations as some groups are excluded and other misinformed groups decide not to declare. First, the system is excluding uninformed individuals, yet the dissemination process seems fairly random. Massive diffusion campaigns providing a detailed description regarding SUR, the benefits of registering, and the process to register may reduce a significant percentage of under registration. These campaigns can be complemented with personalized campaigns channelling information through organizations traditionally working with vulnerable groups. Second, the registration process produces a smaller group, little more than seven percent, who declare but are not registered. A gap between declaration and registration should exist as some households may pose as displaced population to receive the benefits of programs for the displaced population. To minimize the risk of wrongly denying registration to real displaced households, identification mechanisms should be attuned and government officials should be properly trained. Third, other groups of displaced population voluntarily decide not to declare mainly as a consequence of misinformation. Massive and personalized information campaigns may also contribute to promote registration in SUR.

Lastly, once households are registered in SUR, the benefits of registration are ripped only by a small percentage of households. Although all household registered in SUR are

entitled to special benefits, only half are beneficiaries of government programs and a smaller portion receive the complete package. Thus, the main flaws of the system emerge during this last stage of the process. Moreover, the process is not effective to provide aid in a timely manner. If declaration in SUR is going to be promoted, the effectiveness of providing aid should be improved otherwise the benefits of registration are indeed low.

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